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1. Executive Summary 
  
This report was commissioned as a study into the strategic use of patents. In the course of its case 
investigations and legislative reviews the European Commission became aware  of changes in the 
use of intellectual property,  in particular the use of patents. It was noted that firms’ uses of 
intellectual property ar e becoming increasingly strategic. This raised concerns about the 
implications of firms’  patenting behaviour for enterprise and competition policy. The following 
report contains a comprehensive  review of patenting behaviour, the extent to which patenting i s 
becoming more strategic and the implications this has for c ompetition and enterprise policies .  
 
A surge in patent applications,  “a patenting explosion”, has been observed at the European Patent 
Office (E.P.O.) as well as at the patent office for the Uni ted States of America (U.S.P.T.O)  and 
other patent offices world wide. Firms’ patenting behaviour has changed in  several industrial 
sectors. Most of these sectors draw on complex technologies. This means that final products 
embody a combination of a large number of patented technological advances. Most often a single 
firm does not possess all patents relevant to a final  product. Strategic behaviour by rival firms 
supplying the same final product markets ensues:  patent portfolios may need to be licensed , patents 
may be used to block rivals use of technology or to extract concessions.   Strategic uses of patent 
portfolios are a new phenomenon  flowing from the increased complexity of modern technology. 
Previously small patent portfolios could be used to protect an entire technology.  Mobile telephony 
provides an example for the recent trend: the technical standards on which this technology is based 
contain hundreds of patents . These patents are owned by many different firms .  Ongoing 
competition cases in this indu stry demonstrate the potential for strategic behaviour.  
 
This study has two principal aims : first, to survey the existing economic literature on patenting so 
as to provide a grounded assessment of whether any kind of strategic use of patents is damaging to  
welfare and next, to provide an empirical survey of patenting trends in Europe which identifie s 
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patenting trends in different industrial sectors. Building on this analysis the report identifies which 
kinds of patenting and which sectors are m ost likely to require intervention using  enterprise- or 
competition policy.  
 
The report contains four principal sections . These are the description of th e institutional setting 
(Section 2), a literature review (S ection 3), an empirical investigation of patenting at th e European 
Patent Office (E.P.O.) (Section 4) and a validation of the empirical  findings based on two case 
studies (Section 5). Furthermore Section 6 contains policy conclusions derived on the basis of this 
work. 
 
· Section 2 provides a discussion of interna tional patent agreements such as the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) as well as an overview over the patent systems of Europe, the 
United States and Japan. Furthermore this section c ontains a comparison of these patent 
systems.  
 
· Section 3 contains a revie w of the theoretical literature on patent system design and of the 
literature on patent thickets and the patent explosion. Based on this review the section 
develops a theoretically grounded, analytical definition of the “strategic use of the patent 
system”.  
 
· Section 4 contains an in depth descriptive analysis of patenting trends at the E.P.O. based 
on data from the PATSTAT and EPASYS databases. These are described  in the Appendix 
(Section 6).  
 
· Section 5 contains additional analysis based on the PATVAL sur vey of patenting firms as 
well as a closer analysis of a specific industry.  
 
· Finally Section 6 of the report contains policy conclusions. These are directed at Enterprise - 
and Competition Policy as well as the reform of the European Patent System as a who le.  
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The very extensive literature review in Section 3 has led to a definition of strategic use of the 
patent system focusing on patenting strategies that are leading to the  “explosion” of patent 
applications which we observe in recent years. This patenti ng explosion has led to a fundamental 
revue of the functioning of the United States Patent system, which is documented in  F.T.C. (2003). 
This development is also putting measurable strain on the way European patent systems, and the 
European Patent Office (EPO) in particular, operate. 1  
 
Drawing on the literature review in Section 3 this report sets out a definition of strategic use of the 
patent system as a form of patenting be haviour that may be anticompetitive. We define strategic 
use of patents narrowly :  
 
Strategic use of the patent system arises whenever firms leverage  complementarities between 
patents to attain a strategic advantage over technological rivals  .This is anticompetitive if the main 
aim and effect of strategic use of the patent system is to d ecrease the efficiency of rival  firms’ 
production.   
 
The definition is intended to help identify sectors and contexts in which enterprise or competition 
policy may be employed to counteract strategic patenting behaviour. The definition contains three 
requirements:   
i)     patents filed in a technology are complements ;  
ii)    firms are building up portfolios of complementary patents;  
iii)   patent portfolios are  increasingly  employed to raise rival firms’ costs  of production.  
If all three conditions are met then there is an increased likelihood of anticompetitive  use of patent 
portfolios.  
If a firm can demonstrate that the patents in its portfolio protect technology it is using, then the 
third condition is not met. If strategic patenting behaviour mainly affects rival firms’ R&D 
incentives then the third condition is a lso not met. Such cases fall within the remit of innovation 
policy and patent law.  
 
                                                   
1 Compare the current discussion about the aims and means of operation of the E.P.O. of which E.P.O. (2007)  provides 
a glimpse. 
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The definition of strategic use of the patent system  identifies complex technologies in which 
patents are complements as a precondition for strategic use of the patent syst em. Patents are 
complements if the value of holding them jointly exceeds the sum of their individual values to 
different firms. In other words: patents are complements if they are more valuable when held in 
one patent portfolio. If a technology is complex the patents based on it are complements. 
Therefore, the definition excludes patenting activities in technologies that do not require a firm to 
own or license a portfolio of patents in order to use the technology , often referred to as discrete 
technologies. 
 
The definition distinguishes between different aims of strategic use of the patent system in a 
complex technology: those that are anticompetitive and those that are n ot. The mere act of building 
a patent portfolio cannot be considered anticompetitive . This is also true of some discrete 
technologies in which firms have resorted to patenting very heavily. The use of  a patent portfolio 
to exclude rival firms will usually just be the legitimate use of the exclusion right that defines a 
patent. However, firms can systematically employ patent portfolios and the procedures of the 
patent system to raise the production costs of their competitors. This is behaviour which we 
identify as damaging to welfare.  Empirically we identify such behaviour by studying the way in 
which firms use the patent system itself. Typically , anticompetitive uses of a paten t portfolio will 
be observable in the way which firms patent and seek to affect their rivals’ patenting activities.  
 
The definition of strategic use of the patent syste m does not cover all possible forms of 
anticompetitive activity which is connected to  patents. In particular, anticompetitive use of  the 
exclusion rights emanating from single  patents is not covered. Such behaviour cannot be 
empirically identified by surve ying patenting trends. Therefore, in this report w e have sought to 
develop a coherent methodological approach  for empirical work that focuses on strategic uses of 
entire patent portfolios. The  methodology is focused on a clearly defined set of firm strateg ies. 
Implementing it we are  able to deliver results on some very pressing issues.   
 
Our review of the literature has shown that a per se test identifying anticompetitive behaviour in 
the patent system is not within reach at present. Neither the theoretica l nor the empirical basis for 
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such a test is currently given in economics . Furthermore there is no unified view on the basis for 
such a test amongst legal scholars either.  
 
This leads us to a pragmatic approach to the problem of identifying possible antic ompetitive 
conduct within the patent system. This consists of a descriptive analysis of firms patenting 
behaviour which is informed by existing theoretical work on patenting.  
 
Section 4 of the report provides a structured analysis of a set of indicators t hat jointly provide 
information regarding the amount of patenting, the quality of patents, strategic behaviour of 
patenting firms and the interactions between patenting firms in opposition. These indicators are 
constructed for a set of 30 technology areas and for the period between 1980 and 2002. Altogether 
these indicators provide a very comprehensive review of patenting trends at the E.P.O..  
 
To support the empirical analysis of patent indicators Section 5 provides in depth analysis of 
patenting behaviou r in Europe based on the PATVAL survey of patenting firms. This survey 
contains information which allows us to infer how important different motivations for the use of 
patents are in different industries. The survey supports the main findings from the anal ysis of 
patenting behaviour at the EPO.  
 
 
There are four general empirical findings from these two empirical sections:  
 
i. The volume of patent applications and the length of patents ha ve increased substantially. 
This development is concentrated in specific t echnology areas.  Strategic uses of patents 
are likely to be concentrated within these sectors.  
ii. The complexity of firms’ patent applications has increased noticeably in specific 
technology areas. Some of this may be due to attempts by firms to render the ex act 
coverage of patent applications opaque, which can confer strategic benefits.  
iii. Various measures associated with the quality of patents show that patent quality is 
declining overall at the E. P.O.. This means that it is becoming less onerous to obtain 
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patents there. These findings are in accordance with much circumstantial evidence which 
we also cite below.  
iv.  There are three distinct patenting strategies which we can associate with the patenting 
behaviour of firms we investigate. Two of these strategies ind uce firms to build up large 
patent portfolios, but the uses of these portfolios differ  by strategy. 
 
These developments jointly imply that firms are obtaining more questionable patents than in the 
past. We argue that this development has social costs that affect both product market competition 
and innovation incentives.  
 
We briefly describe the  three patenting strategies we observe in the data using the indicators we 
analyze. Firms’ patenting behavior is the result of several factors: R & D efforts, strate gic 
considerations and the competitive environment. These factors are likely to differ across firms. It is 
therefore difficult to identify distinct patenting strategies clearly. Nonetheless, we describe very 
broadly three different strategies which we beli eve can be considered as candidates for  such 
strategies (see Table A). While these are  closely linked to the empirical analysi s of patenting 
behavior on the level of tech nological areas and individual firms the strategies will  not fit every 
firm subsumed under the strategies. 
 
Based on the results from Section 4 , we distinguish between strategies focusing on (i) “Portfolio 
Maximization”, (i) “Portfolio Optimization” and (iii) “Protection of specific IP”.  
 
A strategy which describes  larger firms active in te chnological areas like Information Technology, 
Telecommunications  and Electrical Engineering  is the attempt to maximize the coverage  of the 
patent portfolio by increasing the number  and breadth of patent applications. Often patents owned 
by different companies in these areas are relevant for the establishment of technological standards 
or interfaces. The strategy of “ Portfolio Maximization ” aims at improving a firm’s situation in 
cross-licensing negotiations. It is well documented that in the technology areas mentioned above 
(which can be classified as complex technolog ies) cross-licensing agreements focus  on granting 
access to a set of related technologies protected by a large number of different patents. 
Negotiations in these settings focus on a  general comparison of the size  of the relevant patent 
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portfolios which protect the set of relevant technologies. Then licensing fees are  determined 
relative to the size differences of the portfolios owned by t he involved parties . Therefore, firms 
have a strong incen tive to increase the number of patent applications while simultaneously putting 
less emphasis on the technological content and the legal validity of individua l patents. This is 
reflected in a comparatively  high fraction of marginal patents in patent  portfolios. Moreover, as 
individual patents are rarely  subject of licensing negotiations  and firms are highly dependent on 
cooperation, firms pursuing a “Portfolio Maximization” strategy rarely use legal means of 
challenging individual patents as the benefit fr om invalidating single patents is low.  
 
A second prototypica l strategy could by termed “Portfolio Optimization”. This patenting strategy is 
prevalent predominantly in areas like Macromolecular Chemistry  and Polymers, Organic Fine 
Chemistry , Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics  or Agriculture and Food . This strategy also consists of 
increasing applications substantially. However here it is combined with  frequent use of legal means 
like opposition proceedin gs to invalidate rivals’  patents. In the technology areas mentioned above 
(which could broadly be classified as discrete technologies) independent technologies or 
technological solutions can be assumed to be more important than in complex technologies. 
Therefore, firms have a stronger incentive to achieve strong l egal protection of those separate 
technologies. This is achieved by building strong protection provided by a number o f closely 
related patents related to a single technical problem . This translates into a relatively high share of 
patents with shared priorities. The benefit from invalidatin g competitors’ patents is  higher in 
discrete areas. This leads to a comparably frequent usage of legal means like opposition 
proceedings.  There is evidence that smaller firms face higher hurdles in these technology areas.  
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Table A 
      Patenting Strategies 
   Portfolio Maximization   Portfolio Optimization   Protection of specific IP  
        
Description 
 
Firms try to increase the size of 
their patent portfolio by filing 
large numbers of patent s. The 
share of marginal patents is 
comparably high while opposition/ 
litigious activities tend to be low.  
 Firms consequently build patent 
portfolios by constantly filing 
patents. IP protection is actively 
pursued by frequent opposition 
against competitors' patents. 
 Patenting behavior oriented 
on specific R&D output with 
less emphasis of strategic 
patent portfolio management. 
Share of marginal patents is 
comparably low. 




Technology, Electrical Device s 
 Macromolecular Chemistry/ 
Polymers, Organic Fine 
Chemistry, Pharmaceuticals/ 
Cosmetics, Agriculture Food  
 Most remaining technology 
areas  
        
Examples of firms  
 
Broadcom, Infineon, Quallcom, 
NTT Docomo 
 L’Oreal, Beiersdorf, Schering, 
Henkel 
 n.a. 
        
Indicator Section      
        
Volume* of applications  
4.2.1  
& 4.2.3 very high  high   average 
Use of  opposition proceedings  
4.2.4  
& 4.5.2 below average  above average   average 
Use of blocking patents  5.1 infrequent  frequent  average 
Share of critical references per 
claim 4.3.2 average  high  average 
Use of divisional patent 
applications 4.3.3 
frequent filing of divisional 
applications  
frequent filing of divisional 
applications  
infrequent filing of divisional 
applications 
Applications with shared 
priorities 4.3.3 average  above average   average 
  
 * Volume is applications multiplied by claims. 
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Portfolio Maximization  and Portfolio Optimization  differ chiefly in their occurrence in complex 
and discrete technology areas. This also  explains the differing importance of opposition in these 
two strategies. In some technology areas such as Biotechnology the two strategies exist side by side 
as this technology builds on chemistry but increasingly shows signs of becoming a complex 
technology in which many different research tools covered by individual patents interact in the 
production of a single product.  
 
A third prototypical patenting strategy that can be termed “Protection of specific IP”  comprises the 
traditional use of patents.  This patenting strategy is followed by firms that do not need to build up 
patent portfolios for strategic reasons. Therefore, many of the indicators with which we identify 
strategic use of patents will not provide any clear patterns. In such cases p atent protection is sought 
in order to protect future income streams from the underlying invention. Similarly, competitors 
patents are challenged primarily if they pose a direct threat to the own R & D goals or to products 
sold by the firm.  
 
The synthesis of the the oretical literature and our empirical research indicates that competition 
policy concerns are most likely to arise in those technology areas that fall under “Portfolio 
Maximization”. Here the technology is complex, which implies that patents are complement s and 
that licensing is very important. Firms will be in a position to hold up rivals and will interact 
strategically through the patent system to a greater extent than in other technology areas.  
 
In Section 6 we discuss a number of policy measures that c ould be taken in response to the findings 
contained in the report. We recognize  that the most suitable response to the trends we have 
identified relies on measures to change the way patenting is governed in Europe . As this report was 
specifically intended to cover also implications for policy areas connected to patenting, we 
investigate thoroughly the implications for enterprise and competitio n policy measures that derive 
from our work. 
 
We find that there is scope for the following types of policy measures : 
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Enterprise policies  that support small and medium sized enterprises (SME’s) which a re likely to 
be disadvantaged in the race for large patent portfolios. Such policies focus both on the 
development of own patent portfolios and more importantly on suppor t for the costs of defending 
against patent litigation and hold -up.  In particular we suggest the following policy measures 
should be further evaluated:  
· Direct support to smaller companies which seek to patent but face high costs of doing so 
due to their small size. Such support should allow small companies to overcome the higher 
average costs of patenting which they face relative to larger firms.  
· Indirect support to smaller companies which allows them to protect themselves against the 
threats of patent lit igation by rivals holding disproportionately larger patent portfolios. The 
measures we propose here are intended to support firms which are harassed by litigation 
based on poor quality patents. This includes maintaining a centralised register of patent 
litigation, providing patent litigation insurance and strengthening incentives for patent 
review at an early stage, through patent opposition and third party review processes.  
 
Competition policy measures   
Competition policy must take  account of the very different roles that patents play in the context of 
different technologies. In particular competition policy should recognize that patent protection does 
not have the same incentive effects for each kind of technology. In complex technologies firms 
often derive R&D incentives from lead time advantages or from customer relationships. In this 
context patenting  is mainly a defensive activity, employed to prevent hold up or strengthen a 
bargaining position. This has several important implications for the practice o f competition policy 
in the context of a complex technology:  
· Competition policy should  adopt a sectoral stance when evaluating questionable behaviour 
involving patents. In some sectors the invalidation of the exclusion right inherent in a 
patent may undermine R&D incentives while in others it may even strengthen them.   
· Competition policy authorities should be able to reduce the scope of individual exclusion 
rights if this does not affect R&D incentives.  
· Licensing practices will have important effects for  firms’ R&D incentives. This is 
particularly true in the context of complex technologies in wh ich patent thickets arise. 
Patent thickets can only be unravelled with the help of licensing contracts. Economic 
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research highlights the complex effects for competit ion and R&D incentives that derive 
from different licensing practices. More research into and scrutiny of such practices is 
warranted in the context of complex technologies.   
 
Patent system reform .  
We outline a series of measures that would reduce the inc entives for firms to build up large  patent 
portfolios, where those contain largely spurious patents covering very marginal technological 
improvements. These measures would lower the costs that present patenting behaviour is imposing 
on society.  
 
In particular we propose that: 
· A series of measures which stem the tide of low quality patents be discussed and 
implemented at a European level. These include measures to realign the incentives of patent 
examiners and patent applicants.  
· The governance of key insti tutions such as the EPO be reviewed in order to provide better 
institutional incentives for high quality in the patent system.  
· Third party review mechanisms which reduce the likelihood of low quality patents being 
issued be introduced.  
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2. Description of the Institutional Setting 
 
This section of the report is dedicated to a brief description of the institutional international and 
national settings in some of the world’s most important patent systems. We start by outlining the 
history of harmonization of nati onal patent systems through international treaties and agreements, 
giving particular attention to the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the TRIPS agreement. The 
subsequent sections then describe the institutional framework for patent application, examination, 
grant, opposition (where applicable) and litigation in the three largest patent systems and 
organizations: the European Patent Office, the US Patent Office and the Japanese Patent Office. 
We finally provide a short comparison, focusing on the most importan t differences between these 
patent offices.  
 
2.1 International treaties and harmonization  
 
A patent is the right to exclude others from making, selling, offering for sale, or importing the 
patent holder’s invention; this right is granted in return for publicat ion of the invention. Patents 
have been used as an institution to encourage inventive activity as early as in the 14th century in 
Venice. For the purposes of this study, we focus on attempts of international harmonization starting 
with the Paris Convention  of 1883.2 
 
 
2.1.1 The Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property  
 
The oldest treaty related to patents is the Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual 
Property (1883). Before 1883, supranational arrangements in the field of intellec tual property 
rights did not exist in Europe. Neither the premises nor the consequences of the different 
jurisdictions were recognized in other countries. It was due to growing international 
industrialization that a need for international validity of intel lectual property rights was articulated 
                                                   
2  For a short review of the historical development of patents as an institution, see Harhoff (2005).  
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at the end of the 19th century. As a consequence, in 1883 eleven countries 3 agreed to treat foreign 
patent holders like domestic patent owners; and that patent priorities could from that time onward 
be claimed internationally. The Treaty was revised at subsequent consultations and diplomatic 
conferences in Brussels on December 14, 1900, in Washington, D.C. on June 2, 1911, in The 
Hague, on November 6, 1925, in London, on June 2, 1934, in Lisbon, on October 31, 1958, and in 
Stockholm, on July 14, 1967 The Convention was amended on September 28, 1979. The 
Convention now has 170 contracting member countries . 
 
The Paris Convention established - among other aspects - the patent priority system still in use in 
almost all national patent offices worldwide. If an applicant files a patent in a state that is a 
member to the Paris Convention, the applicant can within one year (the priority year) file patent 
applications based on this priority filing in other countries, claiming th e original filing date as the 
so-called priority date, i.e., as the effective filing date of the subsequent applications. Only 
inventions that were filed before the priority date will then be considered prior art to the filed 
application. The priority year  gives applicant considerable option value – they may decide into 
which countries they want to carry their applications within the priority year. The relatively costly 
decision to file for patent protection into other national patent offices can be underta ken after 
relevant information has been taken into account. Under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT, see 
section 2.1.2) this time period can be extended to 30 months. A second advantage of using the 
priority year fully is that the statutory term of patent  protection is typically determined from the 
actual filing date (not from the priority date). The duration of protection in a foreign jurisdiction is 
therefore shifted by one year into the future.  
Historically, the Paris Convention was a milestone in the g lobalization of commerce and trade. 
Besides establishing the priority system, it also establishes that foreign applicants are given the 
same rights as national applicants in any of the Paris Convention member countries.  
 
                                                   
3  After a diplomatic conference in Paris  in 1880, the Convention was signed in 1883 by 11 countries: Belgium, 
Brazil, France, Guatemala, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Salvador, Serbia, Spain and Switzerland. 
. 
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2.1.2 The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT ) 
 
Negotiations on the PCT were concluded in 1970. The treaty was amended in 1970 and again 
modified in 1984. The PCT i s open to states which are also party to the Paris Convention. 
Documents of ratification or of accession to the PCT must be deposited wit h the Director General 
of WIPO, the World Intellectual Property Organization.  
 
The PCT allows patent applicants to see protection for an invention in a large number of countries 
by filing an “international application.” The filing can be made  with the national patent office of 
the contracting State of which the applicant is a national or resident . Alternatively, it may be made  
with the International Bureau of WIPO in Geneva. If the applicant is a national or resident of a 
contracting State which is party to  the European Patent Convention, the Harare Protocol on Patents 
and Industrial Designs (Harare Protocol) or the Eurasian Patent Convention, the international 
application may also be filed with the European Patent Office (EPO), the African Regional 
Industrial Property Organization (ARIPO) or the Eurasian Patent Office (EAPO), respectively.  
 
Strictly speaking, a PCT filing is not a patent application, but grants the filing party the option to 
launch patent applications in up to 115 (as of April 1, 2002) PCT s ignatory countries within 30 
months of the filing date (which becomes the priority date). Any patent application already filed 
can be turned into a PCT filing within the priority year. PCT filings are advantageous for 
applicants for several reasons. First,  they allow the expansion of patent protection to a large 
number of countries without incurring the full costs and complexity of national application paths. 
Second, applicants will receive an international search report within a relatively short time perio d, 
informing them about prior art that may be relevant for the own application's likelihood of being 
granted. Third, the PCT filing, when compared to a national or regional application has a greater 
option value, since it allows applicants to delay decisio ns about the countries for which they want 
to designate the application for up to 30 months after the priority date. Costly decisions can thus be 
deferred for 30 months (and not just for the duration of the priority year, as with national and 
regional applications).  
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PCT filings can also receive a preliminary international examination which is authoritative, but not 
binding for the national or regional offices finally granting the patent. Applicants have to file the 
demand for the international examination  within 4 months after the publication of the search 
report. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) also claims that “(...) any patents 
subsequently granted by the national or regional Offices on the international application can be 
relied on by the applicant to a greater extent than would have been the case without the benefit of 
the international search report and the international preliminary examination report' implying a 
greater legal certainty for PCT applications than for other applicati ons.” Finally, PCT applications 
are not subject to particular cost rules, e.g., claims fees as they exist at the EPO and the USPTO.  
 
Details on the PCT are available in the PCT Applicant’s Guide and in the PCT Newsletter, both 
published by WIPO.4 Due to flexibility and low costs, PCT filings have become extremely popular. 
In 1979, 2,625 international applications were filed with the International Bureau. In 2003, the 
number had risen to 110,065. Figure 2.1 summarizes the timeline for PCT filings.  
 
Figure 2.1:  Timeline for PCT filings (Source:  Harhoff and Wagner (2005) ) 
                                                   
4 See http://www.wipo. int/pct/guide/en/index.html  and http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/newslett/index.htm , respectively. 
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2.1.3 The European Patent Convention (EPC)  
 
After the initial enactment of the Paris Convention and subsequent revisions,  no further need for 
legal harmonization was f elt until the end of the Second W orld War. The efforts of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) towards trade liberalisation and the establishment of a common 
market in Europe led to the Patent Convention of Strasbourg in 1963. The significance of this 
treaty lies in the alignment of term s of material patent law, such as novelty or inventive step.  
 
It was followed by the rectification of the Patent Convention of Strasbourg in 1963,  and the 
conclusion of the European Patent Convention  in Munich in 1973. We focus here on the second 
convention, as the Strasbourg Convention led to the EPC and the establishment of a European 
patent organization. This alignment of material right terms in the different national legislation was 
a necessary step towards the conclusion of the European Patent Conventi on (EPC) in 1973. The 
EPC is nowadays the most important source of common European patent law. As a special 
agreement referring to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1883  it 
regulates the filing and granting process of common  European patents. It covers both, formal and 
material aspects of patent law. EPC member states  acknowledge with their accession to the treaty  
that centrally examined and granted European patents are given the same validity as nationally 
granted patents. The EPC also stipulates  that granted European patents can be centrally attacked 
via opposition, i.e., in a procedure comparable to a " first-instance challenge suit" in the United 
States. In opposition proceedings (see section 2.2.3 for details), any third p arty may challenge the 
granting decision of the EPO. As a consequence, the opposition may be rejected or the challenged 
(opposed) patent may be revoked or amended (i.e., narrowed).  
 
While the PCT facilitates the organization of patent filing and prior art search from the applicant’s 
perspective, it still leaves examination and grant to the national offices. The European Patent 
Convention goes considerably further by giving applicants access to a harmonized filing and 
examination process. An applicant files a single European Patent Application and indicates the 
designated countries in Europe in which he wants to achieve patent protection. The examination 
decision of the EPO is then accepted by all EPC member nations. We provide more details on the 
EPC below in our discussion of the EPO as the patent office executing the convention.  
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2.1.4 The TRIPS (Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement  
 
The TRIPS Agreement is Annex  1C of the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and was signed by its signatory states  in Marrakech, Morocco on 
15 April 1994.5 TRIPS defines minimum standards for most forms of intellectual property (IP) 
protection for all member countries of the WTO. It was negotiated at the end of the  Uruguay 
Round of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) treaty. Leaving aside the specific 
regulations for IPRs such as copyright, geographical indications, industrial designs, integrated 
circuit designs, patents, plant varieties, trademarks, trade dress, t rade secrets and others, TRIPS 
also details minimum standards of enforcement procedures, remedies and dispute resolution 
procedures. While the obligations under TRIPS apply to all member states, developing countries 
have been given an extended time frame f or compliance. The originally agreed upon transition 
period for developing countries expired in 2005. The transition period for  the least developed 
countries was extended to 2016. Some observers expect that it might be extended even further. 6 
 
TRIPS has proven highly controversial in particular w.r.t. the implementation of IPR minimum 
standards in developing countries, some of which had not granted patent protection in important 
technical fields such as pharmaceuticals (see Reichmann 2000). For patents in developed countries, 
the significance of TRIPS lies in the fact that  according to TRIPS, p atents must be granted in all 
"fields of technology," although exceptions for certain public interests are allowed (Art. 27.2 and 
27.3). This stipulation has played so me role in the European debates on patent protection for 
“computer-implemented inventions”.  
 
 
2.2 The European Patent System7 
 
This section reviews the institutional setup of patent application, search for prior art, examination, 
grant, oppositions and appeals at the European Patent Office (EPO).  
                                                   
5 See http://www.wto.org/e nglish/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm  .  
6 See Reichmann (2000) for a detailed assessment of TRIPS.   
7 This section uses passage s from Harhoff and Wagner (2005)  , Harhoff (2005)  ,  Hall and Harhoff (2004)  and from 




Patent protection for European member states can be obtained b y filing several national 
applications at the respective national patent offices or by filing one EPO patent application at the 
European Patent Office. The Convention on the Grant of European Patents, enacted in 1973 and 
typically referred to as the Europe an Patent Convention (EPC), is the legal foundation for the 
establishment of the EPO. 8 The EPO provides a supra -national application and granting procedure 
to its applicants. Patents granted by the EPO attain the same legal status as patents granted by the  
various national offices in the EPC signatory countries. EPO patent grants are issued for inventions 
that are novel, mark an inventive step, are commercially applicable, and are not excluded from 
patentability for other reasons. 9  
 
The EPO application des ignates the EPC member states for which patent protection is requested. 
On average, the cost of a European patent amounts to about 29,800 EURO, roughly three times as 
much as a typical national application. 10 As a rule of thumb, if patent protection is soug ht for more 
than three designated states, the application for a European patent is less expensive than 
independent applications in several jurisdictions. This cost advantage has made the European filing 
path particularly attractive for applicants whose pro fits depend on selling goods and services in 
more than one European market. Figure 2.2 summarizes the development of applications and 
grants between 1978 (when the first European applications were accepted by the EPO) and 2004. 
The first patent was granted  by the EPO in 1980.  11 
                                                   
8 The full text of the convention is available at http://www3.european -patent-office.org /dwld/epc/epc_2000.pdf . While 
the EPC constitutes the legal foundation for the EPO and its patent examination activities, the actual process of 
examination in practice is detail ed in the Guidelines for Patent Examination in the European  Patent Office. See the 
EPO (2003). Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office. http://www.european-patent-
office.org/legal/gui_lines/pdf_2003/index.html  (Download on Nov. 1st, 2004). The Guidelines give a detailed account 
of the search for prior art (Part B), the substantive examination (Part C) and opposition (Part D).  
9 See Article 52 EPC.  
10 As in other patent systems, the official patent office fees are a relatively small part of the costs. For a patent that 
issues in eight EPC countries and lapses after 10 years, the office fees are 4,300 €. Professional representation before 
the EPO amounts  to 5,500€ on average, while translation into the languages of eight contracting states requires 
11,500€. National renewal fees (to be paid from year 5 to year 10) amount to roughly 8,500€. See “Cost of an average 
European patent as at 1.7.99“, http://www.european -patent-office.org/epo/new/kosten_e.pdf  (Jan. 14, 2004).   
11 Example: 48,074 applications with priority year 1987 were filed at the EPO. By April 2006, 30,676 applications 
from this cohort had been granted. Only PCT applications which actually entered the regional phase at the EPO are 
treated as applications here. Since designating the EPO as a target patent office under the PCT is virtually costless to 
applicants, treating all  PCT applications as actual EPO applications introduces serious misconceptions. Note that 




The determination whether an invention for which patent protection is applied for is patentable 
subject matter consists of a search for prior art followed by an examination of the invention with 
regard to the criteria of  patentability. A first starting point for a discussion of search procedures at 
the European Patent Office can be found in the examination guidelines published by the EPO 12. 
The Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office  became effective on 1 June 1978 
and have been updated regularly since then. Following a general section, the guidelines are divided 
into five sections comprising among others, guidelines for formalities examination, guidelines for 
search, and guidelines for substantive examinat ion. Formalities examination involves checking 
formal requirements, e.g., the completeness of the application documents.  















Figure 2.2:  EPO patent applications  and grants by priority year - 1977 to 2004 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Therefore, there are considerable time lags – for the application cohort of 2004, the full statistics was available by the 
end of 2006. However, the EPASYS data we use only cover the time period to April 2006.  The drop in grants in 1999 
priority year applications is not an artifact but reflects the reduc ed granting activities in 2000/01.  
12 See http://www.european -patent-office.org/legal/gui_lines/pdf_2003/gui_03_full_e.pdf .  
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The search process seeks to identify patent and non -patent documents constituting the relevant 
prior art to be taken into account in determining whether the underlying invention is new and 
involves an inventive step. The objective of the substantive examination, finally, is to decide 
whether the invention meets the requirements for patentability: novelty, inventive step, and 
commercial applicability. Especially important for citation analysis is the search section of the 
Guidelines because European citation analysis use references to patent and non -patent literature 
derived from the EPO’s search report. In order to enable appropriate use and interpretation of 
citation data, the European search and citation procedure underlying the EP search reports is 
described in the following paragraphs.13 Figure 2.3 contains a simplified representation of the 
process of examination at the EPO.14 
 
 
Figure 2.3:  Simplified representation of the process of patent examination at the EPO 
(Source: Harhoff and Wagner (2005) ) 
 
In this section, we describe the search process in great detai l for two reasons. First, this process lies 
at the heart of relating one patent to prior art. Deficiencies in the search process will limit the 
quality of subsequent steps and may ultimately lead to strong litigation activity. Second, since we 
                                                   
13  The following description of th e European Search Procedure is largely based on the Guidelines for Examination in 
the European Patent Office  (EPO, 2003).  
14  The timing of examination processes for the JPO and USPTO is explained in section 2.3 and 2.4.  
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will use citation data frequently in the course of this project on strategic patenting, it is tantamount 
to study how these indicators come about and from which data they are derived.  
 
Overall responsibility for the search lies with the Directorate General for Search ing, located in The 
Hague. European searches are carried out by the Search Divisions of the EPO but may also take 
place in the national patent offices of certain contracting states 15. The search should be directed to 
the most important characteristics of th e invention and is, therefore, conducted on the basis of the 
claims. The patent claims describe the scope of protection for which patent protection is 
designated. According to the guidelines, the examiner should carry out the search focusing 
primarily on novelty. At the same time he should pay attention to any document that may be 
important for the inventive step requirement as well as for other reasons, such as conflicting 
applications or documents facilitating the understanding of the underlying invention . The prior art 
search should be continued until the probability of discovering further relevant documents is very 
low in relation to the effort needed – a decision which is made by the examiner during the course 
of patent examination. The search may also be terminated when documents have been discovered 
which doubtlessly demonstrate a violation of novelty of the claimed invention. We note in passing 
that the prospective value (private or social) of an invention is not taken into account in 
determining the search effort. 
 
After completion of the search, the examiner has to select the documents to be cited in the search 
report. The report should only include the most important documents. In case the search results in 
several documents of equal relevance, the search report should normally contain no more than one 
of them. The decision, on which one to use for citation, is made according to the expert knowledge 
of the examiner. In case of two documents, which are of equal relevance, one document published 
                                                   
15 National patent offices are entrus ted, e.g., in case searches in documents in languages other than the official 
languages of the EPO are required. The Protocol on Centralisation  as of 5 October 1973 (section IV(2)(a)) states “If 
the Administrative Council considers that it is compatible wi th the proper functioning of the European Patent Office … 
it may entrust searching in respect of European patent applications to the central industrial property offices of those 
States in which the official language is one of the official languages of the European Patent Office, provided that these 
offices possess the necessary qualifications for appointment as an International Searching Authority in accordance with 
the conditions laid down in the Patent Cooperation Treaty “, see: http://www.european -patent-
office.org/legal/epc/e/ma3.html#CEN . The EPO also conducts searches for national offices. The share of national 
searches in 2003 amounted to 11% of the total searches (158,631 ), see: http://annual-report.european-patent-
office.org/2003/_pdf/epo_anrep03.pdf . Information generated in these searches is not considered here, with the 
exception of the EPO acting as an International Search Authority  (ISA) within the PCT/WIPO system.  
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before the date of priority and the other published between priority date and filing date, the search 
examiner should choose the earlier one. Michel and Bettels (2001) state that “(...) according to the 
EPO philosophy a good search report contains all the technical relevant information within a 
minimum number of  citations.” Frequently, the relevant information is obtained f rom one to two 
documents ( Michel and Bettels (2001), 189). Citing no more than what is absolutely necessary can 
lead to an understatement of certain documents. Additionally, the examiner is obliged to favour 
early documents over later ones.  
 
One major advantage of the EPO citation data over the USPTO citation data is the assignment of 
references to certain categories. All documents cited are identified by a particular letter in the first 
column of the search report representing the cited catego ry (combinations are possible) bearing the 
following meaning: 
 
X particularly relevant documents when taken alone (a claimed invention cannot be considered novel or cannot be considered to involve an inventive step)  
Y particularly relevant if combined wit h another document of the same category  
A documents defining the general state of the art  
O documents referring to non -written disclosure 
P intermediate documents (documents published between the date of filing and the priority date) 
T 
documents relating to theory or principle underlying the invention (documents 
which were published after the filing date and are not in conflict with the 
application, but were cited for a better understanding of the invention)  
E potentially conflicting patent documents, published on or after the filing date of the underlying invention  
D document already cited in the application  
L document cited for other reasons (e.g., a document which may throw doubt on a priority claim) 
 
Table 2.1:  Classification of references creat ed during the examination of an application at 




X-type references are the most important ones as to patentability of an invention. In case an 
application contains an X clas sified reference, this indicates that the claimed invention does not 
meet the requirements of novelty or of inventive step. In the search report, the search officer or 
examiner actually indicates to which claims of the application the prior art applies to in a critical 
way. Type A references merely provide technical background information. The frequency 
distribution of the most important reference types is summarized in Table 2.2.  
 





1978 38.5 0.0 16.7 44.8 6.0 
1979 21.2 0.0 7.6 71.1 3.7 
1980 13.4 0.0 6.1 80.5 1.8 
1981 19.3 1.0 6.6 73.1 3.1 
1982 36.3 8.2 9.3 46.2 4.7 
1983 58.3 15.0 12.7 14.0 8.1 
1984 52.9 13.4 12.0 21.6 7.3 
1985 54.3 13.9 12.6 19.2 7.5 
1986 53.0 13.8 12.8 20.5 7.4 
1987 53.5 14.0 13.1 19.4 7.6 
1988 55.3 13.7 13.6 17.4 8.3 
1989 57.0 14.3 14.3 14.3 8.4 
1990 59.5 14.6 15.2 10.7 8.6 
1991 60.0 14.8 15.7 9.4 8.2 
1992 63.4 16.1 17.7 2.8 8.0 
1993 63.2 16.3 18.7 1.7 7.8 
1994 62.8 16.0 20.0 1.2 8.9 
1995 62.0 15.7 21.4 0.9 8.8 
1996 61.0 15.7 22.5 0.9 8.7 
1997 60.0 15.6 23.4 1.0 8.6 
1998 58.7 14.9 25.3 1.1 8.2 
1999 56.9 15.0 27.1 1.1 7.9 
2000 53.9 15.3 29.6 1.1 7.5 
2001 51.1 15.7 31.9 1.3 7.0 
2002 49.8 15.3 33.6 1.4 6.8 
2003 47.7 16.9 34.4 1.0 6.5 
2004 46.1 16.9 36.2 0.9 6.7 
2005 47.4 13.7 37.9 1.0 7.2 
TOTAL 54.0 14.8 23.4 7.8 7.5 
Note: The shares of X, Y, A and other (uncoded) references sum to 100%. D -type 
references can occur together with A, X, Y or other (uncoded) references.  
 
Table 2.2:  Classification of EP patent references 1978-2005  
 (Source:  Webb, et al. (2005) )  
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In case an invention is protected in more than one country and, therefore, several documents exist 
belonging to the same patent family, the examiner should preferably cite the pate nt document in 
the language of the application. Paying regard to language convenience on the part of the examiner 
may lead researchers to overestimate the influence of the applicant’s home country. In this regard, 
Michel and Bettels (2001)  show that 90% of the total number of patent citations made by the E PO 
refer to EP, DE (German), GB (British), WO (PCT), or US patent documents. At the USPTO and 
the JPO, 90% or more of the references in the search reports refer to national documents. The EPO 
Search Division cites only documents to which it has access. Thi s procedure may also result in an 
understatement of the documents relevant to prior art. In particular, should relevant non -patent 
literature not be accessible in databases or arranged in the library of the EPO, it is likely to be 
missed in the search repo rt. 
 
The Search Division does not attempt to verify the claimed priority date, but takes the date of filing 
of the EP patent application as a reference date for the search. This approach is conservative, but it 
may lead to the inclusion of subject matter i n the search report that has emerged after the relevant 
priority date. In some exceptional cases, documents published after the filing date may be cited. 
Examples are a later document containing the principle of a theory underlying the invention, which 
is instrumental in better understanding the invention, or a later document showing that matters of 
the invention are incorrect. These documents could also be chosen for citation in the search report. 
Cited documents that were published after the filing or pri ority date may lead to negative citation 
lags16, depending on how lags are being computed. However, such documents are used to provide 
general information about the technical field. They are unlikely to contain “hostile” content that 
would threaten the nove lty or inventive step of the application under inspection.  
 
Documents cited by the applicant should be considered in the search report if they are decisive as 
to the state of the art, or when they are necessary for the understanding of the applicat ion. Citations 
which do not ful fil these requirements may be di sregarded. Verbeek, Zimmermann and Andries 
(2002) describe the difference between examiner and applicant citations as follows: Whereas t he 
examiner has to ensure the novelty of an invention, the inventor aims at identifying work “either 
                                                   
16 „Citation lag“ denotes the difference between the application dates of a patent referring to another patent. In general, 
patents referring to other patents are issu ed later and hence the difference is usually positive.  
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related to, but significantly different from, or else a useful step towards, the new invention or a use 
of the invention” ( Collins and Wyatt (1988)  cited according to Verbeek, Zimmermann and 
Andries (2002) ). “Examiner citations, as a result, usually complement, rather than duplicate, the 
citations given by the inventor” (  Verbeek, Zimmermann and Andries (2002) ). Nevertheless, both  
examiner and inventor could refer to the same publications.  
 
A survey of the uses of patent citations in econometric studies has been provid ed by Webb, et al. 
(2005). These authors also tabulate the classification of ref erence types by publication year which 
we replicate in Table 2.2. They also discuss special features of the EP citation data that should be 
taken into account before interpreting the data. In particular, a one -to-one transfer of the results 
stemming from s tudies which analyzed US citation data is not possible. The citations in a USPTO 
document are generated according to a different regulatory framework. The US system requires the 
patent applicants to cite all documents relevant for the examination  of their patent application. A 
consequence of this regulation is that (1) USPTO patents contain a higher number of references to 
previous patents than EPO patents (since this regulations induces applicants to cite any loosely 
related patent and not only relevant do cuments) and that (2) a large fraction of the references in a 
USPTO patent are made by the applicant while this is not true for EPO patents.  
  
Within six months after the announcement of the publication of the search report in the EP 
Bulletin, applicants can request the examination of their application. This request is a necessary 
prerequisite for the patent grant at the EPO. If examination is not requested, the patent application 
is deemed to be withdrawn. After receiving a possibly negative search report,  many applicants 
either withdraw the application explicitly or simply fail to request examination. After examination 
has been performed, the EPO presents an examination report. At this point, the EPO either informs 
the applicant that the patent will be gra nted as specified in the original application or requires the 
applicant to agree to changes in the application that are necessary to grant the patent. In the latter 
case, a kind of negotiation process in which applicant and examiner exchange written statem ents 
and suggestions may ensue. Once the applicant and EPO have agreed on the specification of the 
patent, the patent is granted by the EPO. The applicant has then the right to validate the patent in 
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each of the designated states where the patent is transl ated into the relevant national languages. 17 If 
the EPO declines to grant a patent, the applicant may file an appeal. 18 On average, the issue of a 
European patent takes about 4.2 years from the date of  filing the application ( Harhoff and Wagner 
(2005) ). However, applicants can file a costly request for accelerated examination of their 
application which reduces examination times by 18% on a verage ( Harhoff and Wagner (2005)  ). 
 
2.2.3 Opposition and appeal 19 
 
The European Patent Convention (EPC) is also the regulatory f ramework governing post grant 
validity challenges which can be filed within the European Patent Office. Part V of the EPC 
(Articles 99 to 105) provides the foundations for the opposition procedure; Part VI of the EPC 
(Articles 106 to 112) describes the app eal process.20 According to Art. 99, any third party may file 
an opposition against the patent grant within nine months after the grant of a patent by the EPO. 
The opposition may even be filed if the patent was never taken out in any of the designed EPC 
countries for which the EPO had granted it. The decision regarding the opposition has force in all 
designated EPC countries, and the opponent is involved in the proceedings as an inter partes  
participant – this provision makes the European opposition mechanis m quite attractive for any 
potential challenger. 21 Art. 100 lists the admissible reasons for an opposition: i) that the subject 
matter is not patentable, i.e., that the three criteria of novelty, inventive step, and commercial 
applicability are not met, ii)  that disclosure of the invention is not sufficient to enable somebody 
skilled in the art to perform the invention, iii) that the scope of the patent as granted exceeds the 
scope of the original patent application. Art. 101 describes the potential outcomes  of the opposition 
proceedings – the patent may be revoked according to Art. 101 (1), the opposition may be rejected 
                                                   
17 Validation is not automatic. Since naming an additional designated country in the EPO proceedings is relatively 
inexpensive, many applicants use the option to do so and decide about the regional scop e of protection once the patent 
has been granted by the EPO.  Validation of patents has not been studied analytically, Most deviations from the initially 
declared designation and the later validation occurs for smaller EPC countries.  
18 See Article 106 EPC. Any decisions made by the EPO receiving, examining, opposition sections and legal division 
can be appealed and the appeal has suspensive effect.  
19 Parts of this section of the paper are drawn from  Graham, et al. (2003).  
20 For more detai led comments, see Harhoff (2005) . Part VI of the EPC deals with appeals at the EPO in general, i.e., 
with appeals against the examiner’s decision to refuse a patent grant and any other decision, such as the ruling of the 
opposition boards.  
21 However, note that the opposition mechanism at the German Patent Office (where rulings are valid for Germany 
only) has been utilized about as frequently as the EPO opposition mechanism in the past. We note this because the 
National Academy Report appears to suggest that a national US post -grant mechanism would be used less frequently 
than the EPO mechanism. We do not think ther e is enough evidence to support that presumption.  
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following Art. 101 (2), or the patent may be amended, i.e. narrowed, according to Art. 101 (3). In 
the latter case, a modified patent grant  will be published by the EPO. The costs of opposition and 
appeal are born by each party following Art. 101 (4). However, Art. 101 (5) permits the opposition 
division to deviate from this cost allocation if it wishes to do so. Our interviews indicate that this is 
rarely the case so that typically, the costs of opposition are  born by each of the parties themselves.  
 
According to Art. 19 (2), the Opposition Division responsible for hearing the opposition case 
consists of three technical examiners, at least tw o of whom have not taken part in the examination. 
Moreover, the examiner may not be the chairman of the division. The opposition chamber may 
conduct oral proceedings, and it can be enlarged – if necessary – by a legally qualified examiner 
who has not taken  part in the proceedings for grant of the patent. A number of additional 
procedural details are described in the Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of 
European Patents  which accompanies the European Patent Convention. 22 It is important to note 
that the settlement options between the opponent and the patent -holder are seriously restricted once 
the opposition case has been filed. Rule 60 of the Implementing Regulation states that the EPO 
may pursue an opposition case of its own motion if e ither the patent has lapsed, if the opposition 
has been withdrawn by the opponent, or if the opponent has been legally incapacitated.  
 
Opposition is a frequently used mechanism in Europe. In Table 2.3, we document the frequency of 
opposition for all patent  grants occurring between 1980 and 2000. A total of 7.2% of all granted 
patents was opposed between 1980 and 2005, and roughly one third of these cases were then 
continued by an appeal. The median duration is about 1.9 years for opposition and 2.0 years fo r 
appeal cases. Getting to legal certainty for patents filed at the EPO is therefore a lengthy process – 
the median duration of examination is about 4 years, and for contested patents, another 4 years are 
needed to sort out the opposition and appeal cases. 23 Across technology areas, there is relatively 
little variation in opposition and appeal rates; moreover, the durations do not vary strongly, with 
the exception of cases involving chemistry patents for which the appeal stage takes 2.6 years at the 
median. 
 
                                                   
22 See http://www.european -patent-office.org/legal/epc/  for the text of the EPC and the implementation rules.  
23  It should be noted that a la rge part of the delay in the resolution of these cases is due to the applicants themselves 









1980 1495 153 10.23% 
1981 5569 567 10.18% 
1982 8381 782 9.33% 
1983 12718 1159 9.11% 
1984 15666 1408 8.99% 
1985 16573 1508 9.10% 
1986 19300 1715 8.89% 
1987 20054 1615 8.05% 
1988 22184 1748 7.88% 
1989 24649 1836 7.45% 
1990 26614 1900 7.14% 
1991 31454 2165 6.88% 
1992 32661 2006 6.14% 
1993 44181 2764 6.26% 
1994 44122 2585 5.86% 
1995 43948 2568 5.84% 
1996 42273 2500 5.91% 
1997 36098 2172 6.02% 
1998 39480 2270 5.75% 
1999 37078 1962 5.29% 
2000 22080 1231 5.58% 
2001 47396 2289 4.83% 
2002 66009 3194 4.84% 
2003 59610 2867 4.81% 
2004 60073 2831 4.71% 
2005 63933 775* 1.21%“ 
    
Total 843599 48570 5.76% 
 
Table 2.3:  Frequency of opposition for all patent grants  
between 1980 and 2005 (* truncated)  
 
The opposition and appeal mechanism would not be remarkable if it did not lead to major changes 
to the preceding examination decision. Roughly one third of the patents (34.7%) are revoked, and 
in roughly another third (32.7%) the patent i s maintained in amended form, i.e., its scope or 
breadth is narrowed in the opposition or appeals procedure. Only 27.4% of all cases lead to a clear 
rejection of the opposition. In 5.3% of all oppositions, the case is closed without yielding any of 
the three outcomes discussed so far. This result of the proceedings can be caused by a withdrawal 
of the opposition by the opponent, or it may be due to the patent -holder letting the patent lapse by 
not paying the renewal fees. Hence, this outcome may reflect som e cases that were successful from 
the attacker’s point of view (the patent lapsed into the public domain) while others represent 
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successes for the patent holder (the opposition was dropped). It may be also be the case that some 
informal agreements between opponent and patent-holder are captured by this classification. But 
note that this implicit settlement rate would be far from the settlement rate of about 90 percent in 
US patent litigation cases (  Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) ). 
 
Another major difference between EPO oppositions and US patent litig ation concerns the costs. 
While there are no official statistics that capture the cost information in a representative manner, 
interview data obtained in discussions with patent attorneys give a consistent picture. The cost per 
instance and per party is on  the order of 15,000€ to 25,000€. This is considerably less than the 
amount of $4 million which has to be paid for getting to a Markman Ruling 24 in US patent 
litigation. 
 
Another aspect of opposition that has been addressed in work by  Harhoff (2005) , Harhoff and 
Reitzig (2004), Graham, et al. (2003), and Hall, et al. (2003) concerns the selection of cases for  
opposition. The results can simply be summarized as follows:  
 
· particularly valuable patents are selected with higher likelihood than less valuable ones;  
· patents in fields with technical and market uncertainty are attacked more frequently than 
patents in more established fields;  
· patents with immediate market impact are more likely to be attacked;  
· patents of independent inventors are attacked less, not more frequently than corporate 
patent applicants.  
 
The first result confirms that opposition at the EPO has  a screening property – particularly valuable 
patents are more likely to be opposed than relatively low -value ones. If we assume that the 
                                                   
24  In 1996, the Supreme Court decided on the case of Markman v. Westview Inst ruments Inc. The effect of the 
Markman decision was to add  (in many cases)  a pretrial phase to litigation . In this phase the parties would discuss  the 
meanings of key terms and phrases found in patent claims. The “Markman Ruling” is now considered a  crucial step in 
patent infringement assessment, in which the judge determines the scope of the patent claims. Settlement decisions are 
often taken following the Markman Ruling. Hence the cost figures apply even to cases in which settlement solutions 
are pursued. 
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potential welfare losses (due to excessively broad patents) are particularly large in the case of 
privately valuable patents, this empirical result is very reassuring. The last result is particularly 
important given that the U.S. independent inventor lobby has voiced concerns that a post -grant 
mechanism may threaten financially weaker patent holders. For the EPO oppositio n mechanism, 
this is clearly not the case. So far, the results indicate that the EPO opposition mechanism can 
produce a large number of error corrections of earlier examination decisions. Given that an EPO 
examiner has considerably more time on average to examine a patent than his US counterpart, one 
would expect that a US post -grant challenge mechanism would yield similar or even more 
impressive results.  
 
2.2.4 Litigation and infringement  
 
While the EPO system provides a harmonized application and examinat ion procedure, the possible 
litigation and court proceedings applying to these patents have not been harmonized in Europe 
while such harmonization has occurred for trademarks. This has led to the peculiar situation that 
some patents (e.g., the famous Phili shave patent) have been granted by the EPO and were viewed 
very differently by the national courts which were asked to assess the validity of these patents. 
Currently, two proposals exist that would lead to harmonization (the EPLA proposal which allows 
for voluntary accession of EPC signatory states to a harmonized process, and the Luxembourg 
court proposal which was promoted by the Commission within its attempts to establish the 
Community Patent).  
 
Ideally, the existence of an opposition system that leads  to the revocation of a large number of 
patents should have considerable benefits if the revoked patents would lead to costly litigation in a 
patent system without a post -grant review. It is difficult to show this directly, since we do not have 
access to a suitable experiment. However, a comparison of the German and the U.S. system shows 
a remarkable difference ( Harhoff (2004)). The filing rate of invalidity cases for EPO -granted 
patents with Germany as the designated country is  only 0.3% of all patents. T he infringement filing 
rate has been estimated to be 0.9%. This compares quite favorably to the overall filing rate of 1.9% 
for the US which has been computed by Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) . This is a remarkable 
difference since there are a large number of factors that would bias the German estimate upwards. 
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For example, this calculation only concerns EPO -granted (relatively valuable) patents which are 
typically more valuable than German patents granted by the German Patent Office and are thus 
more likely to be attacked. Moreover, litigation in Germany is consid erably less expensive than in 
the U.S., and the cases are resolved more quickly – hence, the low German filing rates are all the 
more surprising. Suppose for a moment that only 20 percent of the patents revoked in opposition 
and appeal would lead to patent  infringement and litigation. In that case, the German litigation rate 
would increase by 0.52 percentage points (more than half of its current level).  
 
Please note that we have relegated the review of competition law, which is relevant to the 
functioning of the European patent system, to section 3.4.2, to avoid duplicating any material 
within this report. 
 




The U.S. patent system has three types of patents: utility, design, and plant. The majority of 
applications and issued patents are utility patents and the discussion below focuses on that type of 
patent.  The statutory requirements for patentability specify that “any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful  improvement thereof” may 
be patented. By itself, this definition does not create a subject matter restriction, although it has 
long been held that laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable 
subject matter. The patent statute  (35 US Code 101-103 and 112) thus requires novelty, 
nonobviousness, and utility for patentability. In addition, it requires that the invention be disclosed 
in sufficient detail to enable a person skilled in the art to make and use it.  
 
With certain rare exceptions (death or mental disability) only the inventor may apply for a patent 
on a given invention. The application for a patent is typically prepared by an attorney or patent 
agent who has registered with the USPTO and is composed of a series of claims  and supporting 
                                                   
25 Much of this material in this section comes from Appendix A of  Merrill, Levin and Myers (2004)  and the USPTO 
website http://www.uspto,gov . 
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documentation. A basic filing fee of $300 is payable on application; independent claims in excess 
of three are charged at $84 per claim and dependent claims in excess of 20 at $18 per claim. There 
is also a surcharge for application pages e xceeding 100. These fees are designed to discourage 
some isolated cases of thousands of claims on a single patent. In addition to filing fees, search and 
examination fees totalling $700 are also payable in the course of patent prosecution. All these fees 
are cut by half for small entities (any small business concern as defined by the Small Business 
Administration and any independent inventor or non-profit organization including universities).  
 
The application must be filed within 1 year of the invention’s public use or publication. Applicants 
may file a non-provisional or a provisional application. A non -provisional (ordinary) application 
includes: (1) A written document which comprises a specification (description and claims), and an 
oath or declaration; (2) A drawing in those cases in which a drawing is necessary; and (3) Filing, 
search, and examination fees. The provisional application was designed to provide a lower cost 
first patent filing in the United States and to give U.S. applicants parity with for eign applicants 
who operate under the first -to-file system. Claims and oath or declaration are NOT required for a 
provisional application. Provisional application provides the means to establish an early effective 
filing date in a patent application and pe rmits the term "Patent Pending" to be applied in 
connection with the invention. The applicant has one year to convert the provisional application 
into a non-provisional one.  
 
Publication of patent applications is required by the American Inventors Protect ion Act of 1999 for 
most plant and utility patent applications filed on or after November 29, 2000. On filing of a plant 
or utility application on or after November 29, 2000, an applicant may request that the application 
not be published, but only if the i nvention has not been and will not be the subject of an application 
filed in a foreign country that requires publication 18 months after filing (or earlier claimed priority 
date) or under the Patent Cooperation Treaty. Publication occurs after the expirati on of an 18-
month period following the earliest effective filing date or priority date claimed by an application.  
 
Allison and Lemley (2002)  document a substantial increase in the average complexity of patent 
applications over time. They compared random samples of patent issued in 1976 -78 and in 1996-
98 and found that patent prosecution time had increased, especially in pharmaceutical and 
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biotechnologies, with a greater use of continuation strategies (the addition of new material during 
the prosecution period). Patents issued in the late 1990s cited vastly more prior ar t (three times as 
many prior patents and ten times as many non -patent pieces of prior art) and there was a 50% 
increase in claims. They hypothesize that these changes have occurred because patents are 
increasingly valuable to businesses, who expect to use them in licensing negotiations or litigation 
and are therefore willing to spend more time and effort on obtaining them.  
 
One administrative process that is unique to the U.S. patent system is the interference system. An 
interference is a consequence of th e use of first-to-invent rather than first-to-file principle followed 
in the US patent system to establish priority for an invention . It is an adversarial administrative 
hearing held within the patent office in order to establish who has the right to the p atent. Because 
of this, both parties in such a dispute are well aware of each other’s invention and position prior to 
the award of the junior party’s patent, which can lead to collusion. However, in actual fact, fewer 
than 0.1 to 0.25 per cent of applicati ons result in interferences (  Mossinghoff (2002); Lemley and 
Chien (2003)). Calvert and Sofocleous (1992)  report that 80% of interferences in 1989 -1991 were 
settled prior to a final hearing, and that fewer then 4% r esulted in the junior party being granted 
priority. These figures suggest that the proceeding may be used in part by parties with closely 
related technologies to achieve some kind of non -competition agreement. One of the constants of 
recent patent reform e fforts in the United States has been the elimination of first -to-invent, and 
hence the elimination of interference proceedings, but this has been firmly opposed by the 
independent inventor lobby. The opposition is puzzling since - according to Mossinghoff (2002)- 
independent inventors are slightly more likely than others to be  disadvantaged by the first -to-invent 
system.  
 
2.3.2   Examination 
 
On submission, the patent application is classified by technology and assigned to an examiner in 
the relevant art unit (division) of the office. The examiner reviews the application for 
completeness, determines the scope of protection claimed, and carries out a search of prior issued 
patents and other published literature to determine the novelty of the invention, and also evaluates 
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the application to see if it satisfies the other statutor y requirements of a patent (nonobviousness, 
utility, and disclosure).  
 
The patent examiner is the arbiter of the patentability, novelty, usefulness, and nonobviousness 
requirements cited above, judging these standards against the “prior art,” i.e., prior inventions, in 
the field. Prosecution of the patent has been characterized as a “give -and-take affair,” with 
negotiation and renegotiation between the patentee and the examiner that ordinarily continues for 
2–3 years ( Merges, et al. (1997)). The costs of prosecuting a patent through the USPTO range 
from $5,000 to $100,000 (including the USPTO issue fee), depending on the nature of the 
technology.  
 
The USPTO website has this to say about patentability:  
 
“In order for an invention to be patentable it must be new as defined in the patent law, 
which provides that an invention cannot be patented if: “(a) the invention was known 
or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in 
this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent,” or 
“(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a 
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country more than one year prior to 
the application for patent in the United States . . .”  
 
…… In this connection it is immaterial when  the invention was made, or whether the 
printed publication or public use was by the inventor himself/herself or by someone 
else. If the inventor describes the invention in a printed publication or uses the 
invention publicly, or places it on sale, he/she must apply for a patent before one year 
has gone by, otherwise any right to a patent will be lost. The inventor must file on the 
date of public use or disclosure, however, in order to preserve patent rights in many 
foreign countries.  
 
Even if the subject m atter sought to be patented is not exactly shown by the prior art, 
and involves one or more differences over the most nearly similar thing already 
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known, a patent may still be refused if the differences would be obvious. The subject 
matter sought to be pat ented must be sufficiently different from what has been used or 
described before that it may be said to be nonobvious to a person having ordinary skill 
in the area of technology related to the invention. For example, the substitution of one 
colour for another, or changes in size, are ordinarily not patentable.”  
 
One of the more remarkable features of the U.S. patent system is that is essentially impossible for a 
patent examiner to reject a patent application because of the ability of the applicant to “conti nue” 
an application, that is, to file an amended application that has the benefit of the original priority 
date (Allison and Lemley (2002) ; Quillen and Webster (2001);Lemley and Moore (2004) ; Shapiro 
and Lemley (2005)). Although in some cases (largely in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
areas), continuations are a legitimate way to refine the claims in a patent in line with subsequent 
discoveries while still be able to ensure the original invention is patentable, this feature of the 
system is subject to a great deal of abuse. Commissioner Dudas (2005) reports that more than 
100,000 of the 355,000 patent applications filed in 2004 were continuations of applications that 
had been previously reviewed by an examiner; that is, the examiner was forced to repeat work 
which had already been done. The work of Cecil Quillen and co -authors has established that over 
85% of U.S. patent applications are granted, once continuations are taken in to account (  Quillen 
and Webster (2001)). 
 
Over the past ten years, the worst abuses of the U.S. continuation system have been eliminated, 
largely due to two statutory ch anges: first, the patent term is now 20 years from original filing date 
rather and 17 years from issue, which limits the ability of the patentee to shift the validity period of 
the patent via continuations. Second, the application is published 18 months af ter its submission 
unless the applicant chooses to forego patent protection outside the United States, so the practice of 
“submarining” (keeping a patent secret in the Patent Office for many years) is now limited. But 
many observers believe that continuati on practice is still creating problems for the system via delay 
and uncertainty, the wearing down of examiners, the tailoring of claims to cover potentially 
infringing products already on the market, and the practice of “evergreening.” “Evergreening” is an  
arcane practice in the pharmaceutical sector where multiple patents covering variations of the same 
invention are obtained using continuations. Although all such patents have the same priority date, 
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they are then listed separately at the FDA at different times, which effectively extends the period of 
protection from generics for much longer than the patent term. This loophole was closed by special 
legislation in 2003 (  Lemley and Moore (2004)  ) but it illustrates the potential of the system for 
strategic abuse. 
 
2.3.3 Opposition and re-examination26 
 
Once the patent has issued, there are only t wo ways for a third party to challenge its validity: the 
first is to request a re -examination by the USPTO, and the second is to counter sue for validity if 
sued or threatened with an infringement suit. Currently there is no adversarial opposition system i n 
the United States like those in Europe or Japan, although there is wide agreement among 
policymakers, patent attorneys, and others familiar with the system that such a system is needed ( 
Farrell and Merges (2004) ,  Hall, et al. (2003), Hall and Harhoff (2004) , Janis (1997), Levin and 
Levin (2002), Mossinghoff and Kuo (2002) , Wegner (2001)).  
 
Re-examination may occur any time during the life of a patent. There are two types of re -
examinations possible: ex parte, where there is no third party participation, and inter partes, in 
which participation is al lowed. Until November 2002, inter partes third party requestors were 
barred from appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals, and such third party requests were very 
infrequent.  
 
Re-examination, originally envisioned as an alternative to expensive and time -consuming 
litigation, was created by the 1980 Bayh -Dole Act. The legislative history of this act suggests that 
the re-examination was intended to be a mechanism that would be less expensive and less time -
consuming than litigation. During the legislative proces s, however, the act was purged of its 
intended adversarial characteristics, reducing the usefulness of the procedure for opponents of a 
given patent.  
 
                                                   
26 Parts of this section of the paper are drawn from  Hall, et al. (2003). 
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Procedurally, the re-examination proceeding permits the patent owner or any other party to notify 
the USPTO and request that the grounds on which the patent was originally issued be reconsidered 
by an examiner. Initiation of a re-examination requires that some previously undisclosed “new” 
and relevant piece of prior art be presented to the agency. Under the statute, a relevant disclosure 
must be printed in either a prior patent or prior publication —no other source can serve as grounds 
for the re-examination. 
 
After being initiated by notification and the payment of a fee to the USPTO, the re-examination 
goes forward only if the USPTO finds a “substantial new question of patentability.” Such a 
determination was intended by lawmakers to prevent the reopening of issues deemed settled in the 
original examination (  Merges (1997)). The USPTO must make this determination within 3 months 
of the request and, having made the determination, must notify the patent owner.  
 
When the owner is not the re-examination proponent (about  half the cases)27, the patentee is 
allowed to file a response to the newly discovered prior art within 2 months. If the owner chooses 
to respond, the requester is afforded an opportunity to reply within 2 months. By choosing not to 
respond, the owner can l imit the requester’s participation in the process. Thus the re-examination is 
an ex parte proceeding between the patent owner and the USPTO that provides limited 
opportunities for third-party involvement.  
 
The party requesting a re -examination is entitled  to notify the USPTO of the triggering “prior art,” 
to receive a copy of the patentee’s reply to the re-examination (if any), and to file a response to that 
reply. The owner’s role in the process is much more involved: The re-examination statute 
contemplates a second examination, with the same type of “give -and-take” negotiation between 
owner and patent office that occurs during the initial issuance of a patent. The examiner remains 
the final arbiter of the process, and it is not uncommon for the original e xaminer to be assigned the 
follow-up re-examination, thus putting the question of whether prior art was overlooked in the 
                                                   
27 The reason owners request re -exam is that often accused infringers turn up some pie ce of prior art that invalidates 
one or more claims. An easy way to fix this problem is to maki an ex parte request that the PTO re -exams the patent, 
submitting the prior art with the request. It will often result in a narrower patent, but leave it standin g. The advantages 
are twofold: if the owner requests the re -exam, no third party can participate without filing their own request (and 
losing the right to use the prior art at trial) and also these things take up to ten years, which can delay the litigatio n if 
the judge grants a stay.  
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hands of the same government official who was responsible for ensuring that no prior art was 
overlooked in the previous search.  
 
Once the re-examination goes forward, however, the statute requires that the Commissioner make a 
validity determination. The original patent is afforded no statutory presumption of validity in the 
proceeding, although the practice of assigning re-examinations to the original examiner may 
produce such a presumption. The re-examination cannot be abandoned or postponed to await the 
result of concurrent litigation proceedings, although it may be stayed during other USPTO 
proceedings, including reissue or interferenc es. A re-examination may result in the cancellation of 
all or some of the claims in a patent or the confirmation of all or some of the claims. Nothing in  
the re-examination procedure can expand the scope of the original patent’s claims, but claims may 
be amended or new claims added during the renegotiation between the patent owner and the 
examiner. 
 
In summary, for parties seeking to invalidate an issued patent, the re-examination procedure 
involves considerable costs and risks. The filing fee for the re-examination is substantial, and 
practitioners estimate the average costs of a re-examination at $10,000–$100,000 depending on the 
complexity of the matter. Although the costs of a re-examination are lower than those of litigation 
($1–5 million), the third -party challenger in re-examination is denied a meaningful role in the 
process, and the patentholder maintains communications with the examining officer, offering 
amendments or adding new claims during the re-examination. Re-examination may make it more 
difficult for challengers to prevail in patent -validity litigation, because juries tend to give added 
weight to re-examined patents. Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has 
indicated that claims confirmed by the re-examining officer present added barriers to a successful 
contest.  As a result, challengers face powerful incentives to forego re-examination in favour of 
litigation, a process that may well be more expensive, more time -consuming, and less expert in 




2.3.4   Litigation and infringement  
 
Valuable patents are generally enforced via infringement suits. If a firm believes that a patent is 
being infringed, it can sue the infringer for damages and/or injunctive relief. Any firm that is 
alleged to have infring ed, either via a specific letter of notification or by being a defendant in a 
suit, may sue the patent holder for declaratory relief, that is, for a judgment that the firm is not 
infringing a patent held by the defendant, or that the patent in question is not valid. Most patents 
are never litigated; the rate in recent years has been approximately 1 to 2 per cent of patents, and 
only 0.1 per cent ever go to trial (  Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) ) Empirical studies confirm 
that those patents that are litigated tend to be particularly valuable (  Allison, et al. (2004)).  
 
Such suits are filed in the f irst instance at one of the Federal District Courts and appeals go to the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which was established via 1982 legislation as the 
appellate court for all patent -related Federal cases. In turn, the decisions of this court  may be 
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Prior to 2005, the Supreme Court seldom agreed to take such 
cases, but recently they have accepted several high profile appeals.  
 
Many observers have pointed out that the creation of the specialized patent appea ls court in 1982 
(the CAFC) has led to stronger patents and a shift in case outcomes. Between 1953 and 1978, 
circuit courts affirmed 62% of district court decisions holding patents to be valid and infringed, and 
reversed 12% of the decisions holding patent s invalid or not infringed, whereas in the years 1982 -
1990, the CAFC affirmed 90% of the validity decision and reversed 28% of the invalidity decisions 
( National Research Council (2004) ).  
 
Trends in patent litigation are difficult to measure, partly because cases may be filed in a number 
of jurisdictions in the United States, and such cases are not always reported to the USPTO or other 
data collection agencies in a consistent manner. Figure 2.4 shows the total count of patent suits 
filed each year in the United States between 1984 and 1999, it was dra wn from the Derwent patent 
database by Lanjouw and Schankerm an (2004) ). The number of suits doubled during that period, 
roughly consistent with a doubling of patent grants during the same period. The flow of suits is 
approximately one per cent of the flow of patent grants. By the end of the period, this share has  
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risen very slightly to 1.1 per cent. Thus the “rate” of patent litigation in the United States rose very 
little prior to the year 2000, although some evidence suggests that it has risen more during the past 
five years.  
 
 
Figure 2.4:  Patent suits filed in the United States   
(Source: Lanjouw and Schankerman (200 4) ) 
 
There is no doubt that industry views patent litigation as an increasingly costly activity that 
functions in some cases as a tax on innovation. In addition, firms in a number of sectors 
increasingly report threats from “patent trolls,” which are ent ities that own patents related to their 
technologies but are not working them. The problem here is that a patent that might cover a small 
part of the technology involved in manufacturing a product is capable of threatening an injunction 
that shuts down the  entire product. Given this threat, many firms are willing to pay the troll to go 
away rather than fight it, even if the patent in question is of questionable validity (  Reitzig, Henkel 
and Heath (2006); Farrell and Shapiro (2005)  ). Unlike the situation where they plaintiff is also a 
producing firm in the sector, in this case owning a lar ge patent portfolio is no defenc e. An apparent 
increase in “hold-up” activity of this type has led to calls for reform of the standards for triple 
damages and for allowing courts to use discretion in issuing preliminary injunct ions in patent 
cases. Much of the legislation discussed in the next section contains these features.  
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2.3.5 The U. S. patent reform bill and its current prospects  
 
Weaknesses in the US patent system have received considerable attention over the last five ye ars. 
A report by the Federal Trade Commission (  F.T.C. (2003)) came to the devastating conclusion 
that patents have become major obstacles to innovation in some sectors  A major academic study on 
reform needs was produced by the National Academies of Science (  National Academy of Sciences 
(2004) ), recommending changes in examination and post -examination stages of the patenting 
process as well as in the patent litigation system. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (2003)  
developed a Strategic Plan  to deal with the challenges, and  American Intellectual Property Law 
Association (2004) came up with its own set of recommendations. Partly in response to the 
National Academy of Science and FTC reports as well as the position taken by the AIPLA, the US 
Congress has shown considerable interest in patent reform. Several hearings presided over by 
Senator Orrin Hatch have been held in the Senate and in June 2005, Representative Lamar Smith 
introduced a Patent Reform Bill (H.R. 2795) in the House and held a subcommi ttee hearing on 
June 9, 2005. Based on testimony and the input received from various stakeholders, Smith 
published a substitute bill and held hearings on it in September 2005. A summary list of hearings 
held is shown in Table 2.4 in order to document the t opics for which reform activity in the US  is 









Table  2.4:  Summary of Hearings on Patent Reform, 109 th U. S. Congress  
 
Date Committee Topic 
25 April 2005 Senate Judiciary, Subcommittee 
on IP 
The Patent System Today and 
Tomorrow 
7 June 2005 Senate Judiciary, Subcommittee 
on IP 
Patent Law Reform: Injunctions  and 
Damages 
9 June 2005 House Judiciary, Subcommittee 
on Courts, the Internet, and IP  
H.R. 2795, the “Patent Act of 2005”  
14 July 2005 Senate Judiciary, Subcommittee 
on IP 
Perspectives on Patents: 
Harmonization and Other Matters  
15 Sept. 2005 Senate Judiciary, Subcommittee 
on IP 
Amendment in the nature of a 
substitute to H.R. 2795, the “Patent 
Act of 2005” 
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A number of interested groups have thrown their support behind the principle of patent reform, 
although they do not necessarily agree on all the individual items in the proposed bill. These 
groups are the Association of Attorneys Specializing in the Practice of Intellectual P roperty Law 
(AIPLA), the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO), the IP Law section of the American 
Bar Association, the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), and the Business Software 
Alliance (BSA). A coalition formed by 37 large patent holding firms (9 chemical, 16 
pharmaceutical and 12  in a number of other sectors), the AIPLA, and the IPO has presented a 
reform package that is similar to but not identical to the substitute H.R. 2795 bill published by 
Smith in September.  
 
The original H. R. 2795 bill contained the following provisions:  
 
1. Changes the current “first to invent” standard to “first inventor to file” (§3). 28 This is an 
important step in achieving international harmonization and was accompanied by a rewrite of 
the prior art rules that has caused some controversy in the legal pro fession but is a necessary 
part of harmonization. Accompanying this change was the preservation of a one year grace 
period after publication, intended to benefit small inventors and university researchers. Also 
accompanying it was an extension of prior use r rights to all U.S. manufacturers of all 
inventions to protect those who use trade secrecy instead of the patent system. These changes 
are in the revised bills.  
2. Eliminates the subjective “best mode” requirement from §112 of the Patent Act, delineating 
objective criteria that an inventor must set forth in an application (§4). This change also 
represents a move toward harmonization. It remains in the revised bill.  
3. Imposes a duty of candour and good faith on parties to contested cases before the patent offic e, 
eliminating inequitable conduct as a defence of patent unenforceability (§5), unless at least one 
claim in the patent has already been found invalid.  
                                                   
28 In a “first inventor to file” system, the right to the grant of a patent for a given invention lies with the first person to 
file a patent application for protection of that invention, regardless of the date of actual invent ion. In a “first to invent” 
system, the right to the grant of a patent for a given invention lies with the first person to have discovered the 
invention. However, the first applicant to file has the prima facie right to the grant of a patent. Should a seco nd patent 
application be filed for the same invention, the second applicant can institute interference proceedings to determine 




4. Reduces the scope of wilful infringement by raising the standard of proof required, and limits 
the amount of damages a patent holder can collect from an infringer (§6). The substitute bill of 
Smith and the coalition reform package both change the wording but still try to limit the 
situations where treble damages can be assessed to cases where notice of infr ingement has 
clearly been given by the patent holder.  
5. Limits patentees' ability to obtain injunctions (§7). This has proved very controversial and has 
been removed from the substitute bill and coalition reform package.  
6. Authorizes the director of the paten t office to regulate continuation applications (§8). Again, 
this is controversial and has been removed.  
7. Establishes a new post -grant opposition system in the patent office (§9) with a 9 month 
window. A second window of 6 months at the time of litigation h as since been removed, but of 
course re-examination could still be requested. The substitute bills contain changes intended to 
increase the take up of inter partes re-examination.  
8. Allows members of the public to introduce new information to the patent off ice up to six 
months after the date of publication of the patent application to challenge the patent and to 
provide a final quality check (§10).  
 
As indicated above, in committee a number of these provisions have been dropped or weakened, 
largely due to opposition from the pharmaceutical and biotechnology sector, but also from a 
number of large chemical firms, 3M, General Electric and large companies in traditional 
technologies who are more or less satisfied with the current system. The provision that allow s the 
patent office to restrict continuations has been removed because of biotechnology industry 
opposition; this industry has been and continues to be a heavy user of continuations (  Graham and 
Mowery (2004)).  
 
In July of 2006, the Chair of the IP Subcommittee of the  U. S. Senate Judiciary Committee 
introduced a new bill (S.B. 3818) that included some of these provisions, such as first -to-file, post-
grant opposition (with a limited "second window" beyond an initial one -year challenge period), 
third party submissions o f prior art, prior user rights and limitations on inequitable conduct and 
wilfulness defences
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also includes a provision for apportionment of damages, repeals section 271(f) reg arding shipment 
of components outside the U.S., and adds a requirement for attorney fee shifting when the claim or 
defence was not substantially justified. The latter is intended to discourage frivolous patent suits. 
This bill appears to be a placeholder b ill, intended to be taken up after the next Congressional 
election.  
 
An interesting recent development on the continuation issue has come from the USPTO itself in 
the form of a set of proposed rule changes and request for comment in the Federal Register o f 
January 3, 2006. As was clear from the Dudas testimony  ( Dudas (2005)), continuations have 
become of major concern to the office because they take examiner time away from new 
applications, and often require reconsideration of material t hat has already been examined. 
Therefore they are proposing that all continuations (including continuations -in-part and 
divisionals) other than the first be accompanied by a “showing as to why the amendment, 
argument, or evidence presented could not have b een previously submitted.”  The deadline for 
comments on this rule change was in May. It is not immediately clear that the change will have the 
desired effect, since it appears to call for even more documentation to be submitted with each 
continuation; presumably they are hoping that the requirement will reduce the actual number of 
continuations by sending a clear message to potential applicants.  
 
The concerns of the computing sector lie in other areas. Apparently the BSA (representing Intel, 
Microsoft, and other big software producers) were strongly in favo ur of three “reforms” - a second 
window on opposition, no automatic injunctions where infringement is found, and that 
infringement damage calculations should be based on the contribution of the patented technology 
to the value of the product. They backed down on the first in the face of fierce pharmaceutical 
opposition. The second (and possibly the third) has been taken up by the Supreme Court when it 
granted certiorari in the eBay/Merc -Exchange case, although the outcome of that case is not yet 
known.   
 
What effect that will have on legislation in this coming session is unclear, and the opposing sides 
appear not to have reached agreement on the question of either injunctions or damages when the 
patented technology is a small piece of the product. For reasons that are not entirely obvious, the 
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pharmaceutical industry has been very opposed to changes in this area, whereas the computer 
hardware and software sectors are strongly in favo ur. Most observers (e.g ., see Mark Lemley’s 
testimony to the Senate subcommittee on June 7, 2005) would argue that the two sectors 
(pharmaceutical/biotechnology/medical devices on the one hand and information and 
communication technologies on the other) use the patent system in very different ways and face 
very different problems of enforcement and litigation, because of the nature of their products and 
the technologies they involve. Apparently the pharma sector is reluctant to change a system that 
they perceive is working to the ir benefit, especially in directions that might weaken it, even though 
some of the proposed changes would have little impact on those whose products are not based on 
complex technologies where a patent on a very small piece of the product can wield 
disproportionate power.  
 
With respect to injunctions, the concern of upstream research entities such as the Wisconsin 
Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) is easy to understand. The wording in the bill appears to 
require injury to the patent holder from absence of an injunction, which sounds like a patent 
“working” requirement. This requirement is likely to be difficult for universities and public 
research institutions to meet and they are therefore opposed to any change in this area. On the other 
hand, such a provision is clearly targeted to the damage done by so -called “patent trolls.” These are 
entities who are able to hold firms up for much larger sums than they would ordinarily receive in 
the form of licensing revenue because they have the capability to shut dow n an entire product line 
via injunction, even though their piece of the technology in the product might be very small.  
 
 
2.3.6 Competition policy and patent p olicy 
 
The interaction of competition (antitrust) policy and the use of patents is of considerable  concern 
around the world and the US is no exception (  O.E.C.D. (2005) ). This topic was the subject of  a 
set of hearings held by the Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice during 2003, which resulted in a report containing a series o f recommendations for change (  
F.T.C. (2003) ). The report also contained useful analysis of the relationship between the two that 
emphasized the importance that they work in tandem. A summary of the recommendations 
provided by the FTC follows. Note that most of them pertain to the operation of the patent system 
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rather than to competition policy per se, which suggests that problems in that area were of the 
greatest concern to participants in the hearings.  
 
The hearings found that questionable (low quality, invalid) patents caused harm both to 
competition and innovation because of a combination of the threat that they would be enforced via 
litigation together with the presumption of validity conferred on a granted patent. In industries with 
incremental innovation, such questionable patents were found to increase “d efensive patenting” in 
many cases and to complicate licensing negotiations. A desire to improve t he quality of patents led 
to a series of recommendations. The first was for the institution of post -grant review or opposition 
into the U. S. system. A second related recommendation was that l egislation be enacted to specify 
that challenges to the validity of a patent be determined based on a “p reponderance of the  
evidence,” rather than by “clear and convincing evidence.”  
 
In addition, the FTC recommended tightening the rules determining “obviousness” when allowing 
patents and increasing the resources avail able to the Patent Office. They also recommended 
considering possible harm to competition, along with other possible benefits and costs, before 
extending the scope of patentable subject matter. Because of the strategic use of patent 
continuations to expand claims during the patent prosecution process (sometimes in secret), they 
proposed legislation be enacted to create intervening or prior user rights in the case of added or 
expanded claims.  
 
A final set of recommendations was related to the interaction be tween agencies responsible for 
patent policy and competition policy. Rather than proposing a set of rules for competition policy 
based on patenting considerations, the FTC suggested that increased cooperation and 
communication between the two agencies woul d help to ensure that competition concerns were 
taken into account when policy within the patent agency was determined. That is, the FTC would 
pay more attention to filing Amicus briefs in the case of important patent litigation, and it would 








The origins of the Japanese patent system date back to the Meiji Era (1868 -1912) during which 
Japan started its modernization and rose to world power. In 1871, Japan proclaimed its first patent 
law, the “Provisional Regulations for Monopoly”. The patent law was abolished in the following 
year because people in Japan did not understand how to use the law. Since  it became apparent that 
a patent law was essential to increase economic power, a new law came into force in 1885, the 
“Patent Monopoly Act”, which was designed after the French and the U.S. patent law.  
 
The Patent Monopoly Act was replaced by the “Patent  Act” in 1888, which was patterned after the 
German Code of Civil Procedure. The latter was replaced by the “Patent Act” of 1899 after the 
accedence of Japan to the Paris Convention for the protection of Industrial Property. 29 The Patent 
Act was finally completely revised in 1909, in 1921 and 1959. Today, in Japan, patent rights are 
still protected by the Patent Act of 1959, which has been frequently amended since then ( J.P.O. 
(2006), Kotabe (1992)). In Article 1 Japanese Patent Law (JPPL), the major objective of the law is 
explicitly referred to as encouraging “inventions  by promoting their protection a nd utilization and 
thereby to contribute to the development of industry”.  
 
The Japanese Patent Office (JPO) is a Japanese governmental agency under the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). The Patent Office is headed by a commissioner who is 
appointed by the METI and is generally replaced every two to three years (  Kotler and Hamilton 
(1995) ). 
 
In 1993 and 1994, Japan signed a number of internat ional and bilateral agreements, which had a 
major impact on the Japanese patent system. The agreements were designed to encourage a 
harmonization of the Japanese patent system with U.S. and European patent standards. The 
Framework Agreement30 between the U.S. and Japan, e.g., led to the following changes: the 
                                                   
29  See http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html  (access on August 8, 2006).  
30 The “Mutual Understanding on Intellectual Property Rights between the Japanese Patent Office and the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office” was negotiated in 1993  and entered into force on January 20, 1994.  
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permission to file patent applications in Japan in English, the possibility to correct translation 
errors, a change of the opposition system, and an introduction of an accelerated patent examination 
procedure. In 1994, Japan signed the TRIPs (Trade Related Aspects concerning Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPR)) agreement, which aims at strengthening IPR in developing countries. To 
comply with the requirements of the TRIPs agreement, Japan had to make a nu mber of additional 
changes in its patent law, including limited discovery procedures in patent infringement cases and 
the adoption of a patent protection term of 20 years from the filing date ( Maskus and Mcdaniel 
(1998); Kotler and Hamilton (1995) ). 
 
The Japanese system is a first -to-file system (Article 39 Japanese Patent Law (JPPL)), w hich 




The Japanese examination procedure starts with a formality check. Before 1971, the formality 
check was automatically followed by an examination (  Hayashi (2005) ). After 1971, applications 
were examined only upon request of the applicant, which could be done within seven yea rs from 
application ( Goto and Motohashi (2006)). For applications filed after October 1, 2001, a three year 
period for requesting examination is applicable (Hayashi 2005). Otherwise the application is 
deemed to be withdrawn. During this time period of three years, no one else can claim a patent for 
the same invention and the applicant can file an opposition against another patent application based 
on the novelty requirement (  Wineberg (1988)). Within 18 months from filing, Japan requires 
public disclosure of all patent applications in the Japanese Patent Gazette. After 18 months have 
expired from the filing date the applicati on is published automatically (Article 64 (1) JPPL). In 
case, an earlier priority is claimed, the application is laid open 18 months after the earliest priority (  
Kotler and Hamilton (1995)  ). The European and the U.S. patent system also require public 
disclosure of patent applications. However, a special feature of the pr e-1995 Japanese patent 
system was that as long as a patent had not been granted, competitors were allowed to use 
published inventions within their own research and development processes without any sanction or 
the payment of royalties. In case a competitor  made a follow-up invention which built on the 
published technology, he was allowed to apply for a patent or a utility model claiming the 
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improvement. Afterwards, he could force the applicant of the original invention into a cross -license 
agreement ( Kotabe (1992) ). This particularity was abolished during the revisions in the Japanese 
Patent law in 1995. 
 
Following the bilateral U.S. -Japanese agreements in 1993 and 1994, by January 1, 1996, an 
accelerated examination procedure came into force, enabling applicants upon request to receive an 
assessment of the patentability of the invention withi n 36 months (at that time, a grant took more 
than six years; even more for pioneering technologies) (  Kotler and Hamilton (1995)  ).  
 
Prior to 1994, amendment of the application during examination was not allowed (“no new matter 
practice”). After 1994, amendment became possible under certain circumstances but was (and stil l 
is) limited to certain circumstances, e.g. incorrect translations, cancellation and restriction of 
claims, or clarification of an ambiguous description (Article 17bis JPPL).  In case the applicant is 
allowed to amend the application, he may also divide t he application in two or more applications, 
which are called “divisional applications”. Divisional applications are dated back to the application 
of the priority date of the original application (Article 44 (1), (2) JPPL). As soon as the applicant 
receives a copy of the examiner’s decision to grant the patent, amendments and divisional 
applications are no longer possible. Applications which have not been granted may be converted 
into a utility model within 5.5 years from application data. Utility models may  be converted into 
patents within 7 years from application date (  Schlagwein (2006) ). 
 
After a request for examination has been made the patent examiner checks whether the invention 
meets the requirements for patentability: (1) industrial applicability (Article 29 (1) JPPL), (2) 
novelty (Article 29 (1) JPPL), and (3) non -obviousness (Article 29 (2) JPPL).Invention s that meet 
the requirements for patentability are finally granted. 31  
 
A patent expires, at the latest, 20 years after application date. With approval of the TRIPs 
agreement in 1994, Japan (and the U.S.) has adopted the EU standard of a term of 20 years fr om 
                                                   
31 In case inventions have been made available to the public before filing a patent application, the JPO grants a limited 
grace period of six  months (Article 30 JPPL). The conditions under which the grace period is applicable are again 
extremely limited. For instance, disclosure is accepted only if the disclosure is made by the inventor or the applicant 
themselves. Third party disclosures, on t he contrary, are an absolute bar to patentability (  Kotler and Hamilton (1995)). 
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the first filing of the application. This 20 year protection can be increased by up to 5 more years for 
pharmaceutical patents. Figure 2.5 shows that foreign applicants abandon patents earlier than 
Japanese firms. Japanese government -related patents were maintained longest. This may arise due 
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Figure 2.5:  Patent life length by applicant type   
(Source: Goto and Motohashi (2006)  ) 
 
Figure 2.6 summarizes the patent application procedure at the Japanese Patent  Office. Overall, the 
yearly number of patent applications filed with the JPO remained almost stable during the 1900s. 
Between 1997 and 2000, Figure 2.7 exhibits an increase in the number of patent applications. The 
slight decrease in the number of applica tions in 1994 may at least in part arose due to the 
possibility to file a single application with multiple claims for inventions that previously had to be 
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Figure 2.6:  Patent grant procedur e in Japan as from 1996   
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Figure 2.7:  Patent applications, requests for examination and patent grants   
(Source: J.P.O. (2005), J.P.O. (2002) ) 
 
At the JPO only 50 percent of the applications are examined and only about 30 percent of the 
applications are finally granted. From 2000, the number of requests for examination remained 
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almost stable at 250,000. The sharp increase in 2004 (about 330,000 requests for exami nations) is 
due to the reduction of the period for requesting examination from seven to three years in 2001. In 
general, examination is requested intensively during the last year of the examination term. For 
patents filed in 2001 examination has to be requ ested in 2004 at the latest. These requests coincide 
with the examination requests for patents filed in 1997 (J.P.O. (2005)). 
 
Japan is generally known for an inflation of narrowly scoped patent applications. This patenting 
behaviour originates from a special legal regulation, the single -claim requirement. Before 1988, the 
JPO required patent applications to be li mited to a single (independent) claim. Since 1988, the JPO 
has allowed multiple (dependent) claim applications (Art. 37 JPPL) to reduce the workload of the 
examiners. Nevertheless, the JPO still favours narrow patent applications containing only a small 
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Figure 2.8:  Number of claims by technology (Source: Goto and Motohashi (2006)) 
 
 
Figure 2.8 provides the number of claims per patent in different technical areas. In the mid 1990s, 
the average number of claims per patent amounted to less than five rising considerably afterwards. 





Before 1994 the Japanese Patent system allowed for pre -grant opposition. In particular, it allowed 
third parties, once a patent was examined and again published in the Patent G azette, to oppose to 
the pending patent application by submitting reasons why it should not be granted. The period to 
file an opposition was three months. The average annual opposition rate amounted to 7 percent. 
Following the bilateral U.S. -Japanese Agreements in 1994, the U.S. and Japan agreed to revise the 
Japanese opposition system. Starting on January 1, 1996, the pre -grant opposition system was 
replaced by a post -grant opposition system. Additionally, multiple oppositions were consolidated 
and addressed in a single proceeding to minimize the time spent on opposition (  Kotler and 
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Figure 2.9:  Number of opposed patents and number of oppositions filed   
(Source: J.P.O. (2005)) 
 
Figure 2.9 gives an overview of the development of oppositions since the beginning of the post -
grant opposition system. Due to the requirement to publish patents in the Gazette and due to the 
opposition term of three months, the first oppositions were filed at the end of 1996 which explains 
the small number of oppositions in 1996. The backlog from 1996 in part explains the huge number 
of oppositions in 1997 and 1998. Additionally, the legal instrument may hav e enjoyed greater 
popularity during the first years.  
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2.4.4 Litigation and infringement  
 
After expiration of the opposition term, the only possibility remaining for third parties to attack the 
patent is to file an invalidity suit. A challenge to the patent’ s validity is not brought before the 
courts, but instead directly to the Japanese Patent Office. Patent infringement cases without 
consideration of the validity of a patent are brought before the courts. According to Article 196 
JPPL, patent infringement i s a crime and is subject either to imprisonment up to five years or to a 
fine not exceeding 150,000,000 yen (approx. 1,500,000 EUR). In 2005, Japan has established a 
court dedicated to intellectual property disputes, the IP High Court 32, modelled upon the U.S. 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals to speed up court proceedings and to reduce litigation costs. 
Currently, there is little empirical evidence how frequent these instruments are used.  
 
2.4.5 Relevant competition and enterprise policies  
 
Competition pol icy in Japan can only be understood against the background of some historical 
developments. Japan’s industrial organization before World War II was characterized by the 
presence of “zaibatsu”. Zaibatsu were family -controlled conglomerates organized around a holding 
company that came to significant power over a large number of financial and trading subsidiaries. 
Since antitrust regulations were absent in Japan before World War II, these conglomerates often 
dominated their respective markets. Additionally, ca rtels were legalized in 1925. In particular, the 
law allowed compulsory cartels under government supervision. In 1947 the Anti -Monopoly Act 
came into force, which was modelled on the basis of the U.S. antitrust statutes.  One aim of this 
law was to facilit ate free and fair competition. Especially, the Allies promoted the de -concentration 
and the de-monopolization of Japan, leading to dissolution of zaibatsu (Lin (2002)). The successors 
of zaibatsu were business groups called “keiretsu”. Keiretsu firms were linked through equity 
cross-ownerships and the exchange of personnel. The core of a keiretsu cons isted of a bank, which 
provided financial resources and a trading company that operated as an intermediary to enable 
transactions between member firms (  Porter and Sakakibara (2004)).  
 
                                                   
32  See http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/aboutus/history.html  (access on August 10, 2006).  
 58 
In the absence of antitrust regulations, these conglomerates acted as a barrier to entry into the 
Japanese market (Lawrence (1991)). The weak antitrust enforcement, legalized cartels, trade 
barriers, and barriers to foreign direct investment were considered as beneficial to Japan’s 
economic development since it served as a protection against external threats, i.e. market entry 
from foreign firms (Lawrence (1993), Porter and Sakakibara (2004) ). 
  
The deregulation of Japan’s firms started in the 1980s. In the mid 1990s entry restrictions were 
further reduced in the telecom, financial servi ce and electricity industries. The level of competition 
in the Japanese economy has further increased since then. Recently, a cooperation agreement 
between the European Community and Japan was signed including provisions on the cooperation 
on anti-competitive activities (the agreement entered into force on August 9, 2003). 33 Suzuki 
(2002) discusses the extent to which Japanese competition policy changed due to international 
pressure and reforms in the 1990s. He finds that “the scope of collective action has been reduced as 
a result of the economic internationalization” (p. 325). Nevertheless, th e remaining business -
government connection seems to have been strong enough to be an obstacle to competition in 
certain industries.  
 
Empirical evidence indicates that industries in Japan today can be sorted into two groups: (1) 
industries like, for instanc e automobiles, consumer electronics, or robotic, which are highly 
competitive and (2) chemicals, transportation, and software that exhibit a lower level of 
competition. Comparison of the economic performance of these industries shows that industries 
with a high local rivalry perform much better, i.e. the latter industries are internationally more 
successful Porter and Sakakibara (2004) .  
 
Although the importance of the relationship between competition policy and  patent policy has been 
widely recognized, little related research exists for Japanese firms. For instance Cohen, et al. 
(2002) show that intra-industry R&D spillovers occur more often in Japan than in the US. One of 
the reasons for greater spillovers in Japan may be that patents are used differently in Japan. In 
particular, the authors find that whereas the use of patents for negot iations with other firms is 
                                                   
33 See Report on Competition Policy 2005 from the European Commission: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/annual_reports/2005/en.pdf   (access on September 15, 2006).  
 59 
common in industries such as semiconductors in the US, this particular use of patents is common 
across the entire manufacturing sector in Japan. Additionally, Japanese firms diffuse information 
across Japanese rivals more willin gly than US firms.  
 
Ordover and Willig (1981)  also finds that the Japanese patent system was designed to induce 
innovators to disclose information, i.e., patents are laid open 18 months after application. 
Additionally, institutional features encourage the diffusion of knowledge by creating incentives for 
(cross-) licensing of patents. Especially, the opposition system enhances licensing since granting a 
license could deter third parties from filing an opposition. In Japan, the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry can force a patent holder to grant a license in case the patented technology i s of 
national importance. Although the single claim requirement was abolished in 1988, the JPO still 
favours narrow patent applications containing only a small number of clai ms. A small number of 
claims have led to a large number of narrow and interdepende nt patents. Therefore, a patent holder 
could be forced into a licensing agreement to be able to use his patent.  
 
The previously described competition policy of Japan is also reflected in the design and the 
execution of the Japan ese patent system. Until 199 3, Japanese patent law required applications to 
be filed in Japanese and the correction of translation errors was not allowed. This language 
requirement and the restriction of amendments led to increased costs for foreign applicants. For 
non-Japanese firms this regulation formed an entry barrier since applying for a patent in Japan was 
very expensive.  
 
Overall, the Japanese patent system supports fair competition in the home country by facilitating 
the exchange of knowledge among Japanese firms and also by  fostering cooperation, e.g., licensing 
agreements. However, the Japanese patent system can be used to increase entry barriers to the 
Japanese markets for foreign firms. Whether this is actually the case and how recent changes in the 
Japanese patent system  can contribute to more international competition has to be investigated 
more closely in future research.  
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2.4.6 Incentives for innovative activity of Japanese firms  
 
Until mid of 1990 the Japanese patent system impeded innovation rather than fostering th e creation 
of pioneering technology. First of all, narrow claims and fewer claims per patent (single -claim 
requirement) lead to more patents per product. Assume that the different patentable elements of 
one product belonged to different parties, this resul ted in mutual interdependences. Freedom to 
operate could only be guaranteed by cross -licensing agreements Cohen, et al. (2002). In order to 
increase bargaining power in cross -licensing negotiations firms started cluster patenting. Typica lly 
a large number of patent applications were filed on the same day, each representing an incremental 
variation or improvement when compared to the others. Patent scope is still much narrower in 
Japan compared to the U.S. or Europe. Therefore, in Japan pa tents are still rather used as an 
admission to cross -licensing than as a means to exclude others from using a certain techn ology  
Kotler and Hamilton (1995) . 
 
Second, before 1995, firms were allowed to use the inventions described in pending patents 
without permission or paying royalties. Therefore, Japanese firms were abl e to file patents or utility 
models for small improvement inventions while the application of the original patent was still 
pending. Assume that a competitor who built on an original invention made an improvement and 
filed a patent or a utility model claim ing this improvement and forced the applicant of the original 
invention into a cross -licensing agreement. “In this way, the JPS Hayashi) rewarded firms that 
reverse engineered and modified inventions while penalized original inventors” ( Maskus and 
Mcdaniel (1998) , 10).  
 
Third, a seven year term to request examination of the application along with a pre -grant 
opposition system led to large grant lags. Thus, at the time a patent was granted, the remaining 
term for patent protection was relatively short.  
 
Finally, until 1993, the Japanese patent law required applications to be filed in Japanese and the 
correction of translation error s was not allowed. This language requirement and the restriction of 
amendments led to increased costs for foreign applicants. Applicants often had to have the 
application translated into Japanese and afterwards re -translated into the original language by a  
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second party in order to avoid translation errors. For non -Japanese firms this expensive procedure 
made applying for a patent in Japan rather unattractive. For Japan, this resulted in less knowledge 
transfer from other coun tries  Maskus and Mcdaniel (1998) . 
 
After the change of the patent system in 1995 narrow patent scope and low novelty standards were 
replaced by raising novelty standards and acceptance of broader claims. These changes 
discouraged incremental and improvement inventions and encouraged more fundamental 
inventions. Additionally, the modifications of the patent law led to more freedom to operate since 
widening the scope of protection made cross -licensing agreements less important  Maskus and 
Mcdaniel (1998). The Japanese government still pursues a pro -patent policy. In 200 3, for instance, 
the Japanese government published the “Strategic Framework for Intellectual Property Policy” 
which aims at promoting and strengthening IP protection  Motohashi (2003). Results of scientific 
analysis for the U.S., however, revealed only marginal effects of strong patents on innovativ eness ( 
Lerner (2002); Kortum and Lerner (1999)). Whether this pro-patent policy of Japan succeeds or 
not, remains to be seen.  
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2.5 A stylized comparison of the three major patent systems  
Table 2.5 summarizes some important features of the patent systems in the three countries. We 
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in certified international 
exhibitions and  in 
unlawful breach of 
confidentiality or secrecy  
agreements.  
 
- filing options: standard 






- examination request , 
not later than 6 months  





to validity  
- re-examination  at 
USPTO: no time limit, 
does not allow same 
level of participation of 
third parties as 
opposition. Third parties 
tend to rely on litigation to 
challenge validity.  
 
- post-grant opposition, 
within 6 months from 
publication of grant  
 
- post-grant opposition, 
within 9 months from 
grant, centralised 
process at EPO (litigation 
subject to national court 
decision in each 
designated country).  
 
Table  2.5:  Comparison of patent systems with respect to selected f eatures (Source: 
Martinez and Guellec (2004)  )  
 
 
The most outstanding difference between the systems in Japan and Europe on the one hand and the 
US on the other is the princi ple of first to file (JPO, EPO) versus first to invent (USPTO). The 
latter principle forces researchers and inventors to document research progress very accurately. 
However, empirically the difference has been found to be of rather minor importance. As we 
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pointed out in section 2.3.1, fewer than 0.1 to 0.25 per cent of applications result in interference 
proceedings (Mossinghoff 2002; Lemley and Chien 2003).  
 
Another interesting difference is the degree to which inventors can claim a grace period during 
which they are allowed to publish details about their inventions without endangering their later 
rights to be awarded a patent. Europe has the most stringent regulation under which only very 
select publications may be made. Both Japan and the US provide more leeway to inventors. These 
options are of particular interest to academic researchers who may have to postpone publication in 
order to safeguard their patenting options first. Many researchers in universities and publicly 
financed research institutions in Europe feel that the current European solution (sometimes coupled 
with bureaucratic tendencies in technology transfer offices pursuing the patenting process) renders 
them a competitive disadvantage vis  a vis their Japanese and US competitors.  
 
A much-discussed difference in the area of filing options concerns the US practice of allowing for 
patent continuations. The patent examiner at the USPTO has relatively limited power to reject an 
application for good. Instead, applicants may drop the original applicat ion and then forward a 
continuation or continuation in parts to the USPTO. Quillen et al. (2002) have criticized this 
practice and show that once the USPTO statistics are corrected for the effect of continuations, 
inventions are likely to receive patent pr otection in more than 90 per cent of all cases. Both the 
European and the Japanese Patent Office allow for divisional applications. In these cases, an 
invention that is deemed to be particularly broad by the examiner may be divided into two separate 
applications. Divisionals may be used for strategic purposes when the examiner restricts the patent 
narrowly. In this case, applicants may choose to accept the narrow -scope patent grant, but maintain 
an option on a broader patent right by filing a suitably defin ed divisional application. The extent 
and use of divisional applications will be studied empirically later on.  
 
Finally, Japan allows applicants to delay examination by up to three years (until 2005, the delay 
could be last to seven years). Under new regul ation, the USPTO has offered a new deferred 
examination path since beginning of 2003. Deferred examinations allow applicants to observe the 
development of markets and technologies prior to expending resources on examination. Similarly, 
since many of the de ferred cases will simply be dropped, such a system offers advantages to 
resource-constrained patent systems. However, the option of delaying examination can be abused 
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in order to modify the patent in such a way as to threaten competitors who have made inve stment 
decisions in a particular area. At the EPO, examination requires a request by the applicant, but 
cannot be delayed. 
 
Finally, the US system relies mainly on courts to establish some form of quality control over 
granted patents. The re -examination proceedings available at the USPTO have not been very 
effective, as academic research has shown (cf.  Graham, et al. (2003)). Conversely, opposition at 
the EPO has – despite the decline in utilization – been very effective in invalidating patent rights 
which would have been granted erroneousl y or in too broad a specification. The JPO offers a 
similar proceeding to third parties, but its efficacy has not been analyzed so far. Infringement and 
annulment proceedings in Europe are subject to national law. This fragmentation  of the patent 
enforcement and annulment system has motivated several proposals to establish a harmonized 
European patent litigation system, either in conjunction with the Community Patent or in the 
context of the European Patent Litigation Agreement. The latter proposal has gain ed some support 
lately. The EPLA is a proposed optional agreement and foresees the establishment of a new 
international organisation, the European Patent Judiciary (EPJ). The EPJ would have as its organs 
the European Patent Court (with a Court of First Ins tance and a Court of Appeals) and the 
Administrative Committee. The Court of First Instance will be comprised of a Central Division at 
the seat of the EPJ and a number of Regional Divisions set up by the contracting states. Typically, 
there will be one Reg ional Division per country, in larger countries up to three Regional Divisions. 
The system will adopt the EPO’s language regime, i.e. cases at Regional Divisions will typically be 
heard in the respective national language while cases at the Central Divisio n will be heard in one of 
the three official languages of the EPO (English, French, German). Cases will be heard by panels 
of three or five judges, with at least one judge being technically qualified and at least two judges 








3. Strategic Use of Patents - A Definition and Implications for Enterprise and 




Empirical research in the domain of patents has established that there was a significant shift in 
firms’ propensity to patent – often referred to  as the “patent explosion” - in the United States 
around 1984 and in Europe around 1995. This development is documented in part in Figures 3.1 
and 3.2 below.34 These shifts in firms’ patenting propensities have occurred in industries that are 
not traditionally associated with patenting. There is now a large literature which deals with the 
driving forces and the consequences of the observed phenomenon.  
 
 
Figure 3.1:  USPTO Utility Patents 1953 -2003 (Source: Hall (2005)). 
 
In this paper we review the literature on the patent explosion, patent thickets and strategic 
patenting to derive a definition of “strategic use of patenting” (section 2.2). We discus s a series of 
phenomena that are associated with the patent explosion and show how the definition can help us 
to understand them (section 2.3). Finally we discuss the implications of the “strategic use of 
                                                   
34 Please note that the number of patent applications at the EPO in the years between 1978 and 1990 rose steadily due 
to the increasing familiarity of patent applicants with the EPO which was founded only in 1978. The increase of patent 
applications after 1995 can be attributed to an increasing propensity to patent.  
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patenting” for competition policy (section 2.4). Th e conclusion contains a discussion of indicators 
















































Figure 3.2: EPO Patents 1978 – 2003 (Source: EPO data)  
 
In this introduction we discuss the traditional  view of patents and the welfare arguments that 
support a patent system. Then we turn to a series of surveys through which economists have sought 
to discover why firms patent. Finally we touch on ways in which the literature has moved beyond 
the traditional view of patents in order to accommodate the results of these surveys and the more 
recent patent explosions in the United States and in Europe. 35 This discussion will prepare the 
ground for the following sections of the text by introducing several importan t concepts.  
  
3.1.1 The traditional view of patents  
 
Much of the economic literature on patents is founded on the convenient simplification that a 
patent protects a temporary monopoly over a market or at least a process or product innovation that 
provides significant market power in such a market. In this literature a granted patent right is 
assumed to be (i) valid, (ii) clearly defined in scope and (iii) clearly defined w.r.t. its statutory 
                                                   
35 Note that developments in Japan  are a good deal more complex due to the many legislative changes outlined in the 
previous chapter.  
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term. (iv) Furthermore, it is generally assumed that a  single patent i s sufficient to cover an entire 
product or process innovation (Nordhaus (1969)). (v) Finally much theoretical wor k has tended to 
ignore alternative methods of appropriating returns to innovative activity, suggesting that 
innovators always employ patents to protect innovations. In the absence of patents, perfect 
competition prevails.  
 
This traditional definition of pa tents has proved a useful starting point for economic research into 
the optimal organization of patent systems and into the effects of patents on scientific endeavour 
and competition.  In particular it has provided a basis for normative research on the pat ent system 
which studies the welfare effects of operating a patent system or the optimal length and breadth of 
patent rights. We summarize the welfare arguments that underpin the operation of a patent system 
here. These will be useful in our discussion of the welfare implications of the strategic use of 
patents below. 
 
The justification for operating a patent system  
In two seminal articles Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) provided the underpinning for the modern 
theoretical enquiry into innovation in economics.  Nelson points out the problem of 
underinvestment specifically in basic research and  Arrow shows that inventors’ incentives to be 
inventive will suffer if they cannot appropriate the returns to their inventions, i.e. if others can 
freely copy these inventions. He argues that k nowledge created by innovators has the 
characteristics of a public good. Most importantly this means that once an idea is passed on it may 
be used by those that have received it without the inventor having control over this use. This 
constitutes the appropriability problem and it will lead to an underprovision of innovation if left 
uncorrected.  
 
Many incentive schemes to correct this underprovision of innovative activity exist and have been 
used in the past. The patent system which was first formally imple mented in Venice (1474) is one 
of them. In a recent paper Gallini and Scotchmer (2002)  compare the use of patents with other 
instruments such as prizes and procurement mechanisms. As they point out the patent system’s 
main cost is the cost of the monopoly which a patent confers on the holder. Under the traditional 
view of patents, the patent holder will be able to monopolize a product market and ch arge a 
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monopoly price. This leads to a deadweight loss. Ex post the existence of the patent is therefore 
inefficient. The social optimum would be achieved if the innovation covered by the patent were 
freely available. 
 
However ex ante a patent system also has important benefits for society offsetting the negative ex 
post effects described above. In a context in which inventors have superior information about 
technology, which is due to their efforts to understand a technology, the patent system offers a 
reward for such efforts. This reward consists in the monopoly conferred by the patent and the 
protection against copying that it affords. Most importantly the value of such a monopoly need 
only be known to the inventor and not to the patent office. Thus in co ntrast to a system of prizes a 
patent system allows society to incentivize innovators, without the need to understand the value of 
their innovations and without the need to understand in which areas of technology the most 
promising innovations may reside. Accordingly, Scotchmer (1999)  argues that the patent system is 
the best incentive system whenever society observes neither the  cost nor the benefits of innovative 
activity. Gallini and Scotchmer (2002)  note that a patent system requires the public to sustain 
experts who are able to judge the value of patent applications to some extent.  Thus society must 
observe at least some components of the value of innovations ex post.   
 
The precise value of the monopoly offered by the patent office depends on many factors. The most 
important are the duration of the patent and its breadth. The longer a patent right lasts, the greater 
is the expected value of that right, ceteris paribus. The same is true of greater patent breadth. 
Broader patents allow a firm to exclude a larger range of substitute technologies from use by 
competitors. Following Nordhaus (1969) an extensive literature has emerged  that studies the trade-
off between the deadweight loss due to patents and the incentive effect necessary for innovation to 
take place. This literature has shown that a proper understanding of the welfare effects of the patent 
system will depend not only o n length and breadth of patents but also on the cost of imitating 
patents and on firms’ incentives and ability to license patents to rivals. In particular if firms can 
license technologies to one another efficiently, then patents should be narrow and long lived 
because this is likely to allow several firms to enter a given market with rival technologies and 
because longer lived patents are more likely to give rise to licensing which leads to lower prices.  
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If we take as given the length and breadth of a pat ent, the economic literature has also investigated 
the question of the welfare effects of races for individual patents (Reinganum (1989)). The welfare 
analysis of patent races is ambiguous as it shows that symmetric firms increase their R&D efforts 
whenever firms compete for the only patent covering a product market. Firms may invest more in 
the acquisition of such cont ested patents than these are worth to society; this is referred to as 
overinvestment. Models of patent races were thought to be particularly pertinent to industries 
which conform to the traditional view of patents.  An industry which is often cited as embo dying 
the traditional view of patents is the pharmaceuticals industry (excluding biotechnology). Here a 
single drug is usually based on a single patent. Empirical research by Cockburn and Henderson 
(1994) in this industry has not provided evidence that patent races, such as those described in the 
theoretical literature, arise when firms compete for patents on new drugs. Therefore , it is usually 
assumed that firms generally underinvest in R&D even in the presence of the patent system. The 
empirical literature focusing on spillover e ffects typically detects positive externalities emanating 
from rivals’ R&D. Therefore, the assumption is largely coherent with the empirical studies.  
  
To sum up the theoretical literature on patents has found that under the traditional view of patents 
the welfare effects of the patent system depend on the breadth and duration of patent rights as well 
as the costs of imitation and the likelihood that firms will license patented technologies to one 
another. If the traditional view of patents and Arrow’s anal ysis of the public goods character of 
innovation are an accurate model of reality, then a patent system will provide innovators with 
increased R&D incentives which counteract the tendency to underinvest in R&D. This is the 
traditional justification for the  operation of a patent system.  
 
It should be noted that theoretical research in this area has demonstrated that the optimal design of 
the patent system depends on industry characteristics that are not reflected in patent law. Nordhaus 
(1969) shows that th e elasticity of demand and the technological opportunities in an industry can 
have a strong influence on the optimal duration of patent protection. Therefore it is unlikely that a 
homogeneous patent system (“one size fits all” ) provides a complete remedy t o the appropriability 
problem analyzed by Arrow across all industries and technologies . 
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This discussion has shown that under the traditional view of patents it is incumbent upon patent 
law to stimulate firms’ innovative activities through the design of cl early delineated property 
rights. However theoretical work in this area has also demonstrated that patent law is not 
independent of competition law. Rather the design of competition law rules that affect firms’ 
licensing and cooperative research activities  (which are substitutes for licensing) directly affects 
the optimal design of patent rights. In the following sections we will return to this nexus of 
competition policy and patent law.  
 
Going beyond the traditional view of patents  
While the traditional v iew of patents has proved a fruitful simplification of reality, its defects have 
been widely recognized for some time. Economists have therefore studied innovation in settings in 
which innovation is cumulative and more recently settings in which patents ar e complementary. 
Furthermore firms’ choice between patenting and secrecy has been studied. Here we briefly review 
work on cumulative innovation and on the choice between patenting and secrecy. The effects of 
complementarities between patents are discussed in the following section.  
 
A first step beyond the traditional view of patents is taken when we consider that patents often 
build on previous patents, i.e., that innovation is often a cumulative process. Where this is the case 
the patent system should be designed to compensate earlier innovators for benefits that follow -on 
innovators draw from preceding research. Once more the alternatives the literature considers are 
broad patents that are short -lived and narrow patents that are long -lived. Here the concept of 
breadth or “leading breadth” refers to the inventive step which is necessary in order for a follow -on 
patent not to infringe an earlier one. This notion of breadth must be contrasted with the notion of 
breadth in the literature based on the tradition al view of patents. There the breadth of a patent 
refers to its ability to block contemporaneous (substitute) innovations.  
 
As before the question whether licensing is possible affects the conclusions of this line of research. 
Gallini and Scotchmer (2002) argue that broad, short lived patents are beneficial because they 
prevent duplication of innovative activities and provide incentives for follow on research while still 
providing rewards for early innovators. Under such a system the bre adth of early patents forces 
follow on innovators to take out a license in order for them to bring their newer product/process to 
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market. Thereby the earlier innovator is compensated for the benefits which the follow on 
innovator derives from the earlier p atent. The reasoning which supports broad and short lived 
patents fails if licensing is not possible. In this case the breadth of the initial patent would reduce 
any incentives for follow on innovation by rival firms.  
 
To sum up, this literature also finds  that the ability of patenting firms to license their innovations 
has an effect on the optimal design of the patent system. Furthermore the literature shows that the 
inventive step (breadth) which is necessary for follow on patents to be granted is an impo rtant 
consideration in the welfare analysis of the patent system. The incidence of licensing, affected by 
the regulation of licensing, is an important determinant of conclusions regarding the optimal design 
of the patent system also when technology is cumu lative. However, the design conclusions for 
patent law that emerge from this literature seem to be the exact opposite of those which we drew 
from the literature based on the traditional view of patents.  
 
The work surveyed so far has focused on the design o f the patent system itself and has therefore 
adhered to assumption (v) 36 of the traditional view of patents. We turn now to empirical research 
which has shown that patents have traditionally not been important in the appropriation of rents 
from innovation in many industries. Thus the central premise of Arrow’s work that the public 
goods nature of knowledge implies that innovators cannot appropriate any returns from innovation 
is misplaced in such industries. Instead firms in many industries mainly rely on a combination of 
secrecy and lead time to appropriate substantial returns to innovation.  
 
Empirical research conducted by Levin, et al. (1987) and Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000)  has 
tried to establish how important patents are to firms which protect innovations and what purpose 
patents serve. This work has shown that firms in the United States value patents as highly as 
secrecy and lead time only in the drugs, medical equipments and special purpose machinery 
industries. In all of these industries the prevention of imitation and t he intention to block rivals’ 
applications (which would protect substitutes of the firm’s products) was considered the most 
important motive for patenting.  
 
                                                   
36 This assumption is that patents are always used as a means to protect innovation.   
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Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000)  find that U.S. firms in several industries value patents at least as 
much for the prevention of copying and for blocking as for their use in negotiations with rival 
firms and to prevent suits. Industries in which this aspect of patents was important include steel, 
electrical equipment, electronic components and communications equipment. It is important to 
note that in most of these industries patents are viewed as less effective than secrecy or lead time in 
protecting benefits from innovation.  
 
European evidence from similar surveys suggests that patents are even less important for firms 
than in the United States. In a series of papers Arundel and Kabla (1998) , Arundel (2001) and 
Arundel (2003) use the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) and the KNOW survey to study 
appropriation of innovation rents in Europe. They find that patenting is consistently less important 
than secrecy and lead time for European firms in the appropriation of return s to innovation. This 
remains true if small firms and large firms are considered separately, and if sectors are 
disaggregated. Unfortunately, they provide no evidence on the strategic use of patents in Europe. 
However, their results about the relative impo rtance of patents amongst sectors are broadly 
consistent with findings in US surveys.  
 
Summing up this evidence, we find that industries have differed substantially in their use of 
patents. In particular there are a few industries, such as pharmaceuticals that have used patents in 
ways that correspond closely to the traditional view of patents. In other industries patents have 
been valued for use in negotiations and to prevent suits. This suggests that strategic use of patents 
going beyond the traditionally  envisaged use of patents as an exclusion mechanism have weighed 
more heavily on the decision to use patents in these industries.  
 
3.1.2 Patent uses in complex technologies  
 
In this section we review recent work on the patent explosion and strategic patenting.  This 
literature is largely empirical with some notable exceptions. In contrast to the literature reviewed 
above it attempts to relax almost all of the assumptions underlying the traditional model of patents. 
The implication is not that the traditional vie w is never correct, rather that alternative views apply 
to an possibly increasing number of industries.  
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Industries in which strategic patenting, as defined below, has led to a patent explosion are usually 
complex technologies. In such a technology a produ ct or process depends on many separate 
components, all of which may be subject to innovative change. Two facets of complex 
technologies are relevant to the analysis which follows: firstly complex technologies are often 
modular; and secondly patents on a co mplex product or process are generally held by several, often 
rival, firms. A modular technology is one which can be separated into components each of which is 
related to others through a given set of design rules or interfaces. This allows independent eff orts 
in the improvement of individual components to take place, without the need for coordination of 
these efforts. Modularity can lead to specialization of firms on different stages of the product 
innovation process as we outline later. This often contrib utes to the fragmentation of control over 
property rights on a single technology. We analyze the effects thereof here.  
 
The literature on the patent explosion begins with the observation that the patenting strategies of 
firms in the semiconductor industry  in the United States changed in the mid 1980’s. Grindley and 
Teece (1997) argue that semiconductor firms traditionally did not make much use of patent 
protection because innovation rents were appropriated through lead time and first mover 
advantages. They note that the strengthening o f intellectual property that occurred in the United 
States in 1982 (Jaffe (2000)) led Texas Instruments and other firms to assert their semiconductor 
patents more aggressively. As Hall and Ziedonis (2001)  show, this led to an industry wide 
explosion in patenting activity as all leading semiconductor producers scrambled to build up large 
patent portfolios. Hall (2005) shows that this shift in patenting behaviour has spilled over into other 
patent areas as semiconductor and electronics firms pursue their strategy  of patenting aggressively. 
The trend has been supported by the low examination requirements of the US Patent Office 
documented in Quillen, Webster and Eichmann (2003) .   
 
The most extensive evidence on the patenting explosion is available for the se miconductor 
industry. Following the work by Grindley and Teece (1997)  and Ziedonis and Hall (2001)  there has 
been further empirical research on semiconductor firms’ patenting strategies and their determinants 
by Ziedonis (2004a), on litigation by Somaya (2003) and Ziedonis (2003) as well as on licensing 
by Siebert and Von Graevenitz (2005) . However there is also work on the effects of increased 
patenting in other industries. The effects of firms’ patenting strategies in the software industry have 
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been studied by Hall and Macgarvie (2006) , Schankerman and Noel (2006)  and Bessen and Hunt 
(2004). In the field of biomedical research an early paper by Heller and Eisenberg (1998)  raised 
serious questions regarding the effects of patenting on research productivity in this field, especially 
at the level of basic scientific research. they argue that patent thickets in biomedical research would 
make it difficult or impossible for researchers to access basic research tools. By implication 
research progress in these industries would be stifled. More recent work by Walsh, Arora and 
Cohen (2002) and Walsh, Cho and Cohen (2005) does not show that these concerns are generally 
valid. In the field of nanotechnology Lemley (2005) has documented that firms and universi ties are 
patenting at an unprecedented pace for such a new technology. He points out that this is the first 
new technology to emerge in which basic scientific building blocks are being patented. Finally 
there is the work by Hall (2005) who studies the development of the patenting explosion on 
aggregate as well as looking more closely at firms in the software industry. Close inspection of this 
literature demonstrates the following two points. First, empirical work on the patenting explosion 
is very new, much of it as yet not published in peer reviewed journals. Secondly it shows that there 
is still some uncertainty about the effects of the surge in pat enting on firms’ and universities’ 
research incentives. This is particularly apparent in economic research on the effects of patenting 
in the fields of  biomedicine, software and nanotechnology.  
 
What unifies all of this work is its focus on patenting in technologies in which a product is based 
on a large number of patents, i.e., industries in which products are complex. These patents are 
valuable only as a set of complementary patent rights. Thus, assumption (iv) 37 of the traditional 
view of patents is violated. Shapiro (2001) argues that firms in industries based on such complex 
technologies face a growing “patent thicket”: a dense web of overlapping patents in which a firm is 
often faced by rivals that hold patents which may block the use of its own patents.  
 
Shapiro (2001)  shows that complementarities between patents belonging to rival firms will reduce 
firms’ innovation incentives because firms must share access to these patents. He surveys cross 
licensing, patent pools and standard setting as possible mechanisms through which firms may 
overcome the challenge posed by complementarities. It should be noted that all of these 
mechanisms are forms of coordination and collaboration between firms that are t raditionally 
                                                   
37 Assumption (iv) states that one patent covers the inventions leadi ng to one new product.  
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regulated by competition policy authorities. Therefore it is likely that the connection between 
competition policy and patent law becomes more important in the context of complementary 
patents. 
 
Shapiro (2001)  also points out that there is the threat of hold -up of technologies that are already 
implemented – here hold-up refers to the ability of a second party to extract part of a firm’s profit 
by leveraging a property right over a part of that firm’s production process. Hold -up is usually 
based on patents that are complements to an implemented technology. It is now widely 
documented for the Un ited States that firms threatened with infringement suits often avoid costly 
litigation and settle. The threat of an infringement suit that may be coupled with an injunction to 
cease using a litigated technology constitutes a very powerful form of hold -up as the interview 
partners of Hall and Ziedonis (2001)  consistently argue. The problem of hold -up is exacerbated 
when the number of patents issued grows, when these patents become increasingly complex and as 
the duration of patent examination (and thus uncertainty  about the outcome) increases.  
 
In response to the combined effects of complementarities and the threat of hold -up, large firms 
often resort to building large portfolios of intellectual property rights. These serve the primary 
purpose of enhancing the firm’s bargaining power in negotiations over complementary patents. 
Ziedonis (2004a) and Schankerman and Noel (2006)  document that firms are more likely to resort 
to patenting intensively if they face a large number of rivals with complementary p atents than if 
they face a smaller number of such rivals. The intuition is that it is easier to collectively refrain 
from hold-up if the number of interacting firms is small. Therefore it is not so important to protect 
against hold-up by building up a pate nt portfolio when a firm faces fewer rivals. Ziedonis (2004a)  
refers to the dispers ion of patents amongst rival firms as the degree of fragmentation of patents 
connected to a given technology.  
 
Large patent portfolios and the corresponding bargaining power may be used either to prevent or  
contain infringement actions brought by rivals (defensive use) and to raise firms’ incomes from 
active licensing programs 38 (offensive use). Neither of these forms of using patent portfolios is per 
                                                   
38 It is often noted that IBM, Texas Instruments instituted quite successful programs to manage the licensing of their 
intellectual property rights. Texas Instruments caught the industry’s attention by reaping more income in the early  90s 
from licensing than from manufacturing operations.  
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se illegal under either patent or competition law. However in individual cases firms’ strategies of 
using their patent portfolios have been and are being sc rutinized by competition policy agencies 
and the courts. Examples include: Intel/In tergraph, documented in OFT/CRA (2002),  Shapiro 
(2003b); Yamaha/Bombardier documented by  Rubinfeld and Maness (2005)  and Qualcomm Inc., 
documented in Parchomovsky and Wagner (2004) . Offensive use of large patent portfolios is most 
likely to be successfully implemented by first movers in any given technology, e.g., Texas 
Instruments. 
 
The strategy of building up a large patent portfolio to enhance bargaining power is sometimes 
referred to as “strategic patenting” Schankerman and Noel (2006) . As we have noted this notion 
loosely covers at least two distinct uses of a large patent portfolio, the defensive use which may 
arise in response to fragmented property rights and the offensive use which may arise where firms 
are first movers in adopting strategic patenting. The offensive form of strategic patenting seems 
sometimes to emerge in response to reductions in demand for an industries, as in the 
Yamaha/Bombardier case discussed by Rubinfeld and Maness (2005)  or a firms products as in the 
case of Texas Instruments which is discussed by Grindley and Teece (1997) . Thus it is a reflection 
of a change of strategy which encompasses intellectual property rights. Once a firm in an industr y 
adopts the strategy of building up a large patent portfolio, rival firms are faced with the choice of 
following suit, as occurred in the semiconductor industry, or of trying to contain the flood of 
patents by challenging their validity. Such strategies o f containment are in evidence in the franking 
devices industry as discussed by Wagner (2005), in cosmetics as discussed by Harhoff and Hall 
(2003), and in the personal  watercrafts industry as discussed by Rubinfeld and Maness (2005) . The 
extent to which one or the other strategy is a better response will depend on the degree to which a 
patent system is able to stem the flow of patents that contribute only very marginally to 
technological progress.  
 
To summarize, this section has shown that in certain industries a new model of patents is emerging. 
By analogy to the traditional view of patents, this new paradi gm can be summarized as follows:  
 
 77 
· The validity, scope and duration of individual patent rights depends on the resources which 
society invests in their examination and the opportunities society affords third parties to 
challenge applications (Lemley and Shapiro (2005)  Meurer and Bessen (2005) ).  
· Furthermore, where technology is complex the inventive step required to obtain a patent is 
an important determinant of the complexity of the web of intellectual property rights 
covering the technology. Cohen, et al. (2002) (v) In addition to the traditional motives for 
patenting, firms may engage in strategic use of the patent system if technologies a re 
complex and the patent system (including the institutions for patent litigation) provides 
incentives which support strategic behaviour.  
 
This view of patents which emerges from patenting strategies in complex product industries differs 
from the traditional view of patents in emphasizing the institutional context in which patent 
applications are made and patents are granted. Furthermore, it differs by focusing on patenting 
strategies which are based on the exploitation of complementarities between patent s. As noted 
above this literature is very recent. There is thus far no accepted theoretical model of the 
interaction of firms R&D incentives and the design of the patent system. Therefore it is too early to 
draw wide ranging policy conclusions about the op timal design of the patent system in the face of 
the patent explosion. Furthermore, it is difficult to tell whether the patenting explosion has been 
accompanied by fundamental changes in the process of technological change. In order to support 
the exploration of these issues, it is all the more important to be able to identify technologies and 
sectors in which potential problems might occur due to the developments just described.  
 
It is sometimes suggested that firms caught up in a patent thicket engage in patent portfolio races 
(Hall and Ziedonis (2001)). Such races might be expected to lead to wasteful increases in R&D 
investments. Thus far there is no direct evidence of effects of the patenting explosion on firms’ 
R&D efforts. What is clearer is that transaction s costs have increased and this may have negative 
welfare implications. Welfare would decrease where firms devote increased efforts to defence of 
their “freedom to operate” (Grindley and Teece (1997)  ) by building up patent portfolios that do 
not serve other purposes and that mainly co nsist of questionable technological innovations. Then 
the escalation of spending on “freedom to operate” would consist socially wasteful spending tha t 
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raises barriers to entry. I f expenditure on patenting is sufficiently high these effects could lead to 
reductions in the number of competing firms through an escalation mechanism . 
 
Escalation mechanisms have been identified by  Sutton (1991, (1998, (2002)  as resulting from 
competition between firms through escalation of spending on R&D, advertising or any other 
strategic variable. The escalation  of spending by all firms in a market on such a variable has the 
effect of raising the level of expenditure necessary for any one firm to be able to compete in that 
market. In other words, an escalation mechanism leads to rising barriers to entry into a sp ecific 
industry. These barriers are endogenous in the sense that they result from the competitive 
interaction of firms within that market. Nonetheless, it must be noted that in the context of free 
entry, firms cannot escape the operation of such an escalat ion mechanism either individually or 
collectively. Current developments within the patent systems of the United States and Europe can 
be analysed using this theoretical framework. Existing analysis of these developments is based on 
the concept of patent po rtfolio races ( Hall and Ziedonis (2001)  ). Viewed through the prism of an 
escalation mechanism, patent portfolio races represent the process of escalating expenditures on 
patent applications. The analogy between these models is helpful in the analysis of welfare  effects 
that patent portfolio races may have.   It should be emphasized that we do not yet have sufficient 
empirical evidence to conclude whether escalation mechanisms are at work in patent intensive 
technologies. Research into the welfare effects of paten ting competition is currently very active.  
 
In spite of all of the uncertainty that affects this new literature, it is very clear that the regulation of 
licensing will be an important determinant of how firms are able to deal with the challenges posed 
by complementarities between patents. Just as under the alternative models of patenting, which we 
have surveyed above, an important nexus between competition policy and patent law lies in the 
regulation of licensing of patents. We will return to this issue in section 3.4 below.  
 
3.2 A definition of strategic use of patents  
 
In this section we provide an analytical definition of the strategic use of patents and discuss it. The 
definition we provide here will be used as a working definition for the further course of  the project. 
It will be subject to review and possibly to modifications. Our proposed definition is:  
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Strategic use of the patent system arises whenever firms leverage complementarities between 
patents in order to attain a strategic advantage over technol ogical rivals. This behaviour is 
anticompetitive if the main aim and effect of strategic use of the patent system is to decrease the 
efficiency of rival firms’ production efforts . 
 
Note that this definition has two parts: the first is intended to help us t o identify a broad set of 
strategic uses of patents while the second identifies which forms of strategic use of the patent 
system are anticompetitive.  
 
As noted in the previous section the economic literature on patenting in complex product industries 
and on patenting in general provides no widely accepted definition of either “strategic patenting” 
or “strategic use of the patent system”. The definition of the latter concept which we propose in 
this section seeks to pull together the most important factors that are associated with patenting 
strategies that have emerged in complex product industries in the last two decades. The definition 
has two aims:  
 
1. To provide a foundation for the identification of “strategic use of the patent system” 
based on patent ind icators. 
2. To provide a theoretical basis for the evaluation of a firm’s strategic use of patents 
from a competition policy perspective.  
 
We stress that this definition is not taken from any source in the economic literature and that no 
attempt has been made  in this literature so far to provide a concise definition of patenting strategies 
that is related to competition policy concerns.  
 
The definition we propose also has two important and intentional limitations:  
 
1. The definition cannot and does not seek to pr ovide a per se rule for the 
identification of anticompetitive behaviour based solely on a firm’s patenting 
strategy. The reasons for this limitation are discussed in section 3.4 below.  
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2. Furthermore the definition expressly limits itself to patenting strateg ies that are 
based on the use of large numbers of patents. The reasons for this limitation are 
discussed here. 
 
There are three reasons for this second limitation. Most importantly competition law already has 
mechanisms in place to deal with the abuse of a  firm’s market power if it is based on individual 
patents. What our review of recent patenting trends in the following section will show is that such 
mechanisms do not yet exist in competition or patent law when we turn to patenting strategies 
based on the exploitation of large patent portfolios. A second practical reason to restrict ourselves 
to patenting strategies based on patent portfolios is the identifiability of such strategies in patent 
statistics. As we argue in section 3.5 it is likely that some s trategies may be identified using patent 
statistics, but the indicators we propose are unlikely to work for individual patents such as the ones 
implicated in the Astra Zeneca case 39 or in the Spundfass case 40. Lastly it is unlikely that all 
possible forms of abusing either patents or the patent system for anticompetitive aims are amenable 
to a single analytical definition. We believe, however, that it is possible to provide an analytical 
definition of such behaviour related to the exploitation of patent portf olios. 
 
We now turn to an in -depth discussion of the proposed definition at hand. Once we have discussed 
the definition we turn in the following section to the application of its first part to various patenting 
phenomena. This discussion will provide addit ional means of classifying different forms of 
strategic use of patents. After this step we will provide a discussion of the competition policy 
aspects of the patenting strategies we identify. To clarify the definition we provide a discussion of 
the terms “complementarity”, “strategic advantage” and “decrease of efficiency” next. Thereafter 
we return to the implications of this definition as a whole.  
3.2.1 Complementarities between patent rights  
 
Our definition identifies complementarity between patents as a sourc e of strategic behaviour within 
the patent system. Where complementarities between patents arise the threat of hold -ups arises as 
noted by Shapiro (2001). This threat increases as the fragmentation of patent ownership in a 
                                                   
39 See press release IP/05/737,  available at www.europa.eu.net . 
40 See case BGH KZR 40/02.  
 81 
particular technology increases. As noted in section 3.1.2, firms that move first to build up large 
patent portfolios will have a stron g strategic advantage. Parchomovsky and Wagner (2004)  argue 
that an additional advantage of a patent portfolio is its ability to cover different avenues of possible 
technological change. Therefore they argue it is increasingly likely that firms in all technological 
fields will adopt patenting strategies based on the constr uction of patent portfolios. While this 
conclusion is quite far -reaching, their analysis underscores the need for policy makers to address 
the challenges of patenting strategies based on the patent portfolio as opposed to individual patent 
rights. 
  
Patents are complements if the value of holding them jointly is greater than the sum of their 
individual values to different firms (Scotchmer (2005) ). By assumption (iv) of  the traditional view 
of patents, complementarity of patents is ruled out, because it is explicitly assumed that each 
product is protected by a single patent and it is implicitly assumed that demand for individual 
products is independent of demand for othe r products. Empirically this assumption is violated 
whenever individual patents are embodied in technology protected by more than one patent. In 
such cases the various patents embodied in the product become “technological complements”. 
Technological comple mentarity is one cause for overlapping patents and for the existence of 
blocking patents. Thus it is one precondition for the emergence of patent thickets and for the 
amassing of patent portfolios.  
 
Next to technological complementarity, assumption (iv) o f the traditional view of patents may be 
violated if we allow for complementary products. Then even patents that protect individual 
products may become complementary in terms of their effect. This happens if the protected 
products are complements in the pr oduct market. Products are complements whenever the value of 
owning them jointly is greater than the sum of their values to consumers, if held individually. We 
refer to this form of complementarity as “demand -induced complementarity” between patents.  
Such complementarity is entirely compatible with the explicit assumptions that jointly make up the 
traditional view of patents. However it has not been considered in the literature that builds on this 
view of patents.  
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The traditional view of patents often ru les out any interactions between patents at all. Thus it also 
rules out the possibility of patents that are technological substitutes. Technological substitutability 
in the simplest form arises if there is more than one technology which achieves a certain aim and if 
each technology is covered by a separate patent. As long as substitute patents are held by 
competing firms they guarantee that the underlying product market is at least oligopolistic. 
However, frequently a firm will seek to patent as many substi tute technologies as possible itself, 
even if only one is finally implemented. The aim of building such “patent fences” (Reitzig (2004)) 
is to raise rivals’ costs of imitating a technological improvement. In this case a number of 
substitute patents held by a sin gle firm will become “legal complements” because each of the 
patents in the fence reduces the threat of competition and raises the value of the patent which is 
actually used, to its owner.  
 
Note that a group of patents that are “technological complements”  may also become “legal 
complements” if they are all held by a single firm. In this case the firm will be able to improve the 
technology of its product using the whole set of patents.  
 
We argue that a patent portfolio owned by one firm must contain patent s that are  technological - or 
demand induced complements to rivals’ patents or technological substitutes  if it is argued that the 
use of this portfolio constitutes a strategic use of the patent system. The existence of such a 
portfolio of patents cannot by  itself imply that the use of the portfolio is anticompetitive however.  
 
Where firms use individual patents or patent applications in questionable ways the examination 
systems at patent offices and the courts provide avenues for affected rivals to counter this 
behaviour at the level of individual patents. In contrast Parchomovsky and Wagner (2004)  argue 
that the use of patent portfolios creates challenges to which the patent system and competition 
policy are not well adapted at present because it is very costly to challenge all the patents 
constituting a patent portfolio in dividually. That this is the case is not surprising as patent system 




This begins at the examination phase in which the patent examiner deals with each patent 
application separately. This means that an examiner may seek to control the breadth of an 
individual patent, but they have little or no control over the breadth of a portfolio of patents which 
a firm may be creating through a series of contemporaneo us patent applications. Similarly at a 
stage at which third parties are able to make observations on the validity of patent applications or 
to challenge these, it is presently not possible or customary for rivals to challenge connected patent 
rights. In the face of an applicant who has the capability to produce large numbers of closely 
related contemporaneous patents, opposing or litigating firms that must challenge each individual 
patent may be at a disadvantage. One of our policy recommendations will focu s on this divergence.  
 
We defer the problems which patent portfolio strategies pose for competition policy to section 
3.2.3 below where we discuss the term “decreased efficiency” in our definition of strategic use of 
the patent system. 
 
3.2.2 Strategic advantage  as derived from patent rights  
 
The definition introduced above suggests that firms may leverage complementary patents in order 
to derive a strategic advantage over their rivals. This part of the definition clarifies that firms must 
have in place a strateg y of patenting which exploits complementarities between patents for 
competitive advantage. Here a strategy is understood as a plan of action which takes into account 
the reaction of rival firms and is implemented over a longer period.  
 
This part of the def inition is included in order to clarify that the definition applies to strategic 
behaviour following a longer term plan. Thus it rules out any short term or one off actions by 
firms. This aspect of the definition focuses our attention on activities that re quire some planning 
and resources in order to be sustained for a longer period. Thus a patenting strategy that seeks to 
exploit complementarities between patents may require that a firm strengthen or build up a division 
dealing with the management of its i ntellectual property rights. Such a division will exist in all 
large companies that hold patents, but its ability to implement a certain strategy will depend on the 
type of people working within the division. As an example consider the hiring by Microsoft in 
2003 of Marshall Phelps, an IBM executive who set up a patent -based revenue program at IBM in 
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1985.41 This hiring is having the intended effect of allowing Microsoft to change the way it uses 
intellectual property rights. 42  
 
3.2.3 Reducing rivals’ efficiency b y using patents or the patent system  
 
The third element of our definition focuses on whether strategic use of the patent system is 
anticompetitive or not. We propose that strategic use of the patent system as identified through the 
first two elements of o ur definition is anticompetitive if such behaviour has the primary aim and 
effect of making rivals’ production less efficient.  
 
This criterion is based on the wide definition of predation set out by Ordover and Willig (1981) .43 
The criterion of the efficiency of rival firms focuses our attention on strategies which raise rivals’ 
costs. However, our definition also makes clear that it must be the main aim and effect of strategic 
use of the patent system to raise rivals’ costs. If a firm can provide a justification for its patenting 
strategy which is related to the efficiency of its own production, the n strategic use of the patent 
system will not be anticompetitive. A similar standard is suggested by Carrier (2003).  
 
While theoretically appealing, this standard will not be easy to apply. On the one hand it is clear 
that antitrust authorities cannot be put in a position in which they protect firms which have failed to 
protect themselves, by not applying for patents, by not licensing patents on vital components of the 
technologies they employ or by not using alternative measures which prevent the patenting of such 
technologies by rivals. On the other hand antitrust authorities must be able to  intervene where firms 
make systematic use of implicit or explicit threats based on large patent portfolios. Such threats are 
not unlikely to constitute a justified defence of their own intellectual property if infringement of 
these patent portfolios is no t found or the patents in the portfolio are of low quality and are found 
to be invalid. Cases in which firms use courts in an anticompetitive manner making use of 
intellectual property rights are documented by Meurer (2003) and references therein. There is some 
                                                   
41 For more information on this hiring refer to The Register at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/12/08/microsoft_aiming_ibmscale_patent_program/   
42 Further comment on this process can be found on the web at:  
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5578247/site/newsweek/   
43 Predatory behaviour in the sense of Ordover and Willig (1981) arises if an action is profitable solely because it 
allows the firm to exclude its rivals.  This definition of predation expressly includes non price predation strategies.  
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anecdotal evidence of similar actions being brought in Europe but little systematic evidence to 
date. 
 
Meurer (2003) argues that such practices are partly the consequence of weak and poorly delineated 
patents. Thus improvements in the quality of patent examination will have the effect of reducing 
the scope for such actions. Similarly, measures which affect the frequency of patenting by raising 
the costs of patent applications and renewals will force firms to focus on the most important patent 
rights. This will reduce the number of patent applications and reduce the likelihood of the use of 
very large patent portfolios to threaten infringement.  
 
This observation points to an important division of labour between patent law and competition 
policy which we will explore further in our study. The provisions made in pat ent law should seek 
to reflect the tradeoffs between the provision of incentives to innovate and the deadweight loss of 
the associated monopolies. Therefore our definition of the anticompetitive effects of strategic use 
of the patent system restricts itsel f to the effects of a firm’s use of its patent portfolio on production 
by a rival firm. The definition is not concerned with the effects of patent portfolios on rival firms’ 
patenting activities. In our view the effects of a firms’ patenting strategy on ot hers’ innovation 
incentives should be primarily addressed through the design of patent law.  
 
The role that remains for competition policy is to scrutinize firms’ use of patents and patent 
portfolios. As argued in Régibeau and Rocket (2004)  competition policy should not seek to 
rebalance of firms’ R&D incentives as they are set in patent law. Our definition limits the role of 
antitrust agencies to the immediate consumers’ surplus and producers’ surplus effects of the use of 
patent portfolios. Thus the correct role for competition policy is to prevent the misuse of 
intellectual property directed at product markets. This task, as we argue next, is very challenging. 
The literature in this field is in its infancy, and therefore our definition of anticompetitive 
behaviour is not as detailed as one might wis h it to be. 
 
As an example of the difficulty in judging whether the use of a patent portfolio in licensing 
negotiations and infringement actions is anticompetitive we turn now to a case documented by 
Rubinfeld and Maness (2005) . They discuss a case brought by Yamaha against Bombardier at the 
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U.S. International Trade Commission in 2001. There Yamaha argued that Bombardier infringed a 
number of patents owned by Yamaha. After a four week trail the case was settled. In the process of 
the trial several of the patents which Yamaha were referring to were found to be not infringed or 
lacking domestic industry in the United States 44. Rubinfeld and Maness (2005) provide evidence 
which is strongly suggestive of the fact that Yamaha were trying to raise the costs of all of their 
rivals in the affected industry (personal watercraft) by forcing each one into a package licensing 
deal. Yamaha used thei r disproportionately large patent portfolio (90% of industry patents) to back 
their demands for a licensing deal with their competitors. In some cases this demand was met and 
in one case a rival left the industry soon after signing such a deal. The difficu lty in this case was to 
prove that Yamaha were misusing their patent portfolio with the intention of raising industry 
prices. Clearly such an allegation requires the use of data on product markets and their 
development as set out in Rubinfeld and Maness (2005) . This case makes clear that an 
investigation of firms’ patenting behaviour by itself cannot in general be expected to provide proof 
of anticompetitive actions. However, it can provide an i ndication where such behaviour might be 
expected, a form of early warning indicator. In this case, the strong concentration of IP rights in the 
hands of one producer could be such an indicator.  
 
This concludes our discussion of the definition of the strate gic use of patent systems. In the 
following section we discuss phenomena which the definition may be applied to.  
 
3.3 Empirical Observations 
 
As noted in the introduction there has been a significant increase in the number of patent 
applications both at the U SPTO as documented in Hall (2005) and at the EPO as documented by 
Harhoff and Hall (2002)  and Hoisl (2005). In this section we survey a number of phenomena that 
are associated with this increase in patenting. In each case we will comment briefly on how the 
phenomenon fits into the definition offered above. Additionally, we will discuss possible 
competition policy implic ations of the phenomenon and ways of identifying the underlying 
patenting strategy. 
                                                   
44 Some additional information on this case may be found on the internet such as on this website: 
http://www.morganfinnegan.com/our_services/service_areas/litigation/itc.html  . 
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To structure this section we will consider each step of the process through which a patent 







If firms adopt patenting strategies that fall under the definition of strategic use of patents their 
patenting strategies will take particular form at each of these steps,  
 
3.3.1 Application  
 
The patent application s tep is the one at which we observe the largest number of phenomena that 
we would classify as falling under the strategic use of the patent system. We will discuss the 
following phenomena in turn: increased applications; increased entry of specialized firms ; 
increased complexity of applications. Most of the evidence discussed here pertains to the 
semiconductor industry because this industry is the most extensively studied complex product 
industry to date. We have noted those studies that exist on the effects  of the patenting explosion in 
other industries in section 3.1.2. above.  
 
Increased applications  
 
Hall (2005) shows that the increase in patenting at the USPTO arises across all patent classes apart 
from those covering chemicals and pharmaceuticals .  Thus it has occurred in those industries 
which traditionally do not value patent protection very highly. Surprisingly, she also finds that this 
increase in patenting is due mainly to firms that have traditionally patented in the electrical, 
computing and instruments industries. These firms have begun to patent more widely in other 
patent classes, than those which they are traditionally associated with.  
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Additionally she shows that the recent increase in patenting at the USPTO is driven almost entirely 
by applicants from within the United States. This finding fits in well with the results of a study by 
Wagner (2005) who studies patenting at the EPO in the franking devices industry. He finds that the 
firms that patent most aggressively in this very concentrated industry originate in the United States.  
These findings raise the important question what is driving the increase in patent applications that 
is observable at the EPO? Harhoff (2006b) provides evidence that the increase in patent 
applications at the EPO is not due solely to firms from the United States.  We have yet to establish 
which firms are mainly responsible for this development.  
 
As noted above the semiconductor industry is one of those in which the patenting explosion first 
arose. Direct studies of patenting strategies adopted by semiconductor firms suggest that the shift 
in patenting strategies that occurred in that industry in 1984 is mainl y defensive (Hall and Ziedonis 
(2001, Somaya (2003) ,  Ziedonis (2003, Ziedonis (2004a) ).  In this industry firms adopted a 
strategy which was outlined in the introduction as strategic patenting. The strategy consists of 
amassing of large patent portfolios. The aim of the strategy is twofold: First it provides firms with 
bargaining chips that can be used in cross -licensing negotiations with other firms. Such 
negotiations are frequently little else than mutual pacts of non aggression ( Siebert and Von 
Graevenitz (2005)). The second purpose is to insulate the firm against opportunistic patent 
infringement suits brought by smaller rivals. We discuss such opportunistic patent suits in more 
detail below.  
 
Both of these aims are directly traceable to the underlying complementarities between patents. A 
large patent portfolio is valuable in bargaining only because of the uncertainty that is created by a 
large number of patents that are located in the same patent classes as those of rival firms. These 
patents pose a threat because they may become the basis of a patent infr ingement suit. Such suits 
currently represent very powerful threats as they often result in preliminary injunctions against the 
alleged infringing company’s business ( Meurer (2003)). Large patent portfolios generally 
neutralize each other if they are of similar size and simultaneously h elp to hold at bay any rivals 
that have weaker patent portfolios as long as these have an active business to protect.  
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(Somaya (2003)) begins his paper on patent litigation in the semiconductor industry with a 
quotation from a CEO who makes clear that he sees little value in the defensive patenting game 
which is played out in the semiconductor industry. However  now that the strategy of aggressively 
asserting patent rights has been adopted by virtually all major firms in this industry it seems 
unlikely that any one semiconductor firm can afford  to deviate from this strategy.  
 
Defensive patenting as described do es not raise any immediate concerns for competition policy. 
The principal aim of firms adopting the strategy is to protect their business not to interfere or hold 
up the business of rival firms. Where firms such as Texas Instruments (Grindley and Teece (1997) ) 
have also begun to assert  their patent rights more forcefully they have generally not done this to 
disadvantage specific rivals but to generate income (Hall and Ziedonis (2001)). This activity has 
contributed significantly to the rise of defensive patenting. Thus within industries in whi ch 
defensive patenting arises there should always be at least one firm that also seeks to extract 
licensing revenues from its patent stocks. This is the first mover who introduces the strategy of 
building patent portfolios for strategic advantage.  
 
Clearly the adoption of this strategy has imposed large increases in transactions costs on firms. 
This is documented by Meurer (2003) and in F.T.C. (2003) for instance. Thus the rise of defensive 
patenting strategies may be interpreted as a process in which the endogenous sunk costs of entry 
into an industry increase. This would suggest that fewer firms opera te in the industry in the long 
run. This pattern is so far not borne out in any i ndustry studies we are aware of .  
 
Increased entry of specialized firms  
 
The patent explosion has coincided with a process of increased entry into such complex product 
industries as the semiconductor industry ( Hall and Ziedonis (2001) ).  As documented by Arora, 
Fosfuri and Gambardella (2001)  there has been an increase in the number of firms specializing in 
the design of chips or components in the semiconductor industry. Similar patterns are documented 
for other complex product industries such as software  and biotechnology. This literature provides 
no evidence for a causal effect from increases in patenting to increased entry however.  
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Hall (2005) shows that the valuation of entrants in complex product industries increases strongly if 
these hold patents whereas the valuation of incumbents is not affected much by their patent 
portfolios. This reflects what Hall and Ziedonis (2001) call the financing hypothesis: patents allow 
start-up companies to secure financing.  
 
In the semiconductor industry entry of specialized firms such as “fabless” semiconductor firms 
which specialize in the design of components has taken pl ace over the same period as the patenting 
explosion. These specialized firms emerged once semiconductor technology became standardized 
enough for designers and producers of semiconductors to produce at arms length (Macher and 
Mowery (2004) ).  
 
It is difficult to draw any general conclusions from the experience of the s emiconductor industry 
regarding the effects of the patenting explosion on competition in general. This is due to the 
simultaneity of different influences affecting this industry. On the one hand the patenting explosion 
might be expected to impose substanti al costs on firms operating in the industry and to lead to a 
process of concentration, on the other semiconductor technology is developing in such a way as to 
lower barriers to entry.  
 
As argued above it is the standardization of the product development p rocess that creates 
opportunities for entry into complex product industries. We have also argued previously that 
complementarity of patents is present in complex product industries by definition.  Therefore 
complementarity of patents and periods of increas ed entry activity may be observed jointly quite 
frequently without any causal effects from one to the other.  
 
Patenting by semiconductor firms that are new entrants into a market does not create any direct 
concerns for competition policy, on the contrary both entry and patenting at this level are 
beneficial. However increased entry may also give rise to greater numbers of failing firms and this 
provides a crucial input for the business of patent trolls. These we discuss below in the litigation 
section. 
 
Increased complexity of applications  
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Simultaneously with an increase in patent applications at the USPTO there has been an increase in 
the complexity of patent applications (Allison and Lemley (2002) ).45 In particular they compare 
two random samples of patent applications form 1976 -78 and 1996-98 and find that the number of 
independent claims has increased by about 30% on average while the number of dependent claims 
per independent claim has increased by 18%. The complexity of applications has also been rising 
at the EPO. Between 1980 and 2000 the average number of claims per patent grew from 10.1 to 
16.9 claims per patent. In particular applications coming from the United States have exhibited 
strong increases in the number of claims Harhoff (2006a). This is documented  in Figure 3.3 below. 
 
The increase in complexity of applications is cause for concern because it is increasing the 
workload at patent offices and the time which it takes for patents to be issued. (Allison and Lemley 
(2002)) show that all types of patent applications spent significantly longer in the examination 
process in the 1996-98 sample than in the 1976 -78 sample.  The length of examination affects the 
period during which firms have patent protection because the length of patent protection which is 
laid down by the law is measured form the filing date of a patent.  Thus the increased complexity 
of firms’ patent applications is imposing a negative externality on all patent applicants, which does 
not seem to be internalized properly through existing claims fee schedules.  
















                                                   
45 Recent developments in patent grants and a brief discussion of patent complexity may be found at 
http://www.ificlaims.com/press_release012006a.html  . 
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Figure 3.3:  Average number of claims per year. (Source: Harhoff (2006a)). 
 
It is likely that some firms are using the complexity of their applications in order to mask the 
content of their applications from competitors  or to create uncertainty about that content. Harhoff 
(2006a) cites the extreme case of a WO patent application with so many claims (10,247) that the 
EPO are refusing to examine the application. This a pplication will nonetheless maintain the 
priority date which it attained with the initial patent application at the WO. Such a patent 
application will create uncertainty for applicants in the affected patent classes and rivals of the 
applicant. While this particular application may be an extreme example, it seems likely that some 
firms are using increases in the number of claims to achieve strategic aims.  
 
The data we have at present do not allow us to determine whether the complementarity of patents 
is related to the increased complexity of patent applications. Measures that would allow us to 
connect the number of claims in patent documents and the connectedness of patents have not been 
evaluated together in the empirical literature on patents to date. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001)  
provide evidence for the United States that significant differences between technology fields exist 
in the number of patent claims filed. They find that “ drugs and health, chemical, and electronic 
inventions have more claims per patent“ than “mechanical and other types of inventions“. We will 
need to investigate for Europe to what extent patent strategies based on extremely complex patents 
or patents that are kept within the examination process for a long time are more likely to arise in 
complex or discrete product industri es and are related to complementarities between patents.  
 
We comment on the competition policy aspects of strategies which exploit the application and 




The examination step is a crucial  step for the quality of the average granted patent. The quality of 
the average patent is important because a lower quality leads to more probabilistic patents, i.e. 
uncertainty about the validity of patent rights grows. Such uncertainty creates costs beca use it leads 
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to more litigation and more attempts by firms to introduce even weaker patents into the patent 
system – a feedback process ensues.  
  
In this section we discuss the implications of changes in examination standards at patent offices 
which directly affects patent quality. Thereafter we deal with firms’ incentives to exploit the rules 
of the examination process in order to gain strategic advantages. Here we provide evidence that 
firms may adopt anticompetitive patenting strategies if the patent sy stem provides perverse 
incentives.  
 
Patent quality  
 
There is much anecdotal and some hard evidence to suggest that the quality of patent examinations 
at the USPTO (Quillen, Webster and Eichmann (2003) ) and at the EPO has been decreasing.  This 
has implications for firms’ incentives to apply for patents. Thus low examination standards may be 
fuelling the increase in patent applications we have commented on above as discussed in Harhoff 
(2006a). 
 

















Figure 3.4:  Average share of X-type references per year. (Source: Harhoff (2006a)) 
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Figure 3.4 above provides evidence on the number of X -type references received by each p atent at 
the EPO between 1980 and 2000. An X -type reference is a reference which is potentially damaging 
to a claim in a patent and may cause the claim to be deleted. Figure 3.4 suggests that the quality of 
patent applications at the EPO has been decreasin g. Harhoff (2006a) also shows that there is a 
marked increase in the number of X -type references per claim, thus Figure 3.4 above does not 
simply reflect the increase in claims per patent we have comme nted on previously. Harhoff 
(2006a) argues that the observed decrease in quality of patents at the EPO may partly be the result 
of decisions made by patent offices and those that fund them. Specificall y there may be pressure on 
the patent office to maintain the level of patent applications in order to generate income for the 
patent office. At the EPO this pressure arises because the national patent offices derive income 
from the activity of the EPO.  
 
The finding that patent quality has decreased is worrying as the quality of patents also affects 
firms’ interactions in the product market. Shapiro and Lemley (2005)  argue that firms’ incentives 
to challenge weak patents are too low relative to the social optimum. Thus a patent office that 
generates many “bad” patents is creating monopoli es that raise prices without adequate 
compensation to society. In “good” patents such compensation would come from a reduction of 
production costs or improvements in the quality of products as discussed above.  
 
From the perspective of competition policy su ch a development must be worrying. If it is easy to 
obtain a legal monopoly at the patent office without too much investment in R&D, then this 
undermines much of the work that antitrust agencies will undertake. Antitrust agencies are held by 
the law to observe intellectual property rights as property rights that cannot simply be withdrawn 
from their holders (Motta (2004)). In the context of dimi nishing quality of patent examination 




From the perspective of firms’ patenting strategies the examination stage is important for a further 
reason. The complexity of the rules that apply at this stage is an important determinant of firms’ 
ability to exploit the system in order to attain strategic advantages.  Here we survey evidence from 
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the United States that provides an important example of how firms make strategic use of rules in 
the patent system. This discussion is based on Graham and Mowery (2004) . 
 
In the United States it is possible to file continuations on patents whereas this is not possible in the 
patent systems of Japan, the EPO or the national European patent offices. This means that an 
already existing patent application is abandoned and a new one filed in its place. The new 
application maintains the “priority date” of the original application however. Before March 2001 
patent applications in the United States remained secret until the issue of a patent. This meant that 
continuations were a means for applicants to hide their applications within the patent system for 
prolonged periods of time, sometimes several decades. In the case of so called submarine p atents 
the aim of the applicant was to entrap subsequent applicants or those commercializing a technology 
without patent protection in order to extract significant rents. This usually involved repeated filing 
of continuations to keep the patent application  secret for a long time.  
 
In 1995 the term of patent protection was changed from 17 years from the date of issuance to 20 
years from the date of application. This changed the incentives of those seeking to hide their 
applications, but it did not stop the use of continuations. A further change was introduced in 2001 
when the patent office were required by further legislation to make all patent applications public 
after 18 months. Therefore submarine patents are now much less likely to arise. The requirement  to 
publicise a patent application can only be avoided if the applicant specifically requests it. They 
must declare that they do not intend to file the patent in a jurisdiction (such as those belonging to 
the EPO) which requires patent applications to be m ade public after 18 months.  This means that it 
is possible to this day to file continuations on patents in the United States, although the uncertainty 
created by this practice has been reduced somewhat.  
 
A particularly successful adoption of the continuat ion strategy is exhibited in the Rambus case 
(Oft/Cra (2002)). Here the firm kept a patent hidden which codified a communic ations standard 
and it seems that this violated the rules of the standard setting organization at which this standard 
was agreed. The standard was adopted by the producers of DRAMs (dynamic random access 
memory) in the context of an industry standard setti ng process. Rambus were able to extract large 
royalty payments from the majority of DRAM producers once their submarine patent issued. The 
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FTC recently found that Rambus 46 “(…) unlawfully monopolized the markets for four computer 
memory technologies that ha ve been incorporated into industry standards for  DRAM chips.” It 
may be interesting to note that the EPO recently revoked a patent issued to Rambus on a 
technology connected to this case. This patent spent 9 years in the examination process at the 
EPO.47 This underscores the need for an examination of firms’ delaying tactics within the EPO 
system. 
 
Graham and Mowery show that by 1997, 25% of all patents issued by the USPTO were affected by 
a continuation at least once. Thereafter they detect a decrease refl ecting the changes in legislation 
outlined above. They also show that some large firms adopt a strategy of using continuations 
extensively. Finally they find that applicants make use of continuations for patents that are cited 
more frequently and that are subsequently more likely to be involved in litigation. This suggests 
that applicants used continuations to keep particularly valuable patent applications from becoming 
publicly available for some time. Much of the current use of continuations is now in bio technology 
where firms view it as important because it allows them to modify claims as they learn more about 
their discovery. This behaviour is not strategic, but principally due to the relatively slow pace of 
research in this technology area.  
 
This may reflect a combination of the strategies of secrecy and patent protection in which 
applicants choose the publication date of their patent so as to maintain lead time, while knowing 
that they have a patent in hand if necessary to protect their business.  
 
Mowery and Graham examine software patents in detail. This is an area of technology that is 
considered to be complex due to the sequential nature of innovation. Unfortunately the aggregate 
statistics they provide which compare software to other technologies d o not allow us to establish 
whether continuations were more likely to be filed in complex product industries than in discrete 
product industries.  
 
                                                   
46 The FTC’s decision in this case can be found on the following webpage: 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/08/rambus.htm  . Further information i s given at: 
http://www.managingip.com/default.asp?page=9&PubID=198&SID=645308&ISS=22326&LS=EMS102738`  . 
47  A note on this revocation may be found her e: http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/44600  .  
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Where continuation strategies are chosen to create submarine patents the applicant is clearly 
embarking on a course to extort rivals and as in the Rambus case this is likely to be considered 
anticompetitive behaviour. In the case in which firms use continuations as a form of mixing 
secrecy with patent protection the strategy is not obviously anticompetitive. It does however add 
significantly to the workload at the examining patent office (Quillen, Webster and Eichmann 
(2003)) and this has negative consequences of its own.  
  
The attempt by firms to create additional uncertainty surrounding their patent appli cations is 
presently not something that many European legal scholars are troubled by, although we have 
indications that such strategies are available at the EPO too. Rather the work of European legal 
scholars currently focuses on abuses in the enforcement of intellectual property such as refusals to 
deal (Dolmans and O'Donoghue (2006) ).  Nonetheless uncertainty surrounding patent applications 
deserves more attention as it may damage to competition in two ways :  
 
1. Firms may seek to hold up rivals who are implementing a technology with the use of 
previously filed patents. For this strategy to work patents must be kept hidden (as in the 
United States) or made sufficiently obscure, as in cases in which excessive numbers of 
claims are filed. The Rambus case illustrates that the use of continuations, thoug h restricted 
to the USPTO may nonetheless have significant effects in Europe. This is because of the 
importance of the United States markets for European firms and because global technology 
standards are often set there.  
2. Firms may seek to prevent rivals fr om inventing around or at least significantly raise their 
costs of doing so by creating uncertainty around their patents. This strategy may be directly 
applicable to patents filed at the EPO as suggested by cases of applications with large 
numbers of claims.   
 
This implies that we should analyze the patent strategies of firms in order to detect whether some 
regularly seek to generate uncertainty within the patent system and exploit this. If such patenting 
strategies exist, then these should be a matter of concern for competition authorities as well as 





Currently the EPO and several other national patent systems in Europe and Japan allow third 
parties to challenge patent grants in a low -cost proceeding. Opposition  represents a second process 
of screening in which third parties may challenge the delineation of patent rights in order to defend 
their own or to provide information about prior art which undermines the patent entirely. Typically 
firms challenge more valu able and more damaging patents and therefore this process provides an 
important correction element to the examination process to which third parties typically do not 
provide much input. About one third of all opposed patents are revoked and one third are a mended.  
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Figure 3.5:  Opposition rate by technical field  (Source: Harhoff (2006a)) 
 
As Figure 3.5 documents the rate of opposition at the EPO has steadily declined since th e late 
1980’s. Thus far we have no understanding of the reasons for this development. The following 
possibilities have been suggested by Harhoff (2006a): 
 
1. More marginal patents have been granted and th ese marginal patents are not so 
damaging for competitors, therefore the rate of opposition decreased;  
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2. The group of firms affected by a single patent may have increased – this is consistent 
with increases in the number of claims, reviewed previously. If the  number of affected 
parties is greater, then each affected firm may refrain from opposing in the hope that 
some of the other affected parties oppose. Opposition then becomes a public good that 
is underprovided because no opponent reaps the full social bene fits of opposition. This 
is essentially the same public goods effect invoked by Shapiro and Lemley (2005)  in 
their argument regarding the damaging effects of weak patents. Their argument relates 
to the likelihood of litigation. If complementarities between patents have increased, due 
to changes in technology, then greater fragmentation o f property rights and the 
observed increase in the public goods problem might result.  
3. A greater number of patents granted falls into patent classes in which complementarities 
matter. If firms owning complementary patents  frequently interact they may have  
strong incentives to settle patent disputes away from the patent office. Such incentives 
arise whenever firms must resolve disputes repeatedly. Game theoretic research has 
shown that such repeated interaction of competitors can give rise to collusive outc omes 
(Tirole (1988, Phlips (1998) ).  The incentives to collude are particularly strong where 
firms are in a position to hold each other up, which is more likely where patents are  
complements.  Additionally settlements of patent opposition could be based on patents 
that are known to be weak but which are used to bolster collusive licensing agreemen ts. 
Antitrust concerns created by such licensing agreements are discussed by Shapiro 
(2003a).   
 
It is quite likely that each of these exp lanations has some relevance to the phenomenon we observe 
in Figure 3.5. For instance the first and third of these explanations are entirely compatible with one 
another. 
 
The second and particularly the third of these explanations are troubling from the po int of view of 
competition policy. Collusive behaviour at the EPO is presently also not on the agenda of 
competition authorities. Nonetheless this form of behaviour, if identified could have significant 
effects on welfare, if it supports monopolies that wo uld not exist if the patent office were aware of 
all the facts related to weak patents.  
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Calderini and Scellato (2004)  provide evidence on patent oppositions at the EPO in the 
telecommunications sector. They show that opposition activity in telecommunications increased in 
line with patent grants at the EPO until 1996.  Thereafter oppositions in this sector decreased 
sharply while granted p atents remained constant or grew. They provide evidence that suggests the 
larger firms in their sample are acting collusively, due to a remarkable dearth of opposition cases 
between them. They find that the vast majority of opposition cases involve quite a symmetrical 
players, with either a small firm being opposed by a large firm or vice versa. Unfortunately their 
paper does not allow us to establish whether larger firms were systematically more successful in 
the opposition process than smaller firms.  
 
While the average opposition rate at the EPO has decreased there is evidence of extensive 
opposition activity in some areas of the patent system as documented in Harhoff and Hall (2002).  
They find that the opposition rate for patent grants in the area of Cosmetics is twice the average 
rate. Furthermore they find that in this sector opposition takes place repeatedly amongst larger 
players and that one firm is particularly active in opposing others’ patents.  
 
The industry they investigate is similar to the pharmaceuticals industry in that technological 
complementarities between patents have traditionally be en thought of as of little relevance . This 
may be one reason why the incumbents in the industry so vigorously oppose each other’s patents. 
Where patents cover individual products or product attributes that are independent of one another, 
it is less likely that firms need access to each other’s patent portfolios to market products. In such a 
setting engaging in repeated conflict with rivals is not damaging to one’s own products. If a firm is 
manifestly better at patent opposition than its rivals, then a stra tegy of seeking conflict helps that 
firm to establish a reputation which may be valuable by itself. Indeed Harhoff and Hall (2002) 
observe in their study of the cosmetics industry that those firms that engage in frequent oppositions 
are not themselves attacked as frequently as others.  
 
These findings raise an important question however – is it possible and do firms in this industry 
systematically pick on smaller rivals to raise their costs? If such strategies exist, have firms been 
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able to keep entrants out of particularly attractive product segments? These questions remain to be 
answered but would be i nteresting from the point of view of competition policy.  
 
We comment on the competition policy aspects of strategic behaviour in opposition at the end of 





The litigation step is the one which poses most problems for empirical research. As there are few 
systematic databases of litigation cases filed, authors are frequently forced to compile databases by 
hand. Nonetheless there is a sizeable literature which provides  indications about patent litigation 
trends in the United States. The main concern here is whether litigation is increasing and to what 
extent such litigation arises between parties that are not of the same size.  There are two main 
patterns to discuss:  
 
1. Litigation initiated by large firms against smaller firms that own production facilities.  
2. Litigation initiated by small firms without production facilities; here the defendants are 
usually larger firms.  
 
Economists have long studied the phenomenon of litiga tion, because it presents an interesting 
puzzle: if two parties to a dispute have (a) the same information about the value which they are in 
dispute over and (b) the same information about the law, then they should settle their dispute and 
avoid going to court. The fact that we observe litigation suggests that these two conditions are not 
always met. The economics literature on litigation   (Priest and Klein (1984)), (Bebchuk (1984)), 
(Schweizer (1989)), (Waldfogel (1998)), (Lanjouw and Lerner (1998) ) has emphasized three 
different mechanisms that may lead parties to fight a dispute through in court. These are: 
 
· Divergent expectations, which arise when uncertainty leads parties to different expectations 
about facts of the case or the law;  
· Asymmetric information, which arises when one party tries to exploit superior information 
in order to extract rents; 
· Asymmetric stakes, which arise when the defendant in a suit is unable to ade quately 
compensate the patentee. This will arise if the patent in dispute has a value to the owner 




Empirical analysis of litigation has focused mainly on the third of these explanations, due to the 
expectation that court proceedings themselves usually mitigate the fa ctors underlying the first two.  
Asymmetric stakes have been found to play an important role in intellectual property litigation in 
several empirical studies: Waldfogel (1995, (1998, Siegelman and Waldfogel (1999)  and Somaya 
(2003). These studies all focus on the experience of the United States. There are presently no 
studies on the effects of asymmetric stakes in patent litigation in Europe.  
 
It is more likely that such asymmetric stakes arise if patents are complements to one another. Then 
the validity or the licenses on one patent will affect the value of one or several others. Thus we 
would expect patent litigation to arise increasingly in complex product industries. This is borne out 
in the dataset constructed by Somaya (2003) who investigates litigation in computers 
(semiconductors, data storage, computer systems, I/O devices, computer applications and 
networking technologies) and research medicines (biotechnology, drug delivery systems, assays 
and dental innovations). Consistently with this hypothesis he also finds that computer suits 
typically involve more than one patent.  
 
Evidence provided by Meurer and Bessen (2005)  shows that the likelihood of litigating and of 
becoming a defendant in a patent suit is particularly high (relative to expenditure on R&D) in t he 
electronics (SIC 36) and instruments (SIC 38) industries, both of which are classified as complex 
product industries above. We reproduce this evidence, part of which is not included in their paper, 
in Table 3.1 below. 
 
The main finding of recent empiric al studies is that on aggregate litigation has increased in line 
with patenting (Somaya (2003)), (Ziedonis (2003)), (Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001, Lanjouw 
and Schankerman (2004)), (Meurer and Bessen (2005) ). Another important finding is that small 
firms are more likely to be involved in either the defence of their own patents (relative to patents) 
or as alleged infringers of others’ patents (relative to R&D expenditure) than large firms (Lanjouw 




Table 3.1:   Reproduced from Meurer and Bessen (2005) with additional information 
kindly provided by Jim Bessen.  
 
Finally there is evidence that repeated intera ction reduces the likelihood of litigation (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman (2004)). This econometric evidence underscores the descriptive results we cited 
above for opposition at the EPO that repeated interaction is likely to reduce the probability of 
opposition/litigation. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004)  also find that large asymmetries between 
the patent portfolios of rival fir ms within a technology area have the effect of reducing the number 
of court cases the larger firm gets involved in. This confirms the value of building up large patent 




Patent infringement s uits brought by large firms directed at small firms  
There is now a whole host of studies which show that patent litigation presents a serious and 
elevated cost to firms with small patent portfolios relative to firms with large patent portfolios. 
Lerner (1995) found that small biotechnology firms avoided patenting in certain patent classes if 
patent litigation affected many  patents in these classes previously. Lanjouw and Schankerma n 
(2004) and Meurer and Bessen (2005)  find that small firms face substantially higher marginal costs 
of protecting their patents than larger firms and that these costs have been increasing recently.  
 
These findings imply that we must investigate to what extent opposition activity at the EPO and 
litigation activity which we have data on involves cases between asymmetric parties. We will seek 
to establish whether oppositions and litigation have similar effects on small firms’ costs of 
patenting in Europe as in the United States.  
 
Patent infringement suits brou ght by small firms directed at large firms  
In this section we discuss the phenomenon of patent trolls. A patent troll is a company that acquires 
patents of failed companies or independent innovators and uses these to threaten suit against 
infringing partie s, without having the intention of actively using the patent they assert 48. This 
definition is quite slippery as patents are created in order to allow inventors to recoup fixed outlays 
on R&D. Typically a suit will be classified as being brought by a patent  troll if the patent being 
asserted is of dubious quality; this often means that the patent is also very broad. Patent trolls can 
earn a lot of money because many of those they seek to hold up are unwilling or unable to fight a 
patent infringement case through to a judgement in order to have the patent invalidated.  
 
The problem of patent trolls is more likely to arise as the quality of patent examination decreases. 
More weak patents mean that there is more ammunition to fuel to process of hold up and that the 
ideal patent for this purpose which is typically vague but covers an extremely lucrative process 49.  
 
                                                   
48 Brenda Sandburg traces the origin of the term “patent troll” back to Peter Detkin, the assistant general counsel at 
Intel. Her account of the  activities of such firms can be found at: http://www.phonetel.com/pdfs/LWTrolls.pdf  . A good 
article on patent trolls can be found on Wikipedia.  
49 One example cited by Brenda Sandburg are the pat ents on machine vision and bar code technologies owned and 
enforced by Jerome Lemelson. Wikipedia provides interesting information on Lemelson’s methods and his successes 
and failures in court. He has been occupying courts in the United States until very r ecently.  
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Reitzig, Henkel and Heath (2006)  argue that the troll’s business model works best in industries in 
which patents are complements. This is due to the fact tha t in such industries products are often 
based on very large numbers of patents and no firm can ever be absolutely certain that it has ruled 
out the risk of infringement entirely. In such settings it is profitable for firms to acquire obscure 
patents and wait for these to be infringed. They point out the strategy of being infringed is 
profitable because of the threat of injunctions and because the damage awards that are attainable 
are usually very large. They argue that courts generally refuse to consider th e costs of inventing 
around a patent, that the infringer would have had, had they been aware of the patent, as a basis for 
damages. They provide examples in which these costs are almost zero and yet the damages 
awarded are very large 50. If the costs of inventing around were taken into account, then the 
marginal value added to a product by the patent under dispute would become the main issue in 
court. This would doubtless be so low that many cases would no longer come to court.  
 
While this argument is an int eresting one, it disregards the large costs faced by a defendant in the 
process of coming to a court decision on a litigated patent. These may include the effects of 
injunctions (Hall and Ziedonis (2001) ). At present there is very little evidence of the activitie s of 
patent trolls in Europe, but even their activities in the United States may be costing European firms 
large amounts of money as the following quote found by (Reitzig, Henkel and Heath (2006) ) 
reveals: 
 
“From an IP management perspective, patent sharks (the same as patent trolls) currently pose one 
of the great challenges to our firm” (Peter Halkjaer, Senior IP Manager, Mobile Phones at Nokia).  
 
 
3.4 Competition policy, patent law and strategic use of patent systems  
 
This section summarizes what we know at presen t about the competition policy implications of 
strategic use of the patent system. In particular the section summarizes which role competition 
policy can play in industries affected by strategic patenting. To do this we consider: i) the main 
                                                   
50 Interestingly this is another case involving Mr Lemelson. The patent covered a coupling technology which Mattel 
Inc. used in a toy truck. Mattel were forced to pay Mr Lemelson almost $25 million.  
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welfare effects of strategic patenting as far as they have been identified, ii) the main antitrust 
legislation that is related to behaviour we have identified and iii) the way in which we propose that 
our study must proceed to provide an assessment of the empirical impo rtance of the welfare effects 
identified in Europe.  
 
In the introduction to this chapter (3.1) we undertook a review of the welfare justification for the 
operation of a patent system. We also showed that this form of analysis provides guidance 
regarding the extent of protection provided by patent rights. We turned then to the subject of this 
study: strategic use of the patent system, primarily by firms in complex product industries (3.1.2). 
Here we noted the fact that the economic theory and empirical rese arch are still in a state of flux. 
Although some implications from this research are emerging, it is too early to draw strong welfare 
implications from this literature regarding the extent of protection provided by patent rights in 
complex product industri es. This does not mean that we are unable to draw any conclusions from 
the current literature on the patent explosion. Rather it implies that this study is in many respects 
advancing into new territory and that we must take this into account. The methodolo gy we propose 
in the following section is a reflection of this fact.  
 
The literature we reviewed in section (3.1.2) and in section (3.3) shows that a proper understanding 
of the impact of firms’ patenting strategies calls for an in depth analysis of the i nstitutional details 
of the patent system to an extent not attempted by earlier theoretical work on patents. This raises a 
central question: how should competition policy and patent law interact?  
 
In our discussion of the definition of strategic use of th e patent system (3.2) we note that it has 
been the domain of patent law to provide the correct incentives for innovating firms. The domain 
of competition policy has been to regulate firms’ interactions in product markets and in particular 
the effects of these interactions on consumers. This division of labour is clearly set out and 
analyzed in Régibeau and Rocket (2004) . Our review of the literature on the patent explosion and 
strategic uses of the patent system indicates that where patents are complements, competition 
policy and patent law must draw  closer together. The literature review does not indicate that the 
fundamental division of labour delineated here must be abandoned.  
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Our review has found that complementarity of patent rights calls for a closer integration of patent 
law and competition po licy because firms must resort to instruments of coordination such as 
licensing contracts, patent pools, standard setting in order to insure themselves against hold -up. 
Thus the regulation of licensing will have even stronger effects on the way in which pa tent systems 
affect firms’ incentives to innovate. To make this point starkly: in a world of complementary 
patents the prohibition or restriction of licensing would reduce firms’ incentives to innovate. There 
would be no mechanisms to resolve hold -up situations and innovating firms would be threatened 
with expropriation of their innovations. Therefore the ex ante effects of licensing rules on 
incentives to innovate and patent must be taken into account both by those designing these rules 
and by those who design patent law. 
 
Competition policy also has ex post effects on firms’ behaviour. These arise where competition 
policy authorities act on the rules they have set to determine in practice how firms should act. Here 
the literature we have reviewed has not a chieved a consensus on what should be the basis of ex 
post action by competition authorities. In particular it is argued by Carrier (2003) that competition 
authorities should take into account mainly the dynamic effects of firms’ patenting strategies on 
rival firms’ innovation incentives. Similarly the doctrine of innovation markets suggested by 
Gilbert and Sunshine (1995)  implies that competition authorities should take into consideration 
how firms’ agreements and transactions affect resources devoted to research and development 
directed at competition in some future market. Both of these proposals imply that competition 
authorities involve themselves  in detailed deliberations regarding the development of technology 
and its relation to product markets. In practice the literature on the concept of innovation markets 
has shown this to be a difficult concept to implement and so it has been used with restr aint (Davis 
(2003)). 
 
The definition we have set out above is more restrained in its definition of the remit of  competition 
authorities in the field of the strategic use of patent systems. We argue above (3.2.3) that patent law 
has a large role to play in reducing firms’ incentives to patent extensively where patents are often 
just variants on a theme and to affect  firms’ incentives where these are misusing the process within 
the patent system to create uncertainty. In our view much could be done to reduce the problem of 
strategic patenting by strengthening firms’ incentives to focus on really important patents. 
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Therefore our definition of anticompetitive effects of the strategic use of the patent system restricts 
itself to direct effects of firms’ patenting strategies on product markets. This is a more conservative 
position than that discussed in the previous paragr aph. Given the present state of the art we feel 
that this is appropriate. The following discussion will show that this does not leave antitrust 
agencies without a role in regulating firms’ behaviour ex post. The main effect is to preclude 
antitrust agencies from focusing on the provision of innovation incentives.  
 
3.4.1 Summary of welfare effects identified  
 
In this section we summarize the findings of section 3.3 and highlight the most likely problems to 
be addressed by competition policy. Table 3.2 below summa rizes the results of the previous 
section. 
 
Our review of the empirical literature in section 3.3 has shown that the strategic use of patent 
systems raises concerns about collusion and about unilateral behaviour. In general the 
complementarity of patents i n complex technologies gives rise to greater frequency of interaction 
between firms. This happens when firms disentangle the patent thicket and insure themselves 







policy aspects ? 
Indirect competition 
policy aspects ? 
Application 
Increased applications  Yes None Collusion opportunities  
Increased entry No None None 
Increasing complexity 
of applications 
Possibly None Uncertainty, possibly aim 
to raise entry barriers, 
induce exit 
Examination 
Poor quality No None Monopolies, Collusion 
opportunities  
Uncertainty Yes Raise costs, Raise 
entry barriers  
 
Opposition 
Collusion Yes Monopolize markets   
Predation Yes Predation / Raising 
rivals’ costs  
 
Litigation 
Collusion Yes Monopolize markets   
Predation Yes Predation / Raising 
rivals’ costs  
 
Trolls Yes None Create large 
inefficiencies 
Licensing Yes Collusion, 
Foreclosure 
 
Table 3.2:  Summary of the results   
 
We have identi fied both the role of first movers who make use of patent portfolio strategies first to 
gain competitive advantage and industries in which all firms have adapted to a new business model 
in which patent portfolios assume an important role. Where this busine ss model has been 




Table 3.2 summarises the phenomena we have discussed in section 3.3. It provides information on 
the question whether complementari ties between patents are relevant to the behaviour and whether 
there are direct or indirect competition policy aspects. The remainder of this section discusses how 
each form of behaviour identified is connected to concepts that underpin competition policy.   
 
Collusive behaviour  
Section 3.3 has shown that collusion connected to strategic use of patents may arise in three 
different ways: collusion of firms in adversarial proceedings (1) at the opposition stage, (2) at the 
litigation stage and (3) collusion of  firms in general. We comment on each of these briefly:  
 
Collusion during adversarial proceedings  
The term collusive behaviour is usually reserved for firms that act jointly to raise prices and restrict 
output in specific markets. Above we have argued that  there can be collusive behaviour in 
adversarial proceedings that regard patents. The parallel to price fixing arises, because firms that 
cooperate to avoid re-examination of patents may have agreed to withhold information from the 
patent office that would  invalidate a patent.  
 
In such cases the patent constitutes an exclusion right which should not exist or should be restricted 
in its reach. In either case a patent right that is vacuous but remains in force constitutes a basis for 
market power which ultim ately is borne by consumers. In this sense cooperation of firms to avoid 
re-examinations of patents constitutes a form of price fixing or collusion, albeit indirectly.  
 
In order to prevent this form of cooperation the antitrust authorities must impose rule s on the types 
of licensing contracts which firms are permitted to write and enforce these rules. Shapiro (2003a) 
and Maurer and Scotchmer (2004)  discuss principles on which such regulation might be founded. 
The enforcement of such principles remains challenging as it is hard if not impossible for 
competition authorities to collect information on licensing contracts between firms. Information on 
the incidence of opposition and litigation in different industries may p rovide clues to the likelihood 
of collusive licensing between firms. Furthermore patent data allow us to classify firms as rivals in 
technology space. This together with an analysis of the type of technology, the concentration of 
competitors’ shares of the  technology space and the stability of these shares can provide clues to 
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the likelihood of collusion. For instance if a technology is complex, there are few large firms, that 
have large shares of the patents covering such a technology and the identity of t hese firms is stable 
over a long period of time, then existing theories of collusion suggest that collusive behaviour is 
sustainable (Phlips (1998), Tirole (1988)).  
 
If a suspicion is entertained that firms in a specific sector are colluding at the opposition and 
litigation stages of the patent system it remain s to establish what aim such activity has.  
 
It may be that the firms involved are attempting to reduce transactions costs that arise within a 
patent thicket. In this case it is incumbent on patent offices to note that firms are avoiding 
opposition and to evaluate critically whether this is reducing the quality of patents which are 
granted.  
 
On the other hand it may be that collusion within the opposition and litigation stages of the patent 
system is a signal for collusive activity that affects product mar kets. Such effects might be the 
traditional price fixing effects. Research  on multimarket contact by Bernheim and Whinston (1990)  
has shown that firms will be able to sustain collusion more easily if they interact on several 
markets simultaneously.  The punishment which a cartel can implement is much greater if firms 
collude in one market but are able to  sanction one another on multiple markets in case of deviation 
from a cartel agreement. The patent system adds an additional level of strategic interaction for 
firms which is akin to strategic interaction on a separate market. Therefore in the context of t he 
patent system one might surmise that the threat of more intense opposition by a rival at a patent 
office and in the courts could be used to provide additional stability to a cartel agreement.”  
 
Finally, a cartel might also consist in an attempt to erec t entry barriers against smaller entrants as 
discussed below.  
 
The important empirical question in this context is to what extent firms that have the ability to hold 
each other up or punish one another in the patent sphere are also competitors in product markets. 
There are suggestions in the recent empirical literature (Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen 
(2005)) that product market rivals also hold patent portfolios that interact, but this question has not 
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been studied very extensively yet. Furthermore we do not know whether such constellations are 
more likely to arise in  industries in which patents are complements.  
 
Unilateral conduct  
Here we consider two forms of unilateral conduct, predation and foreclosure. Possibilities for each 
of these types of behaviour arise within the patent system. Our main purpose here is to c larify 
where this may occur.  
 
Predation 
Predatory behaviour in the sense of Ordover and Willig (1981) arises if an action is  profitable 
solely because it allows the firm to exclude its rivals. This definition of predation expressly 
includes non price predation strategies and it is this form of predation we are dealing with here. 
The problem, as always with predation, is to demonstrate that a firm or group of firms is using its 
patent portfolio to affect market competition in this way. We should repeat our observation from 
section 3.2.3 here: it cannot be the role of a competition authority to insur e firms against situations 
in which a rival has patented a series of blocking patents that prevent the adoption of a new 
technology. However Rubinfeld and Maness (2005)  demonstrate that firms m ay have a case to 
answer if they employ a portfolio of patents of dubious quality to affect the ongoing business of 
rival firms. To assess such a case a competition authority will need data on the development of 
competition in underlying product markets. F urthermore the competition authority will need strong 
evidence that the patent portfolio in question is of poor quality or does not support the allegation of 
infringement which is brought by the patent owner.  
 
Therefore acts of predation will leave traces  in patent data if they are connected to opposition or 
litigation activity. In such cases firms are likely to focus their oppositions or infringement suits on 
rivals, whose costs they seek to raise. Meurer (2003) provides examples and further literature 
regarding such activities in the United States.  
 
We have described this type of behaviour as predation in Table 3.2. . This alludes to the literature 
on litigation which has found that in particular small firms are susceptible to being forced out of 
markets if confronted with systematic threats of litigation. Where such litigation is frivolous in the 
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sense of  Meurer (2003), e.g. based on infringement claims that are found to be without substance, 
the litigating firm may be attempting to raise its smaller rivals’ costs.   
 
Foreclosure 
As Table 3.2. shows we are concern ed with horizontal foreclosure in the sense of  
D.G.Competition (2005)51. This form of foreclosure arises when a dominant firm in an upstream 
market seeks to foreclose access to downstream customers. Foreclosure often involves exclusive 
licenses that create barriers to entry for an efficient upstream rival as discu ssed by Motta (2004), 
Rey and Tirole (2005)  and Whinston (2006). Such exclusive licensing contracts are considered in 
the recent discussions surrounding Article 82 and intellectual property ( Dolmans and O'Donoghue 
(2006)).  
 
Modern theories of foreclosure emphasize that externalities between firms on one side of the 
market are an important ingredient in allowin g the other side of the market to attempt foreclosure 
(Whinston (2006)). Thus foreclosure opportunities are more likely to arise in markets in which 
complementarities between patents are important as such complementarities give rise to 
externalities between firms. O ur attempt to identify patent classes in which patents are 
complements is an important first step in a systematic assessment of the opportunities for 
foreclosure which may be arising in the context of the European patent system. Beyond this we do 
not see any role for our research into firms’ patenting strategies to provide direct information about 
the likelihood that firms are foreclosing markets. This has to do with the kind of information that is 
contained in patent data. In particular, we do not have inf ormation on licensing contracts and it will 
be impossible to infer that foreclosure is taking place from the data on patent applications, on 
references to and from patent documents or on opposition and litigation of individual patents.   
  
This concludes our review of patenting strategies that are likely to give rise to competition policy 
concerns. We turn now to a brief review of the relevant competition legislation connected to the 
practices we have discussed here.  
 
                                                   
51 The discussion paper on Article 82 provides a  very wide ranging definition of foreclosure. In particular this 
subsumes predatory pricing. We distinguish between non price predation, which is not included in the definition of 
foreclosure in the discussion paper, and horizontal foreclosure as defined t here. 
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3.4.2 Review of relevant competition law  
 
As we have noted in the introduction to this section as well as in previous sections the most 
important competition legislation for the operation of the patent system are the rules regarding 
licensing. Additionally our discussion above has identified that fi rms may use patent portfolios to 
support collusion or to raise rivals’ costs which is a form of non price predation.  Furthermore, 
there is the question how weak patents affect competition law cases regarding licensing. Tom and 
Gilman (2003) discuss the effect of uncertainty about the validity of patents on the question 
whether firms are to be considered competitors or not; we briefly deal with this issue below. 
Finally, we also briefly review competition law relevant to such activities. We restrict ourselves to 
a review of competition law in Europe here.  
 
In general European competiti on law rests on the provisions of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of 
the European Communities as well as on the Merger Regulation. Article 81 prohibits agreements 
between firms which may distort trade between member states and competition within the commo n 
market. Article 82 prohibits the abuse of a dominant position by one or several firms.  
 
 
The competition legislation relevant to licensing  
In May 2004 Regulation 1/2003 (the “modernisation” regulation) came into force which provides 
for a much greater role for the competition authorities and national courts in the enforcement of the 
provisions of Articles 81 and 82. Together with this regulation the previous system of notifications 
of licensing agreements came to an end. Under this system licensing contr acts that did not fall 
under the provisions of the Technology Transfer Block Exemption (TTBE) applying to technology 
transfer agreements (Regulation 240/96) or the block exemption for research and development 
(Regulation 418/85) had to be notified to the c ommission with a request for an exemption from the 
provisions of Article 81(1).   
 
Licensing is now regulated under Regulation 772/2004, the block exemption regulation for 
technology transfer. This regulation contains market share ceilings below which firm s are exempt 
from the provisions of Article 81. Under the regulation the following practices are black listed 
 116
(prohibited) and have the implication of preventing the application of the block exemption to the 
licensing contract in general: price fixing, lim itation of output, the allocation of markets, 
restrictions on the ability of the licensee to use technology provided by third parties if the parties 
are competitors in the market. Under this regulation firms are considered to be competitors if they 
would have been able to compete in the absence of a license. If firms are considered non -
competitors, then the regulation is less restrictive than in cases in which firms are competitors. 
Tom and Gilman (2003)  argue that uncertainty about the validity of patent rights is crucial here. In 
a competition case the validity of a patent may determi ne whether firms would have been 
competitors or not. Specifically, if a patent is invalid, then there is no requirement for a license and 
firms would have been able to compete. Similarly, if a patent is narrower than claimed by the 
holder firms would have been able to compete. However this is only the case if the actual breadth 
of the patent is clearly established. These distinctions are not mere formalities, Tom and Gilman 
(2003) cite a number of cases fought in the United States over precisely this question.  They point 
to the fact that also in the United States the court have not yet  developed a unified approach to the 
problems posed by patent uncertainty.  
 
If it can be established that firms are not competitors the list of black listed practices in Regulation 
772/2004 is less restrictive than if the firms are competitors. In this ca se it precludes only price 
restrictions and passive sales. Furthermore the regulation does not apply to grant back provisions if 
these are exclusive or require the transfer of property rights to a technology. Non exclusive grant 
back clauses are permitted in order to encourage licensing. This is particularly relevant to technical 
fields in which innovation is cumulative. For further detail regarding this regulation refer to Korah 
(2004).  
 
Regulation 2659/2000 – the group exemption for cooperative R&D – exempts some form of 
research joint ventures. Such agreements may be substitutes for ex ante cross licensing agreements.  
Just as in the technology transfer regulation a market share ceiling applies.  
 
In general these regulations are viewed to be quite tough as they impose strong market share 
restrictions that may exclude licensing in markets in which costly research and de velopment 
activities naturally lead to high levels of concentration. However, if agreements do not fall under 
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these exemptions, they are not prohibited per se, but have to be analysed on a case -by-case basis, 
the outcome of which can still be that they are  not considered to be anti -competitive.  
 
Finally it should be noted that even if licensing agreements are not caught by the provisions of 
Article 81, they may nonetheless be affected by the provisions of Article 82. The application of 
Article 82 to exclus ionary practices is currently being reviewed. Most relevant to licensing 
contracts are the provisions regarding the refusal to license intellectual property rights. These 
proposals outline when a dominant firm or group of firms may be required to license a  technology. 
The introduction of such rules is likely to strengthen weaker firms relative to dominant firms if 
patents are complementary and should enhance these smaller firms’ innovation incentives. 
Incentives will be improved where smaller firms would ot herwise not have access to the 
technology of the dominant firms.  
 
The competition legislation relevant to collusion  
Collusion with the object to fix prices or production quotas is prohibited under Article 81. This 
article also prohibits agreements to limi t or control technical development. We have discussed 
above that collusion, whether explicit or tacit, within the opposition process at the EPO is not the 
same as price fixing. However we have also argued that it may have effects on product markets 
where it allows a group of firms to erect barriers to entry into a specific technology. If this can be 
demonstrated collusion within the patent system together with its effects on product markets may 
fall under the provisions of Article 81(1) and therefore may be  illegal. Of course collusive 
agreements that are enforced through threats of patent litigation would fall under this article as 
well. 
 
The competition legislation relevant to non price predation  
Non price predation as outlined in the previous section (3.4 .1) arises where firms use their patent 
portfolios to raise the costs of their rivals in order to induce exit or less aggressive competition 
within the market. This type of behaviour is presently outside the scope of the review of Article 82 
outlined above. Nonetheless this form of behaviour should fall under Article 82. It is hard to find 
good precedents for this in case law however. The reason is that here, contrary to most cases of 
raising rivals’ costs, the dominant firm is not supplying an input to the  affected firm. Rather they 
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are directly affecting the firms’ costs by involving them in litigation. In the case discussed by 
Rubinfeld and Maness (2005)  the dominant firm is trying to provide an input to the firms it 
threatened with litigation. The fact that this type of case is hard to pigeon hole underscores the 
difficulties that arise in this area.  
 
3.4.3 Applying competition policy analysis to patent data  
 
Here, we address a very general methodo logical problem to do with the interaction of patents and 
product markets. This could be called the problem of identifying a market. Under the traditional 
view of patents a patent was tied to a single product. If one suspected that the firm owning a patent  
was violating antitrust rules, then the market in which that firm was seeking to maintain or 
establish a monopoly with that patent was clearly identified through the patent.  
 
Under the new view of patents there is a problem in identifying the market which  the firm owning 
a patent is monopolizing. For instance there are technologies for which there are many markets and 
often these are not final goods markets but markets for intermediate inputs. Whether these markets 
for the technology are monopolistic or no t is irrelevant, although we would expect some element of 
market power to be present. Furthermore, it is often necessary to assort a whole array of patents in 
order to be able to use such a technology. In this setting it may be very profitable to monopoliz e 
just a bottleneck component of a technology in order to extract large surpluses from the application 
of the technology in diverse markets. A bottleneck component would be a patent which is 
necessary for the technology to operate and for which no viable s ubstitute exists.  
 
This form of monopoly is very different from the monopoly typically analyzed in competition 
cases. There is no longer a clearly definable market which is being monopolized as the bottleneck 
patent by itself will have no value or little value at all. Only the combination of the bottleneck 
patent with complementary patents, which then constitutes a technology, is valuable. The owner of 
the bottleneck does not hold a monopoly over this technology, although they may be able to extract 
a major part of the surplus which it generates through bargaining with the owners of the remaining 
complementary patents. The outcome of such a multiparty bargaining process depends on factors 
that are very specific to the group of bargaining firms and the barga ining setting (Binmore (1992)),  
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(Muthoo (1999)) and is not amenable to analysis using the standard monopoly model. 52  In 
particular, the monopoly model assumes that the monopolist sets a price for their good, whereas a 
bargaining model allows for negotiations between both parties. In such a case outc omes very 
different from the monopoly result may emerge.  
 
This discussion shows that in a setting in which patents are complements, identifying a market 
which is the relevant antitrust market may be very hard or well nigh impossible. This problem is 
compounded when we are faced with the analysis of firms’ patenting strategies and where each 
individual firm holds large patent portfolios. A complementary practical problem also emerges: 
patents are classified into IPC classes using the International Patent Cla ssification whereas firms 
are often assigned to industry classifications according to their principal line of business. Any 
attempt to link between patents and product markets must assign patents in IPC classes to industry 
classes. Attempts to do this exis t (OECD (1994)), but these disregard the problem s in linking 
product markets and patent classes which we noted above 53.    
 
Due to these problems we have chosen an alternative approach to the study of the competition 
policy implications of strategic patenting. In the previous section we have delineated c arefully 
what is known about firms’ patenting strategies. In this section we have extended this discussion 
by drawing out how some of these strategies could give rise to competition policy concerns.  
 
This approach follows the “first principles” approach t o competition policy advocated by Salop 
(2000) and OFT/CRA (2002). Salop argues that competition policy analysis should focus on the 
competitive effect of firms’ actions. This is contrasted with the usual app roach to competition 
policy in which the definition of a relevant market and the question of market power must be 
addressed before competitive effects are considered (Geroski and Griffith (2003) ), (Motta (2004)). 
The first principles approach  is an effects based approach to competition policy. It is based on the 
direct evaluation of competitive harm to consumers of an allegedly anticompetitive action. Thus 
                                                   
52 The complexity of undertaking competition policy analysis in the context of bargaining is currently affecting 
regulation in other areas, such as that of telecommunications. In a useful paper  ( Binmore and Harbord (2005) ] show 
how bargaining affects settings that were traditionally analyzed using monopoly models.  
53 Note that we wil l make use of the definitions of the 30 technology areas set out in the appendix to this report, but we 
do not make use of the link between these fields and product markets which is also suggested by the report for reasons 
discussed in the text.  
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our aim is to provide as much information as possible from patent data about the effects  of a firm’s 
actions on competitors. Given this information an antitrust authority will be able to collect 
information on impacts this may have had on consumers buying from these competitors or the 
original firm. The benefit of patent data in this case is that they provide information about the firms 
affected by allegedly anticompetitive behaviour. There is therefore no need to identify the relevant 
market in order to determine which firms and which firms’ customers might be affected by the 




















4. Empirical Assessment: Importance and Identification of Affected 
Sectors 
 
4.1 Introduction and Methodology  
 
In the first interim report to the Commission we proposed a n empirical two-step procedure  for the 
identification of technical a reas which might be considered prone to anti -competitive behavior of 
firms. The chosen approach is of a descriptive nature and will employ a series of indicators which 
will be computed from patent data. In a first step, relevant technical areas which are p rone to be 
influenced by strategic use of the patent system will be identified. In a second step, individual 
patenting strategies within selected technical areas at the firm level are analyzed based on the 
findings from the first step of our analysis. Our procedure relies on the analysis of comprehensive 
large-scale patent databases provided by the EPO. These databases cover approximately 1.76 
million patent applications filed at the EPO between 1978 and 2006. 54  
 
Step 1) Identification of technical fields w arranting further investigation  
 
The aim of step 1 is the identification of technical areas in which strategic use of patents is most 
likely to occur. As we have noted in our tender document, the patent literature does not contain a 
recognized or reliable method to map patents to product markets. In some technical fields, IPC 
classifications can be related fairly precisely to some markets (e.g. in cosmetics), in other fields it 
is almost impossible to do so (e.g., biotechnology). Therefore, in this study we  will rely on the 
original International Patent Classification Scheme  (IPC) used by the patent offices world -wide. 
The IPC is a hierarchical system in which the whole area of technology is divided into a range of 
sections, classes, subclasses and groups. 55 All patent applications are assigned to at least one IPC 
group during their examination by the patent office based on the technological nature of the 
underlying invention. The OST-INPI/FhG-ISI Technology Classification is used to classify the 
                                                   
54 We use the PATSTAT database as of September 2006 and the EPASYS database as of May 2006.  These datasets 
provide comprehensive coverage of all patent applications at the EPO.  
55  See http://www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/ipc8/?lang=en  for more information.  
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patents into one of 30 technology areas which can be aggregated to six broader main areas. 56 Based 
on this classification of different technical areas we will compute different indicators for each of 
the areas in order to characterize different patenting regimes.  
 
Moreover, we will compute many of these indicators on an annual basis in order to analyze and to 
compare their development over time. For most of the indicators we will use the priority year of a 
patent application as the reference year for the indicators. The priority year is the year in which a 
patent application was filed for the first time at a patent office. Within the priority system 
established by the Paris Convention the application can be subsequently filed within one year after 
the exact priority date (the priority year) at another patent office in nations that have ratified the 
Paris Convention. Therefore, in many cases the priority year can be different from the year in 
which the application has been filed at the EPO ( application year).57 Nevertheless, we use the 
priority year as the reference year for the annual computation of our indicators, since the priority 
year is more directly linked to a firm’s initial decision to apply for patent protection for a given 
invention. In cases where our indicators r elate to opposition against granted patents we will use the 
grant year as reference year for these indicators. Opposition only arises once a patent is granted. 
Since the time lag between the filing of a patent application at the EPO and its final grant is on 
average more then four years (Harhoff and Wagner (2005)) and varies greatly over different 
applications, using the grant year for indicators relating to disputed patents is more appropriate 
than its priority year.  
 
We will compute different indicators based on patent counts and patent references for each of the 
30 technical areas over time. Table 4.1.1 gives a brief description of the indicators we compute as 
well as a short interpretation of their meaning.  
 
 
                                                   
56  The OST-INPI/FhG-ISI Technology Classification is an aggregation scheme which classifies the IPC subgroups 
into 30 technology areas (see Oecd (1994) 
57  For example, an application could have been filed at the USPTO in March 1995 and then – within its priority year – 




Number of patent 
applications  
The most basic indicator we use is the count of patent 
applications . Computing the numbers of patent applications 
per technical field yields interesting insights into patent 
filing trends. In particular, increasing growth rates in 
patent application counts  in a technical area might be a 
consequence of a shift in the patenting strategies of firms 
active in the respective technological area. Patent 
applications at the EPO are set out by the yea r in which the 
application for the patent was first made at a patent office 
world wide; this is called the priority year.  
Concentration of patent 
holdings 
The concentration of patent holdings  among firms in a 
technical field is computed based on establis hed 
concentration measures like the Herfindahl index58, the 
concentration ratios of the largest 4 ( C4) and the largest 8 
(C8) firms59.60 Below we have concentrated on the C4 ratio 
as this is based on consolidated names of firms. We have 
found that the Herfind ahl index is unreliable as long as all 
names are not consolidated. Consolidating the names of all 
patent applicants would be a herculean task however, given 
that there are over 250,000 different firm names in the patent 
database. 
                                                   
58  The Herfindahl-Index is the sum of the squared shares of the patents held by a firm relative to all patents in an IP C 
subsection.  
59  C4 (C8) concentration measures are the share of pat ent applications filed by the 4 ( 8) most largest  applicants in 
given IPC subsection.  
60  Please note that the computation of concentration measures relies on applicant names provided withi n the 
PATSTAT database. We will consolidate these names (consolidation of conglomerates and correction of typos) 




Entry and exit of 
patentees 
The analysis of the concentration of patent holdings among 
firms can be complemented by studying entry and exit. 
There is no generally accepted definition of entry and exit 
into technological areas. We define an entrant into a 
technology area in a given year t as a firm that has not 
applied for a patent in the three years prior to t in that 
technology area, that is applying for at least one patent in 
year t and that goes on to apply for at least one further patent 
in one of the three years after year t. Conversely we define a 
firm exit as a firm that has applied for at least one patent in 
the technology area in one of the three years preceding year 
t, is applying for a patent in year t and then fails to apply for 
further patents in the three years after year t.  
Rate of oppositions  The count of oppositions relative to the number of patents 
granted in a given technological area will be computed and 
analyzed in combination with other indicators. For example, 
a growing concentration of patent holdings among firms 
combined with a decreasing number of oppositions might be 
a first indicator of collusive behaviour of firms active in a 
technological field.  
Number of claims  The number of claims  contained in a patent application can 
be seen as a measure of the complexity of patent 
applications. It has also been suggested that some applicants 
file an excessive number of claims in order to create 
uncertainty about the true scope of the patent. Here 
uncertainty derives from the volume of claim s filed which 




Number of divisional 
patent applications  
A divisional patent application  is a type of patent application  
which contains matter from a previously -filed application  
(the "parent" application). Divisional applications exist to 
cover cases in which the parent application describes more 
than one invention and the applicant is required to split the 
parent into one or more divisonal applications each claiming 
only a single invention. However, we suspect that divisional 
patent applications are also used more strategically by 
applicants in order to increase flexibility during the 
examination process.   
Number of shared 
priorities 
We compute the average number of patents whic h share one 
or more priority filings. It might well be the case that this 
indicator is higher in areas where patentees try to create   
patent thickets.  
Number of X references  We compute the average number and share of X 
references contained in a patent application. X references 
point to previous patents and other documents which are 
conflicting with the application under consideration. 
Increasing shares of X references in a patent application can 
be considered an indication for decreasing quality.  
 
Step 2) Analysis of individual patenting behaviour in relevant technical fields  
In the second step of our analysis we examine patenting in a selected set of technology areas. 
Based on the results from the first stage we select nine areas for closer inspection.61 For the 
selected areas an in -depth analysis is provided focussing on the patenting behaviour of individual 
firms. Since the number of firms in a given technology area is relatively high, we restrict our 
analysis to the most important firms in the selected  technology areas. The indicators we compute 
characterize (1) the patenting activities  of the analyzed firms and (2) the interaction of these 
firms with other firms patenting in the same area.  
                                                   
61 We select these areas on the basis of several indicators. The selecti on is undertaken in section 4.4 below.  
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We undertake three types of analysis:  
- we compute an indicator t o infer the areas most likely affected by patent thickets;  
- we analyze firms’ opposition behaviour in order to see whether opposition affects 
smaller firms or larger firms more;  
- we analyze the patenting behaviour of the 30 largest firms in six62 selected technology 
areas using a range of indicators. These are: the number of applications, the number of 
claims per patent, the average share of critical references on a firm’s patents, the 
number of citations indicating blocking power related to a firm’s patents and the 
concentration of a firm’s patenting activity across technology areas.  
We identify whether there has been a substantial change (relative to levels before 1995) in the rate 
of patenting and the range of patenting of specific firms in Europe. Hall (2005) has found that the 
patenting explosion in the United States can be traced to firms in the electronics and semiconductor 
industries. It is impor tant to establish which firms and sectors are driving the patenting explosion 
we observe in the data from the European Patent Office, too.  
 





references made by a 
cohort of applications in a 
given technology area.  
This indicator shows how concentrated the references on a group of 
patents are. If th e concentration is high then all patents in the group 
cited the same patents; this indicates that the patents were closely 
related. In contrast, if concentration is low then patents in the group 
cited very different patents; this indicates that patents wer e not so 
closely related. This measure provides us with an indication of the 
technology areas in which patent thickets are likely to have arisen.  
 
                                                   
62  These six classes are a subset of the nine classes selected at stage one of our analysis. They are selected on the basis 





frequency of opposition 
proceedings between 
firms 
We try to identify firms’ opposition strategies by analyzing the 
opposition activity within the selected technical fields at the 
firm level. Our data allow us to identify opposing and opposed 
parties and therefore to trace patterns of repeated oppositions 
between firms. 
Number of patent 
applications  
We compare firms’ patenting rates  over time. The aim here is to 
establish which firms are affected by the logic of defensive 
patenting set out above.  
Concentration of firms’ 
patenting activities across 
technology areas 
We compare the concentration of firms’ patenting activities across 
all technology areas in two periods. To do this we calculate 
Herfindahl indices measuring the concentration of patenting across 
the 30 technology areas for each firm. This measure also tells us 
something about whether firms are pursuing a strategy of patenting 
defensively or not.  
Number of claims per 
patent 
We compare the number of claims a firm made on its patent 
applications for two periods in order to establish whether the firm 
has shifted towards drafting more complex patents.  
Number of patents per 
area with claims above 
the 75 percentile of the 
number of claims in the 
area of the patent. 
We compare how many patents a firm submits to the patent office 
bearing a high number of claims relative  to the average patent in a 
technology area. With this measure we seek to identify firms that 
submit more complex patents than firms patenting in the same 
technology areas. These firms are likely to be pursuing strategic 
aims with such patents.  
The average share of 
critical references  noted 
on a firm’s patents63   
Critical references indicate that parts of a patent are closely related 
to prior art. This suggests that the patents do not embody a high 
inventive step. We compare the average quality of a firm’ s patents 
in two periods in order to understand whether firms shifted towards 
the acquisition of larger patent portfolios of lower quality or not.   
                                                   
63 This indicator is related to b ut not the same as the X -references indicator on page 7 above.  
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Indicator Description 
Number of citations  We also analyse patent citations64 and compute the share of 
citations received indicating that firms possess blocking power. We 
compare this indicator for two periods for all firms.  
 
Please refer to section 4.6 for a description of the datasets used in the following analysis.  
 
4.2 Review of European patenting trends  
 
In this section we illustrate the main trends in patenting at the EPO for the period between 1980 
and 2003. The main trends we uncover in the data are:  
 
1. sharply increasing numbers of patent applications after 1992  
2. a corresponding increase in patent grants aft er 1992 
3. no change in the proportion of applied patents that were granted  
4. an increasing number of claims per patent indicating greater complexity of patent 
applications  
5. a decrease in granted patents that are opposed   
6. large differences in opposition rates a cross technology areas  
7. strong increases in the share of divisional patents filed which indicates strategic 
behaviour by firms  
 
Table 4.2.1 ranks all technological areas by growth of patent applications between 1990 and 
2000.65  The technology areas that we select in Section 4.4 are highlighted in this table for ease of 
reference. The Table shows that there was an increase in the number of patent applications of more 
than 100% in seven technological areas.  Two of these ( Telecommunications and Information 
Technology) come from the main technology area Electronics. Additionally Electrical Devices 
grew by 91%. A further two come from the main technology area Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 
(Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics and Biotechnology). In the main technology area  Mechanical 
                                                   
64  Patents can be cited by subsequent patents in the search report of the latter. Previous studies show that the number 
of citations a patent receives is a  noisy correlate to the patent’s monet ary value and to its technical relevance.  
65 The base year for these growth rates is 1990.  
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Engineering Engines, Pumps and Turbines  and Transport also grew strongly. Finally the 
technology areas Medical Engineering  and Analysis, Measurement, Control  from the main area 
Instruments also grew strongly. We concentrate on all of these tech nology areas in the following 
section to establish whether this growth is connected to strategic patenting behaviour or not.  Table 
4.2.1 also shows that patent applications also became more complex. On average the number of 
claims contained in a patent gr ew by 35% and in eight technology areas the growth of claims on a 
patent application was over 50%.  
 
In addition to the technology areas already noted we will also focus on Audiovisual Technology 
(Electronics) and Macromolecular Chemistry (Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals). These are selected 
because the growth in claims was also very high.  
 
In the following sections we illustrate patenting trends for four main technology areas in greater 
detail using graphs that display time series data. These provide a riche r impression of the trends 
than a table. Only the most salient graphs are discussed. The Appendix to this report contains 
graphs for the remaining areas.  
 
Methodology: 
We insert a brief methodological remark here which applies to all indicators we have ca lculated. 
All patents are classified into patent classes (IPC classes). These classes are aggregated into the 30 
technology areas we use as the basis of our analysis. It is possible and occurs frequently that the 
patent classes on a patent fall into more t han one technology area. In order to avoid a somewhat 
arbitrary ascription of patents to technology areas we have counted how many patent classes a 
patent falls into. From this information we calculate which fraction of a patent falls into which 
technology area. We use the fractional patents as the basis of our analysis. This choice allows us to 
be more precise in many indicators which we generate. Sometimes it has a cost too as becomes 
clear in our analysis of firm opposition matrices (Section 4.5.2).  
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Table 4.2.1 Annual applications and claims per patent across 30 Technology areas  
Rank Technical Area  Main area Annual Applications  Claims per Patent  Total no. 
of claims 
     1990 2000 Total Growth 1990 2000 
 Total 
  Growth 2000 
1 Telecommunications  Electronics  3273 11554 253% 11.6 18.6 60% 466% 
2 Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics  Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals  1896 6080 221% 17.1 25.8 51% 328% 
3 Information Technology  Electronics  2754 7540 174% 13.5 21.1 57% 384% 
4 Biotechnology Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals  1193 3176 166% 11.6 15.3 32% 149% 
5 Medical Engineering  Instruments  2298 5708 148% 13.5 20.4 51% 275% 
6 Engines, Pumps, Turbines  Mechanical E ngineering  1369 3245 137% 12.1 14.6 21% 154% 
7 Transport Mechanical E ngineering  2269 5037 122% 12.5 18.7 50% 232% 
8 Electrical Devices, - Engineering  Electronics  3818 7296 91% 11 14.6 33% 63% 
9 Consumer Goods and Equipment  Consumer goods 2370 4414 86% 11.4 14.6 28% 89% 
10 Analysis, Measurement Control  Instruments  4412 7712 75% 12.7 18.1 42% 89% 
11 Semiconductors  Electronics  1523 2524 66% 12.5 17.4 39% 89% 
12 Mechanical Elements  Mechanical E ngineering  2123 3509 65% 10.5 12.8 23% 139% 
13 Thermal Processes and Apparatus  Process Engineering  809 1334 65% 11.9 14.9 25% 133% 
14 Civil Engineering, Building, Mining  Consumer Goods 1918 3111 62% 11.3 14.2 25% 54% 
15 Surfaces, Coating  Process Engineering  1089 1759 61% 13.1 17.7 35% 251% 
16 Environment, Pollution  Process Engineering  492 791 61% 10.8 12.2 14% 186% 
17 Machine Tools  Mechanical E ngineering  1642 2533 54% 10.6 12.4 17% 101% 
18 Handling, Printing  Mechanical E ngineering  3205 4942 54% 12.7 15.6 23% 104% 
19 Audiovisual Technology  Electronics  2413 3666 52% 11.2 17.2 54% 131% 
20 Agriculture, Food  Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals  639 963 51% 13.3 17.5 32% 79% 
21 Agricultural - and Food Machinery  Mechanical E ngineering  711 1055 48% 11.2 13.6 22% 74% 
22 General Technological Engneering  Process Engineering  2172 3142 45% 11 13.6 24% 75% 
23 Optics Instruments  2742 3863 41% 13.4 18 34% 80% 
24 Chemical -, Petrol-, Basic Mat. Chem.  Process Engineering  1757 2301 31% 12.7 16.9 33% 118% 
25 Materials, Metallurgy Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals  1580 2040 29% 11.8 16 36% 106% 
26 Macromolecular Chemistry, Polymers  Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals  2927 3544 21% 14 21.8 56% 98% 
27 Material Processing  Process Engineering  2913 3518 21% 12.8 16.3 28% 80% 
28 Organic Fine C hemistry Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals  4158 5005 20% 12.1 16.4 36% 82% 
29 Space Technology, Weapons  Mechanical E ngineering  330 393 19% 11.5 14.4 25% 47% 
30 Nuclear Engineering  Mechanical E ngineering  302 293 -3% 13.9 21.1 52% 49% 
Total  61100 112049 78% 12 17 35% 145% 
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4.2.1 Patent applications by priority year  
This section illustrates the following points:  
· Patent applications grew substantially after 1992. Growth is concentrated in a few 
technology areas. 
· After 2000 the number of patent applications per annum is  substantially above 5,000 in 
Telecommunications ; Electrical devices ; Information technology ; Analysis, Measurement, 
Control; Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics  and Medical engineering. 
 
Each of the following graphs contains a series illustrating the development of patent applications 
in a fictitious average technology area. This just represents the total number of patent applications 
per annum at the EPO divided by 30. This series is included to pr ovide a reference point for the 
reader.  
 
Figure 4.2.1 confirms that patent applications in the Technology area Telecommunications  grew 
very substantially between the late 1980’s and the period after 2000.  Additionally, the number of 
patent applications in Electrical devices  and in Information technology  was also high after 2000, 
relative to the late 1980’s. A comparison with Figures 4.2.2, 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 also illustrates that 
the annual number of applications in each of these technology areas is higher t han in any other 
technology areas. These observations suggest that much of the growth in patenting observed at 
the EPO is due to information technology and its applications. This finding is in line with the 
results of  Hall (2005) who shows that the growth in patenting at the USPTO is driven mainly by 
semiconductor firms. She shows that these firms patent in a very diverse set of technology areas. 
In order to confirm this hypothesis we investigate whether the set of technology areas in which 
the firms that led patenting in the main area Electronics patented in 1990 increased by the year 
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4.2.2 Outcomes of patent examination  
 
This section illustrates that: 
· The likelihood of obtaining a patent grant at the EPO is almost constant over the entire 
sample period.  
· On average two thirds of all patent applications are granted.  
 
Therefore the  observed increase in patent applications has also led to a marked increase in the 
number of granted patents. The following Figures illustrate how the grant rate developed in the 
main areas Electronics (Figure 4.2.5), Instruments (Figure 4.2.6), Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 
(Figure 4.2.7) and Mechanical Engineering (Figure 4.2.8). These Figures are based on data 
obtained September 2006.  
Figure 4.2.2.1 
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Figure 4.2.5 shows that the grant rate in Electronics, t he main area most affected by the dramatic 
growth in patent applications in the 1990’s was stable if not slightly increasing between 1988 and 
1995. The strong decrease in the grant rate after 1995 is a consequence of the large share of 
patent applications that are still pending.  The long delay between the grant of a patent and its 
first submission at a patent office – the grant lag - is partly due to the application process chosen 
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by many firms and partly an expression of the complexity of the patents invo lved given the 
office’s examination capacity.  
Figure 4.2.2.2 
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Figure 4.2.2.3 
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Firms generally do not submit their first version of a patent to the EPO but ra ther to a national 
patent office. They than have one year to submit their patent to the EPO. At the EPO the average 
patent is granted in approximately four ye ars after its EPO filing date ( Harhoff and Wagner 
(2005)).A comparison of the Figures in this section s hows that patents in Mech anical Engineering 
have shorter grant lags than those in the other three main areas which we illustrate here.  
Figure 4.2.2.4 
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It is interesting to note that the grant rate in Mechan ical Engineering has been in creasing since 
the EPO started to operate.  This implies that an increasing fraction of applications were granted.   
4.2.3 Claims per patent  
This section documents that: 66 
 
· Not just the number, but also the complexity of patents measure d as the number of claims 
increased after 1992.  
                                                   
66 It should be noted that the EPO instituted a reform of its fee structure in 2003. This led to changes in the cost of 
claims and may be the cause of the observed dec line in claims per patent at the very end of the time series reported 
below.  
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· While the growth in claims was strong in Electronics or Instruments it was especially 
pronounced in Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals.  
· The highest average number of claims per patent occurs in Biotechnology . 
 
Each patent document consists of a number of claims. A claim contributes to the delineation of 
the patent’s scope. A higher number of claims per patent indicate a higher complexity of the 
patent. More complex patents are more costly to examine and raise cos ts for rivals who are 
seeking to understand, oppose or avoid the patent. How many claims a firm puts on a patent is 
partly a matter of choice. Therefore strategic behaviour of patent applicants may be reflected in 
the number of claims per patent they file. 67 This indicator is not conclusive, however. It only 
suggests in which technology areas we should investigate firms’ patenting behaviour more 
carefully. The average included in all the figures reflects the average number of claims for all 
patent applicatio ns at EPO. The Figures below show that this average masks considerable 
variation across technology areas.  
                                                   
67 Patent documents contain independent and dependent claims. The latter clarify the former. Our data do not 
distinguish between these kinds of claims. A detailed analysis of the relationship between these types of claims 
would be very interesting but is presently not possible due to data limitations. More detail on the development of the 
number of claims on patent applications can be found in Archontopoulos et al. (2006).  
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Figure 4.2.3.1 

















Figure 4.2.9 shows that the number of claims per patent grew in all technology areas  in 
Electronics apart from Electrical devices. Figures 4.2.10, 4.2.11 and 4.2.12 illustrate that patents 
in all technology areas included in Instruments and in most technology areas included in 
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals became considerably more complex  after 1992. 
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Figure 4.2.3.2 
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Figure 4.2.3.3 
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The number of claims on patents in all areas of  Mechanical engineering grew only slightly, 
indicating much slighter increases in complexity of patents than in the other main areas surveyed 
above. Additional information about the workload faced by the EPO as a result of the increasing 
complexity of patents is provided by Archontopulos, et al. (2006) . 
 
To summarize the differences between the main technology areas we analyze the growth of 
claims per patents in the four main areas we focus on (Electronics; Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals; 
Instruments; Mechanical Engineering ) relative to the remaining two (Process Engineering and 
Consumer Goods) in Figure 4.2.13 below. This Figure shows clearly that claims  per patent grew 
substantially faster in Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals than in any other main technology area. The 
Figure also makes clear that claims per patent in Electronics grew much less quickly.   
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Figure 4.2.3.5 
Claims per patent by technology over time
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Figure 4.2.13 shows time dummy estimates from a weighted regre ssion of claims per patent  on a 
full set of time dummies and individual time dummies for each of the four technology sectors. 
The number of observations was 30 tech classes by 24 years.  
 
4.2.4 Rate of patent opposition cases  
 
In this section we show that:  
 
· On average the rate of opposition to patents fell at the EPO after 1985.  
· The rate of opposition was very low in: Information Technology, Audiovisual Technology 
and Organic Fine Chemistry. 
· The rate of opposition to patents was high in: Medical Engineering; Agriculture, Food ; 
Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics and Transport.     
 
At the EPO a granted patent may be opposed by other patent holders and other interested parties. 
An analysis of patent opposi tions can provide information about the intensity of R&D rivalry 
amongst firms in a technology area. Furthermore, opposition contributes to the quality of the 
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patent stock by introducing additional checks and additional sources of information into the 
process of patent examination.   
 
The findings we report here show that technology areas fall into two groups: those in which 
opposition activity has remained very strong and those in which it has steadily declined since the 
EPO started operating in the late 1 970s. We will show that in combination with information 
regarding the concentration of patent applications and exit and entry into technology areas these 
findings provide indications of differences in the development of technological areas which we 
study.   
 
In Electronics the rate of opposition is consistently below the weighted average for technology 
areas. The opposition rate is particularly low in Telecommunications , Information Technology  
and Semiconductors.  There is not much variation in the rate of opposition over time after 1990 
and all of the technology areas display the same downward trend.  
Figure 4.2.4.1 
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Figure 4.2.4.3 
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The opposition rate in Instruments differs significantly by technology area. It is higher in Medical 
Engineering than in Analysis, Measurement, Control  or Optics. Furthermore, the opposition rate 
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in Medical Engineering does not fall until 2000. This is especially remarkable as Table 4.2.1 
shows that patent applications grew faster in this technology area than in Optics or Analysis, 
Measurement, Control.  
 
In light of the general downward trend in the average rate of op position Figure 4.2.15 above, 
summarizing opposition rates in Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals, is especially interesting. The 
Figure demonstrates that opposition rates have been high and variable in Agriculture and Food , 
in Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics and in Materials and Metallurgy . It is also noteworthy that 
opposition rates are very low over the whole sample period in Organic Fine Chemistry  which we 
showed to be a technical area receiving a particularly high rate of patent applications (viz. Figure 
4.2.3).  
Figure 4.2.4.4 
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The rate of opposition in technology areas that receive high numbers of patent applications is 
interesting if it is either very high or very low. The former indicates a high degree of 
technological rivalry amongst firms while the latter indicates that firms are generally not 
interested in preventing each other from patenting.   
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To round clarify the evidence provided above we undertook an analysis in which we compare the 
aggregate opposition rates in the four main areas we have singled out relative to the remaining 
two, i.e. relative to Process Engineering and Consumer Goods. Figure 4.2.18 below shows that 
opposition rates in Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals have increased over time and are sig nificantly 
higher than in all other main technology areas. Meanwhile opposition rates in Electronics are 
much lower than those in all other main technology areas.  
 
Figure 4.2.4.5 
Opposition rate by technology over time
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Figure 4.2.18 shows time dummy estimates from a weighted regre ssion of the opposition rate  on 
a full set of time dummies and individual time dummies for each of the four technology sectors. 
The number of observations was 30 tech classes by 24 years.  
 
In section 4.5.2 below we invest igate which kinds of firms oppose  each other. To do this we 
focus on the following technology areas: Medical Engineering ; Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics ; 
Agriculture, Food; Agriculture-, and Food Machinery (high opposition rates) and 
Telecommunications ; Information Technology; Audiovisual Technology (low opposition rates) as 
well as Analysis, Measurement, Control . 
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4.3 Identification of technology areas warranting further investigation  
 
The previous section provided a general review of broad patenting trends affecti ng the EPO in the 
last two decades. We showed that the number and complexity of patent applications increased 
dramatically in some technology areas. At the same time the grant rate remained the same, while 
the rate of opposition to patent applications freq uently decreased substantially.  
 
Taken together these findings raise questions about the quality of patents granted in several 
technology areas. They also provide a first suggestion that firms might be acting strategically in 
their applications for patent s. 
 
In this section we try to identify which technology areas could be affected by strategic behaviour 
in the patenting process. To do this we make use of indicators that provide better information 
about the quality of patent applications and about the app lication strategies of firms in different 
technology areas. This section has three parts: the first deals with evidence regarding the 
concentration of patent applications, the second with evidence regarding the quality of patent 
applications and the third with evidence regarding strategic behaviour by applicants.  
 
4.3.1 Size of patent portfolios and their effects  
 
In this section we set out evidence regarding the concentration of patent applications and entry 
and exit into technology areas. This information will  prove useful in assessing whether the trends 
we observe elsewhere are the result of strategic behaviour between a few firms or result from the 
actions of many different firms.  
 
Originally, it was our intention to study the Herfindahl index as well as the C4 and C8 
concentration ratios. As the Herfindahl index would have been unreliable for reasons noted above 
and as we are already presenting a very large amount of empirical evidence, we have found it 
useful to concentrate on the C4 ratio alone. We have cal culated the C8 ratio as well. This 
confirms the results we present here.   
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Concentration measures  
 
In this section we show that:  
  
· The concentration of patent applications varies strongly by technology area.  
· The share of patent applications accounted for  by the four most frequent applicants is high 
in Audiovisual Technology; Telecommunications ; Engines, Pumps and Turbines  and 
Optics.68 
· The share of patent applications accounted for by the four most frequent applicants is 
remarkably low in Medical Engineering and Biotechnology. 
 
The figures presented in this section are based on the PATSTAT dataset. The applicant names 
from this dataset were consolidated on the basis of the DERWENT Appendix .69 Additionally we 
consolidated the names of the 15 largest applicant s in each of the 30 technology areas on the 
basis of information about firm ownership patterns which we researched ourselves. The averages 
reported in the Figures below represent the average share of the top four applicants across the 30 
technology areas.  
 
Figure 4.3.1  shows that a large share of patent applications in all of the technology areas included 
in Electronics is concentrated in the hands of a few applicants. These applicants are also very 
similar across all of these technology areas.  In contrast, patent applications are much less 
concentrated in Instruments . Additionally, the concentration of patent applications in Chemicals, 
Pharmaceuticals has dropped in the last ten years.  
                                                   
68   The data also show that Nuclear Engineering is highly concentrated. Due to the overall insignificance of the 
number of patents in this technology area (viz. Table 4.2.1) we do not analyze it at all. Concentration in 
Information Technology was high until the e arly 1990’s but has since declined.   
69  This is the appendix to a document that may be found on the internet at http://www.thomsonscientific.com/ 
media/scpdf/patenteecodes.pdf  . 
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Figure 4.3.1.1 
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Figure 4.3.1.2 
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In Mechanical Engineering the concentration of patent applicati ons has always been high in 
Transport. This is still the case but much less so as Figure 4.3.4 reveals. Interestingly the 
concentration of applications has risen very steadily in Engines, Pumps and Turbines  since 1992. 
 
Entry and exit of patentees  
 
In this section we show that: 
 
· On average entry into all technology areas fell before 1990 and increased thereafter. 70 
· On average exit from technology areas was highest between 1990 and 1995.  
· There is considerable variation across technology areas in entry and ex it rates. 
 
Measures of entry into - and exit from technology areas may be interesting if they reveal 
substantial changes over time. Lerner (1995) argues that in the United States the incidence of 
high litigation against patents in certain patent classes had the effect of deterring further patent 
applications to these classes by small firms. On the other had Hall and Ziedonis (2001) show that 
the patent explosion in semiconductors was accompanied by increased entry of small and 
specialized niche players.  
                                                   
70 The definition of entry and exit used in this section (compare page 6) implies that entry rates are likely to decrease 
in the last four years of the time series shown. Similarly it implies that exit rates are likely to increase in this period. 
This is due to the three year lags which are contained in the definitions of entry and exit. Therefore we discount these 
last years when interpreting the time series set out in this section.  
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Figure 4.3.1.5 













Electrical devices, - Engineering Audiovisual technology
Telecommunications Information technology
Semiconductors Average  
 
Figure 4.3.1.6 
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Figure 4.3.1.8 
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There is no widely accepted definition of entry and exit in the literature. In this section we define 
an entrant into a technology area in a given year t as a firm that has not applied for a patent in the 
three years prior to t in that technology area, that is applying for at least one patent in year t and 
that goes on to apply for at least one further patent  in one of the three years after year t. 
Conversely we define a firm exit as a firm that has applied for at least one patent in the 
technology area in one of the three years preceding year t, is applying for a patent in year t and 
then fails to apply for further patents in the three years after year t.  
 
Figures 4.3.5-4.3.12 show that a substantial proportion of patenting firms enters  and exit each 
technology area in a given year. These Figures reveal a general downward trend for entry rates 
and an upward trend for exit rates over the whole sample period. The average series depicted are 
weighted averages which reflect the importance of each technology area in the entire sample for 
each year. 
 
Figures 4.3.5 and 4.3.6 reveal that in Electronics the period in w hich patenting activity started to 
explode (1989-1995) is a period in which entry decreases to its lowest level and exits rise to a 
comparatively high level. A similar pattern is observable for Instruments in Figures 4.3.7 and 
4.3.8.  This pattern suggests  that patent applications in these technology areas were made by 
fewer firms. At the same time these firms were responsible for a considerable increase in patent 
applications as documented in Figures 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.  
 
Figures 4.3.9- 4.3.12 show that entry and exit in Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals and Mechanical 
engineering are less affected by the overall trend towards concentration.  In the following section 
we summarize our findings regarding applications, opposition, concentration, entry and exit in 












































































































































































      
 
 
Table 4.3.1 shows no immediately obvious patterns. It is clear that high opposition activity can be 
the result of high levels of applications as in Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics ; Transport and Medical 
engineering . This is what we would expect if opposition is used by firms to stop questionable 
patents and if the increases in patent applications have reduced the quality of the average patent 
application.   
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However, opposition activity in all of Electronics does not follow this pattern. Table 4.3.1 shows 
that this failure of opposition activity can only be part ly explained on the basis of high 
concentration levels for the top four applicants. Further below ( Section 4.5.2) we investigate the 
determinants of opposition in greater detail. This will provide us with a clearer picture of firms’ 
opposition behaviour. 
 
Finally we note that the level of entry into technology areas that have high concentration levels 
for the top four firms and that are characterized by high rates of patent applications has risen 
towards the end of the sample period. This suggests that the patenting explosion is not generally 
stopping firms from entering new technology areas. Below (Section 4.5.3) we investigate 
whether entry is due to established firms from other technology areas or to firms that have not 
patented previously at all.   
 
4.3.2 Quality of patent applications  
 
In section 4.2 we showed that the number of patent applications at the EPO increased 
substantially after 1992 while the grant rate remained constant or increased slightly. Therefore 
the number of patents granted by the EPO has i ncreased proportionately to the number of 
applications. This raises the question how the quality of patent applications has been affected by 
their increase. Quality of a patent can be measured in several dimensions such as the novelty the 
non-obviousness or the clarity of the disclosure made by the patent. For further discussion refer 
to Graham, et al. (2003).  
 
The literature on strategic patenting indicates that firms in the United States have been turning 
more marginal innovations into patents than previously. Their aim in this activity is to increase 
the size of their patent portfolios. The patents themselves are frequently used as bargaining chips 
in licensing negotiations between firms over access to patents. Another use for the patent 
portfolio may be as an insurance against hold -up by rivals seeking to enforce their own patents. 
This is discussed at length in the literature review in this report (Section 3).  
 
 158 
In this section we investigate whether the quality of patents at the EPO decreased in the period in 
which we observe the patent ing explosion. We show that: 
 
· The number of references in EPO and International Search Reports has been very stable.  
· The proportion of references indicating that the novelty of patent applications is at least 
partly questionable is increasing per patent an d more importantly per claim.  
· The quality of patent applications has fallen particularly in Semiconductors; Agriculture 
and Food; Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics ; Macromolecular Chemistry , Polymers; 
Materials, Metallurgy and Engines, Pumps and Turbines . 
 
The strong increase in patent applications and patent grants at the EPO raises the question 
whether at the same time the quality of patents remained constant or decreased. In this section we 
use the number of X-References on a granted patent and the number of  citations to patents to 
discuss the quality of patents granted at the EPO over the sample period. In doing this we assume 
that a lower quality of patent applications will be reflected at least partly in lower quality patents 
given that the patent grant ra te has remained constant.  
 
X-References 
We begin by studying those references on a patent document that indicate that it may be partly or 
wholly inadmissible. All references on a European patent application are added to the patent by 
the examiners at the EPO. The total number of references on a patent document is regulated by 
the rules for patent examination in force at the EPO. Indeed we find that the number of references 
is stable at 4.5 references per patent on average over the entire sample period (viz . Figure 
4.3.13).71 
 
Please note that the stability of the number of references per patent illustrated in Figure 4.3.13 is 
representative of all technology areas. Therefore, we omit Figures for the remaining main areas 
from this report.  
                                                   
71 Figure 4.3.13 displays a dip for the year 2001 that we attribute to errors in the data. The same is true for all Figures 
relating to X-Type references (4.3.14 - 4.3.17). These errors do not affect our interpretation of the data.  
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Figure 4.3.2.1 
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Therefore, the share of references indicating that a patent application is questionable is a useful 
indicator of patent application quality as it shows that patent examiners are replacing references 
to prior art with references indicating poor quality.  
 
We find that on average the share of X -References has increased since 1989. At the same time we 
showed above that the grant rate of patents remains constant while the number of patent 
applications increases over the same period. The increase in the number of X -References 
suggests that the grant rate of patents should decrease unless all problems that critical references 
point to can be resolved. This seems unlikely. As the grant rate does not decline this sugge sts the 
possibility that on average more questionable patents are being granted by the EPO. Another 
interpretation of the data suggests that the examiners at the EPO have been able to find more 
critical references due to improvements in search technology. If the problems giving rise to 
critical references are removed from these patents, they may be of high quality. Then our data 
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Figure 4.3.2.3 
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The analysis of opposition at the EP O (Harhoff and Reitzig 2004, and Section 4.5.5.2 below) 
shows that the probability of success in opposition cases depends on the number of critical 
references which these patents received in the search report. Thus, granted and opposed patents 
which are of lower quality also received more critical citations. This indicates that the 
examination process at the EPO does not remove all problematic claims from a granted patent. 72 
Supporting this interpretation Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2006) indicate that it  is likely that 
the EPO has found it increasingly difficult to uphold the quality of patents granted in face of the 
growing workload faced by the EPO. Clearly then, our measures are not perfect indicators of 
patent quality but they provide indications of a  trend that should not be ignored.  
 
Figures 4.3.14-4.3.17 illustrate that X -References are particularly high in Semiconductors,  
Medical engineering  and extremely high in Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics  and Agriculture and 
Food. Apart from Semiconductors, all of these technology areas are also characterized by high 
rates of patent opposition. This suggests that the quality of patent applications in all of these 
technology areas fell dramatically.  
 
However, we also noted above that the number of claims per pat ent has increased since 1990. 
Therefore, we now investigate how the number of X -References per claim has developed. If the 
number of X-References per claim increases, patent applications are becoming more complex and 
questionable. If the number of X -References per claim remains constant patent applications are 
just becoming more complex.  
                                                   
72 It might argued that only opposed patents are affected by problematic quality as indicated in critical references and 
that opposition cases deal with this problem adequately. This remains an open question however. It has not been 
investigated whether the quality of granted patents not opposed is unrelated to the quality of the original patent 
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Figures 4.3.18- 4.3.21  show that there are technology areas in which more patents with more 
claims are being granted and these claims receive more X -References during examination. This is 
true on average which supports the view that patent quality is declining on average at the EPO. 
The average increase of X -References per claim is from 0.05 to 0.09; this is a large increase.  
 
The following technology areas are par ticularly affected by increases in X -References per claim: 
Semiconductors; Agriculture and Food ; Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics ; Macromolecular 
Chemistry , Polymers; Materials , Metallurgy and Engines, Pumps and Turbines . In these 
technology areas the quality  of patent applications has dropped significantly.  
 
 In contrast, there are technology areas in which the number of X -References per claim has 
remained more or less constant. These are: Information Technology; Biotechnology  and Nuclear 
Engineering. Here patent applications have become more complex but the quality of the claims 
has remained constant. The remainder of the technology areas show some evidence of declining 
claim quality. 
 
Patent Citations  
 
The empirical literature on patents shows that the cita tions a patent receives can be an indicator 
for the importance of a patent. The evidence also shows that this indicator is noisy, i.e., not very 
reliable for an individual patent but helpful in characterizing large numbers of patents. We have 
already shown that the number of new patent applications at the EPO grew strongly between 
1990 and the present. Additionally we showed that the number of references per patent was 
constant over this time. This alone suffices to indicate that the number of references to  previous 
patents should increase over time. These increases should be particularly pronounced in 
technology areas that are characterizes by larger increases in patent applications. As a result time 
series of patent citations are not presented here as comp arisons between technology areas or 





4.3.3 Complexity of patent applications and strategic behaviour by patent applicants  
  
In this section we focus on indicators that tell us something about the wa y in which firms apply 
for patents.  These indicators provide direct information about the aggregate results of strategic 
behaviour by patent applicants.  In this section we find that there is strong evidence for strategic 
behaviour in several technology a reas. 
 
Number of claims  
  
Section 4.2.3 provides evidence that the number of claims made on patent applications at the 
EPO has increased substantially in many technology areas. In part this may be the result of 
attempts to confuse rivals or to create uncer tainty about patent applications for rivals. In order to 
distinguish this explanation from alternative ones we provide an analysis of the number of patents 
with a comparatively high  number of claims in section 4.5.3 below .  
 
Number of divisional patent app lications  
 
In this section we analyze the share of patents which are split off from previous patent 
applications. Provision for such “divisional” patents is originally made by the EPO to allow for 
patent applications that contain subject matter which can form the basis of more than one patent. 
The recent increase in patenting activity seems to be leading to an abuse of this provision. 
Reasons for this might be that firms are seeking to create uncertainty about the final extent of 
their patents or that they are seeking to keep open options about exactly what subject matter they 
will protect. Divisional patents can only be narrower than the original patent application. 
Nonetheless, the attempt to keep options open together with the long grant lags at the EPO will 
create uncertainty for rival firms.  Knowing what might be patented is not the same as knowing 
what will be and therefore the use of divisionals may force rival firms to use less efficient 




In this section we demonstrate that:  
 
· Divisional applications are particularly prominent in Audiovisual Technology; 
Information Technology; Telecommunications; Medical Engineering; Biotechnology; 
Pharmaceuticals , Cosmetics and to some extent in Transport.   
· Simultaneously there is a general trend towards increased use of divisional applications 
across all technology areas.  
 
In the time series we set out in this section there can be quite long lag effects as the EPO allows 
second generation divisionals. These are divisionals derived from a first generation divisional. 
This may explain the hump shape of all time series in the figures that follow. If so, then the data 
show clearly that divisional patent applications  are generally on the rise. This is the clearest 
evidence at the macro level that we have of strategic patenting behaviour, because divisional 
patent applications constitute the attempt to create uncertainty about the extent of a patent.    
 
As Figure 4.3.22 shows divisional patent applications are very prominent in Electronics, a 
technology area that is often categorized as containing complex technologies.  This is also true of 
Biotechnology which is the technology area in which divisionals have the longes t tradition at the 
EPO as Figure 4.3.24 below demonstrates.  
 
Figures 4.3.24 and 4.3.25 show that divisional patent applications are less important in 
technology areas which are not likely to harbour complex technologies, such as Macromolecular 
Chemistry or Engines, Pumps  and Turbines. Even here there is evidence of increases in the 
number of divisional patent applications. However this may be the natural consequence of the 
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Finally it should be noted that the technology area Transport deserves special attention since the 
propensity to make particular use of divisional applications seems to come and go in this 
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technology area. We will investigate this more closely at  the firm level in order to determine 
whether this is due to specific firms’ actions.  
 
Number of shared priorities  
 
In this section we analyze how many patents in a given technology area share priorities with at 
least one other patent. This means that two  or more patents applications at the EPO are derived 
from one and the same original patent application at another patent office (the priority patent 
application). Increased occurrence of such shared priorities may be due to greater uncertainty 
about technologies or to differences in the way different patent offices examine patents. It may 
also indicate that firms are seeking to confuse their rivals about the exact extent of the patent 
protection they are seeking at the EPO.  
 
The following Figures indicate t hat: 
 
· Shared priorities increasingly arise across all technology areas.  
· Shared priorities are particularly frequent in most of the technology areas that also 
exhibit increased use of divisional patent applications. These are: Telecommunication ; 
Information Technology; Biotechnology; Pharmaceuticals , Cosmetics and to some extent 
in Medical Engineering .   
· Shared priorities also arise in Agriculture, Food . 
 
The most interesting result of the analysis here is the almost complete similarity of the analysis of 
divisional patent applications and of the incidence of shared priorities. 73 Both of these indicators 
which are most likely to indicate in which technology areas we might observe strategic behaviour 
in patent applications point to the same technology areas. An other interesting observation is the 
fact that shared priorities became more important at the same time as firms started to increase the 
number of patent applications filed. The figures in this section demonstrate that at the same time 
the share of applica tions which derive from a common root has increased.  
                                                   
73 In order to avoid double counting the following Figures represent the share of applications with shared priorities 
that are not also divisional patent applications. Therefore this indi cator is truly independent of the preceding 
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4.4 Summary: technology areas in which there is evidence of strategic use of the patent 
system  
 
In sections 4.2 and 4.3 a variety of different indicators related to patenting behavior of firms are 
discussed for 30 different technology areas over the period from 1980 to 2003. The results of this 
exercise reveal important trends characterizing the European patent system in general:  
 
· strong growth in application figures over time;  
· increased comple xity at the level of individual patents;  
· a slightly decreasing opposition activity relative to the number of issued patents;  
· indications of deteriorating patent quality;  
· signs of increased strategic patenting behavior.  
 
In addition to the identificatio n of these general trends, our analysis also revealed large 
differences in the development of the indicators across different technological areas. In particular, 
areas belonging to Electronics;  Instruments; Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals  and to some extent 
Mechanical Engineering proved to be major driving forces behind these developments. Table 
4.4.1 provides a concise summary of the development of our indicators in the technological areas 
belonging to the broader main areas.  
 
By and large, all of these main ar eas are characterized by a strong increase in patent applications 
and an increase in the complexity of patent applications which seems to be most pronounced in 
Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals. Moreover, three main areas exhibit clear signs of increasingly 
strategic patenting behavior of applicants which again is most pronounced within Chemicals, 
Pharmaceuticals but also visible in Electronics and in Instruments. With regard to opposition 
activity we observe clear differences across the main areas. While oppositi on rates are strongly 
decreasing in Electronics, the converse is true for most areas within Chemicals/Pharmaceuticals. 
We interpret this finding as an indication of different patenting strategies within complex 
industries dominating Electronics compared to  more discrete technologies related to Chemicals/ 
Pharmaceuticals. The finding of different developments of the rate of opposed patents is 
especially interesting when compared to the concentration of patent holdings in the according 
areas. In Electronics, decreasing opposition rates go along with strongly increasing 
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concentrations of patent holdings. The inverse is true in areas belonging to Chemicals, 
Pharmaceuticals, where increasing rates of oppositions are accompanied by decreasing 
concentration rates. One notable exception is the area of Agriculture, Food where we observe a 
strong increase in opposition rates and also in the concentration of patent holdings among 
applicants. 
  
In the following, we comment on the development of the different technology a reas within the 
four selected main areas in more detailed below and select individual technology areas for further 




Table 4.4.1:  Summary of important patent indicators. +++, ++, + denote developments of indicators above the average of all 30 
areas, while ---,--,- denote developments of indicators below the sample average.  


















Electronics Telecommunications +++ + -- ++ o ++ o 
 Electrical Devices ++ - - o o o o 
 Information Technology ++ ++ --- + o ++ o 
 Semiconductors - o -- + + + o 
 Audiovisual Technology o o -- +++ o +++ o 
         
Instruments Analysis, Measurement Control +++ o o -  - o o 
 Medical Engineering ++ + + - + +++ o 
 Optics o o --- ++ o o - 
         
Chemicals, 
Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics ++ ++ ++ - ++ +++ ++ 
 Organic Fine Chemistry ++ ++  -- o o o +++ 
 Agriculture, Food -- - +++ ++ ++ -- + 
 Biotechnology ++ +++ + -- + +++ + 
 Materials, Metallurgy --- o ++ -- o - - 
 
Macromolecular Chemistry, 
Polymers o o + o + o o 
         
Process Engineering 
Chemical, Petrol- and Basic 
Materials -- o ++ ++ o - + 
 Material Processing o o ++ - o -- - 
 Surfaces, Coating - o o o - - o 
 General technological Engineering - o o -- o o o 
 Handling Printing + - - o o ++ o 
 Environment, Pollution -- o - o o o - 
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Table 4.4.1 continued:  Summary of important patent indicators. +++, ++, + denote developments of indicators above the average of 
all 30 areas, while ---,--,- denote developments of indicators below the sample average.  
 



















Machinery Agricultural- and Food Machinery ++ - +++ o o ++ + 
 Machine Tools - o o - -- o o 
 Thermal Processes -- - - - -- -- - 
 Transport ++ - o +++ - -- - 
 Engines, Pumps, Turbines o -- - ++ o - o 
 Mechanical Elements -- - o - o -- - 
 Space Technology, Weapons -- - --  - - -- 
 Nuclear Engineering  -   -- - o 
         
Consumer Goods, Civil 
Engineering Consumer Goods and Equipment o o o -- o - o 






We observe a strong increase in the number of patent applications  filed in Electronics which 
is largely driven by the technology areas Telecommunications , Electrical Devices  and 
Information Technolog y. Interestingly, this increase in the number of applications in Electron ics 
is going along with an increase in the concentration  of patent holdings across patentees – the 
increase in concentration is most pronounced in Audiovisual Technology. This increase in 
application figures is accompanied by a moderate increase in the com plexity of the 
corresponding applications in Telecommunications  and Information Technology . In contrast, the 
complexity of applications in the remaining areas evolves within the overall average across all 30 
areas. Applying the share of X -References contai ned in a patent, we find little evidence of 
deteriorating patent quality  in Electronics. 
 
It is a striking feature that the opposition rate (relative to granted patents) decreased over 
time in Electronics – the decrease is most pronounced for Telecommunica tions and Information 
Technologies – and has reached levels well below the overall average of all European patents. In 
addition, we find indications for more refined application  strategies  applied by the applicants 
in almost all areas of Electronics. Again , Telecommunications  and Information Technology 
clearly exhibit an above average development in the indicator of strategic patenting behavior, the 
share of divisional applications. In addition, applicants in Audiovisual Technolog y make use of 
divisional applications most frequently.  
 
Based on these findings, we select the technology areas of (1) Telecommunications,  (2) 
Information Technology and (3) Audiovisual Technology  for further investigation s at the 
firm level in the following part of the study . 
 
(ii) Instruments 
The increase in application figures  within the main area Instruments is well above the overall 
average and is similar to the development in Electronics. This increase is largely driven by strong 
application activities in the areas Analysis, Measurement, Control  and Medical Engineering . 
However, with regard to the opposition rates in Instruments, we observe a strong decrease in 
Optics, while opposition rates in Analysis, Measurement, Control  and Medical Engineering  
remain within average levels. Similar to Electronics (but to a lesser extent) this increase in 
opposition rates is accompanied by a decrease in the concentration of patent holdings.  
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The development of the complexity of patent applications in Instruments is comparable to 
the overall average, again with the exception of Medical Engineering . Medical Engineering is 
also the only area within Instruments where we observe a strong increase in the reliance on 
divisional patent applications which points to systematic differences in the patentin g activity in 
this area.  
 
Based on these findings, we select the area  of (4) Medical Engineering  for further 
investigations on the firm level  in the following part of the study . 
 
(iii) Chemicals/ Pharmaceuticals  
Within Chemicals/ Pharmaceuticals applications figures rose strongly within the areas 
Pharmaceuticals , Cosmetics; Organic Fine Chemistry  and Biotechnology but were stable in the 
technology area Macromolecular Chemistry, Polymers. Contrarily, we observe a below average 
growth of applications in Agriculture, Food and Materials, Metallurgy. It is striking that the 
development of application rates is intensified by an increase in the complexity of the individual 
applications: We observe strong increases in the number of claims per patent within 
Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics ; Organic Fine Chemistry  and Biotechnology, which are not present 
in the remaining areas within Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals . 
 
Moreover, opposition activity has been above average  in almost all areas within Chemicals, 
Pharmaceuticals  with the exception of Organic Fine Chemistry  where we observe a decrease in 
opposition rates over time. Compared to Electronics, increasing opposition rates are associated 
with decreasing concentration of patent holdings in the different areas with one exception : In 
Agriculture, Food opposition and the concentration of patenting activities both increased.  
 
In general, the use of more refined application strategies increased across all areas of Chemicals, 
Pharmaceuticals  with most pronounced peaks in Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics  and Biotechnology. 
 
Based on these findings, we select the areas  of (5) Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics, (6) 
Agriculture, Food and (7) Biotechnology  for further investigation  at the firm level in the 
following part of the study . 
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(iv) Process Engineering 
Compared to the other main areas application figures in most fields associated with process 
engineering rose below the overall average and the complexity of the individual application 
evolved according to the average. Moreover, we do not see intere sting patterns of opposition 
activity or concentration of patent applications. Since the measures of strategic patenting 
behavior also are in line with the overall trend, we think that no area within Process 
Engineering warrants further research . 
 
(v) Mechanical Engineering  
While application figures within Mechanical Engineering developed below the overall average, 
we observe a strong increase in patent applicat ions in the areas Agricultural-, Food Machinery 
and Transport. These two areas are distinct from the other fields in Mechanical Engineering with 
respect to the different indicators presented. In particular, Agricultural-, Food Machinery  is 
characterized by above -average opposition activity and an increased use of divisional 
applications filings. While  being not of particular interest with regard to these indicators, 
Transport is characterized by a sharp increase in the concentration of patenting activities across 
firms. 
 
Based on these findings, we select the areas  of (8) Agricultural-, Food Machinery and (9) 
Transport for further investigations at the firm level in the following part of the study . 
 
(vi) Consumer Goods/ Civil Engineering  
The development of the computed indicators within the areas of Consumer Goods, Civil 
Engineering is by and large with in the overall average across all 30 areas. Moreover, 
concentration rates are going down and there are no indications of strategic patenting behavior 
within this are. Therefore, we select no area from Consumer Goods, Civil Engineering for further 
analysis. 
4.5 Analysis of firms’ patenting behaviour in relevant technical fields  
 
The analysis in the previous sections has revealed that there are nine technology areas in which 
patenting trends suggest that strategic behaviour by patent applicants may exist. The pu rpose of 
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this section is to analyze these technology areas in greater detail. In particular we will now begin 
to analyze patenting behaviour at the firm level.  
 
This section contains three parts:  
 
· In the first we look for signs of patent thickets in the t echnology areas we have selected 
above. 
· In the second we analyze individual firms’ opposition activity in the selected technology 
areas 
· In the third we analyze a broad range of patent based indicators for individual firms in the 
selected technology areas.  
 
These sections will progressively take us towards the goal of identifying indicators for strategic 
use of patents by individual firms.  
4.5.1 The relatedness of firms’ patents by technology area  
 
The purpose of this section is to provide information about the li kelihood that a technology area 
harbours one or more patent thickets. In the literature a patent thicket is defined as a field of 
technology in which many patents are connected to individual products, e.g. a mobile phone 
which embodies 3G technology. 74 Direct measures of patent thickets would require information 
about the link between patents and products. This information is not available in patent data.  
 
In order to learn something about the likelihood that patent thickets exist we have investigated 
how concentrated the references of a given cohort of patents are in a given technology area. To 
do this we have identified which patents are cited in a given technology area by a given patent. 
We also know what type of citation is made, i.e. whether the referenc e is critical of the citing 
patent indicating that it is not very original. Using this information we calculate two indices: i)  
the Herfindahl index over the set of cited patents and ii) the Herfindahl index over the set of 
critical citations to patents. Here we use both X- and Y-References. These indicators are higher 
and indicate higher concentration, if the same set of patents is frequently cited by all the patents 
of a cohort.  
                                                   
74 Bekkers and West (2006) identify 23 patenting entities and 140 essential patents for 3G technology between 1988 
and 1991. For the subsequent UMTS standard they identify 73 patentors and 1227 patents.  
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Using these indicators we find that:  
· The concentration of references decre ases over time in almost all technology areas, which 
reflects the increasing pool of patents that may be cited.  
· There is much variability in the concentration of references across technology areas, 
which reflects technology specific differences.  
· Several technology areas are characterized by constant or slightly increasing 
concentration of references. These areas are most likely to harbour patent thickets. They 
are: Telecommunications ; Electrical Devices; Analysis, Measurement and Control ; 
Medical Engineering; Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics . 
 
In using these measures we assume that patents which are used as complements within the same 
products will also reference the same prior art more often than patents which are independent. 
The measures are informative if c omplementary patents within a patent thicket are used jointly in 
the product market and derive from similar prior technology. Our measure is not informative if 
complementary technologies entering a set of products such as a telephone are also based on 
independent inventions. The measure is also misleading if different patents are related in a 
technological sense but used independently in the product market. Any other measure derived 
from patent data will have the same weaknesses.  
 
The two measures we use p rovide different information. The first measure uses all references on 
the patent documents. It captures the similarity of technologies best because it is based on all 
patent references contained in the patent documents, a very comprehensive set of data. T he 
second measure focuses on patents that are cited as X -References. X-References indicate that a 
new patent or claims on a patent do not represent an inventive step in light of the cited document. 
As such the cited patent may block the new patent. Thus th e measure based on the concentration 
of X-References is an indicator of the extent that a subset of patents blocked later patents. The 
results of the two measures are broadly similar. Nonetheless, the second measure is sometimes 
useful in sharpening the picture. For instance it shows more clearly that references to blocking 
patents in Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics  behave quite differently from the overall trend.  
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Please note that Figures 4.5.1 – 4.5.8 all display an increase in 2001 which we attribute to an  
error in the underlying dataset. This is the same problem which is also manifested in the time 
series on references per patent (Compare pages 39 and 40).  
Figures 4.5.1- 4.5.4 show that references are more concentrated in Electronics and Instruments 
than in the other main areas. Telecommunications  is clearly the technology area with the highest 
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In Medical engineering  the level of X-References was particularly high during the 1990’s. The 




Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals  
Figure 4.5.1.5 
 














































These Figures show that references in Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics remained level while all 
other technology areas become less concentrated over time in line with the overall average.  
 
 
Mechanical Engineering, Machinery 
Figure 4.5.1.7 
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Finally Figures 4.5.7 and 4.5.8  reveal that references in all of Me chanical engineering declined in 
line with the trend. Only the concentration of references in Handling and Printing  during the 
early 1990s suggests that firms may have encountered patent thickets in this technology area. 
However the subsequent developments also indicate that thi s is no longer the case.  
 
This section has shown that in a subset of technology areas there are particularly strong signs of a 
patent thicket. We investigate the behaviour of firms in these technology areas in more detail in 
section 4.5.3 below. In the fol lowing section we turn to an analysis of opposition behaviour.  
 
We summarize our findings from this section together with those from the following sections in 
4.5.4 below.  
 
4.5.2 Opposition behaviour at the firm level  
 
In this section we undertake a detailed an alysis of opposition behaviour in the selected 
technology areas. The aim is twofold:  
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· first we are seeking to identify differences in the opposition behaviour of individual firms 
in different technology areas. This provides us with information on which fi rms are 
particularly aggressive in opposition and whom they target most often.  
· secondly we investigate whether litigation (related to opposition) raises entry barriers for 
smaller firms. This question has been studied in the literature on U.S. patents by Lerner 
(1995),  Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001)  and most recently by Cockburn and 
Macgarvie (2006). We try to uncover whether there are differences by technology area in 
the likelihood that smaller firms ’ patents will be opposed.  
 
In section 4.5.2.1 we employ tables which represent the most important opposed and the most 
frequently opposing firms by technology area. These tables also include information about the 
frequency with which the opposing firms op posed medium sized and small firms. In section 
4.5.2.2 we employ simple descriptive regressions in order to uncover whether the size of an 
applicant firm’s portfolio has effects on the likelihood that its patents will be opposed at the EPO.  
 
Opposition tab les 
 
In this section we analyze which firms oppose which rivals. In particular we focus on the top 10 
opponents. We rank the opposed firms by the number of oppositions they received in total. The 
tables show the number of oppositions received by the top te n opposed75 as well as the firms 
ranked 11 th to 40th by oppositions received as well as all remaining firms. These tables show 
whether opposition activity is directed mainly at specific firms or whether it is widely dispersed. 
The tables also provide insigh ts into differences between the opposition activities of the firms 
who oppose others’ patents most frequently. This allows us to establish whether firms that 
frequently oppose are focusing on specific rivals or not.  
 
                                                   
75 In the case of several tables we consolidated firms and their dependent firms. This is necessary whenever the 
tables include firms that we had not consolidated for our other analyses. In these cases the tables contain fewer  
than 10 names. Furthermore it should be noted that we counted all opposition cases that are connected to a 
technology area in the tables below. This leads to a certain degree of double counting between tables. The tables 
are intended to provide informatio n about the propensity of certain firms to oppose in specific technology areas. 
Therefore we have not attempted to ascribe opposition cases to any one technology area, which would have forced 
us to make random choices whenever a patent is ascribed to diffe rent technology areas in equal measure. Compare 
the methodlogical point made in Section 4.2 above.  
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To aid interpretation of the tables we  provide an example:  
Table 4.5.1 shows that Siemens opposed 18 patents that were applied for by Sumitomo in 
Telecommunications . In total Siemens opposed 67 patents applied for by the firms that were 
opposed most frequently in this technology area. Note th at Siemens opposed 91 patents that were 
applied for by firms ranked below 40 in terms of oppositions received. Thus Siemens were far 
more likely to oppose firms in this group than Alcatel, who mainly opposed patents applied for 
by firms in the group of the  ten most frequently opposed firms.  
 
The following tables are presented by main area.  
 
Electronics 
For Electronics we find that:  
 
· The set of the most important opposing firms in Electronics is very homogeneous across 
Information Technology, , Telecommunications and Audiovisual Technology. Siemens, 
Philips and Bosch appear amongst the top ten in all three and many other firms appear 
twice.  
· The set of the most important opposed firms is less homogeneous across the three 
technology areas. Siemens and Toshiba always appears amongst the top ten opposed 
firms.  
· The majority of top ten opposing firms are European while the majority of top 10 opposed 
firms are not. 
· Opposition in Telecommunications and Information Technology  is highly dispersed as the 
total number of cases involving the least frequently opposed firms is high. In contrast, in 
Audiovisual Technology opposition is quite concentrated amongst the top ten opposing 
and opposed firms. 
· The concentration of oppositions amongst the most important opponents is v ery high in 
Audiovisual Technology  with Grundig and Philips accounting for more than 60% of all 
opposition cases in this technology area. Especially Grundig have focused their 
oppositions on the top ten opposed firms and especially on Thomson.  
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· Opposition is generally very weak in Information Technology  as well as being directed 
towards less often opposed and most likely smaller firms. This contrasts with a level of 
patent applications which is much higher than that in Audiovisual Technology  (viz. Figure 
4.2.1). This suggests that Information Technology  is an area in which the opposition 
mechanism is not working well. This may be partly due to the relatively lower 
concentration of the most important firms (C4) in this technology area (viz. Figure 4.3.1).  
 
Table 4.5.1               Telecommunications 















































































MOTOROLA 9 1 12 15 1 0 0 1 4 13 56 
SUMITOMO 18 3 3 8 4 5 0 0 0 0 41 
SIEMENS 0 7 19 1 7 1 0 0 2 1 38 
THOMSON  1 24 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 27 
QUALCOMM 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 8 4 5 21 
TOSHIBA 8 4 3 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 21 
FUJITSU 5 1 7 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 19 
PHILIPS 9 5 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 19 
ALCATEL 3 2 3 0 4 0 0 2 0 0 14 
THALES 11 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 14 
Rank 1-10  67 48 48 36 20 10 0 11 11 19 270 
Rank 11-40  44 57 23 19 9 3 24 8 6 3 196 
Rank >41  91 60 57 22 39 17 6 9 7 0 308 
Total 202 165 128 77 68 30 30 28 24 22 774 
 26% 21% 16% 9% 8% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 100 
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Table 4.5.2                Audiovisual technology 
 Opposing parties  




























































SONY 35 6 8 2 1 4 3 3 2 64 
THOMSON 49 1 0 6 0 2 0 0 0 58 
TOSHIBA 7 24 5 9 1 3 1 0 0 50 
HITACHI 9 0 6 6 1 0 7 0 1 30 
PIONEER 19 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 24 
SHARP 8 14 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 24 
MATSUSHITA 17 0 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 23 
SIEMENS 3 11 0 0 0 2 0 3 0 19 
KONICA 0 1 9 0 1 0 5 0 0 16 
EASTMANKODAK  3 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 10 
Rank 1-10  150 61 35 26 5 11 17 9 4 318 
Rank 11-40  96 59 11 11 9 11 1 2 5 205 
Rank >41  60 59 21 29 14 2 1 3 5 194 
Total 306 179 67 66 28 24 19 14 14 717 
 43% 25% 9% 9% 4% 3% 3% 2% 2% 100 
Table 4.5.3                       Information Technology 











































































































FUJITSU 2 8 2 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 17 
SIEMENS 5 0 2 3 0 1 3 0 0 0 14 
TOSHIBA 2 1 4 3 1 0 1 0 2 0 14 
PHILIPS 5 2 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 12 
IBM 0 1 0 0 4 3 0 0 0 0 8 
BOSCH 0 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
SUMITOMO 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
PITNEYBOWES 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
CITIBANK 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Rank 1-10  16 23 12 7 5 4 4 3 6 0 80 
Rank 11-40  27 20 13 10 2 9 3 0 3 5 92 
Rank >41  51 43 37 29 16 4 9 7 1 3 200 
Total  94 86 62 46 23 17 16 10 10 8 372 




Table 4.5.4                  Medical engineering 
 Opposing parties  






































































P & G 0 0 0 33 43 0 20 96 
KIMBERLYCLARK  0 32 0 8 24 0 6 70 
PACESETTER  51 0 0 0 0 0 0 51 
MEDTRONIC  37 0 5 0 0 0 0 42 
MCNEIL 0 20 0 1 9 0 4 34 
ST JUDE MEDICAL  31 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 
SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS  0 20 0 10 0 0 0 30 
CARDIAC PACEMAKERS  21 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 
SIEMENS 16 0 0 0 0 2 0 18 
Rank 1-10  156 72 5 52 76 2 30 393 
Rank 11-40  25 31 15 24 1 25 5 126 
Rank >41  77 37 97 26 1 44 14 296 
Total 258 140 117 102 78 71 49 815 
 32% 17% 14% 13% 10% 9% 6% 100% 
Table 4.5.5         Analysis, Measurement, Control 
 Opposing parties  






































































































SIEMENS 0 37 0 6 3 4 5 7 1 1 64 
HITACHI 24 18 2 5 1 1 0 0 0 0 51 
BOSCH 17 0 0 0 0 8 1 9 1 1 37 
TOSHIBA 17 0 0 6 9 1 3 0 0 1 37 
PHILIPS 12 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 19 
FANUCLTD 1 14 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 16 
THALES 10 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 
ABBOTT  0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
INVERNESS MEDICAL     0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
PITNEY BOWES  0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Rank 1-10  81 73 10 19 13 15 10 17 2 5 245 
Rank 11-40  49 35 8 16 11 5 8 8 13 4 157 
Rank >41  217 86 102 80 50 50 39 22 24 29 699 
Total 347 194 120 115 74 70 57 47 39 38 1101 
 32% 18% 11% 10% 7% 6% 5% 4% 4% 3% 100% 
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Here we focus on Analysis, Measurement, Control  and Medical Engineering. Opposition activity 
is high in the latter of these two technology areas (compare Figure 4.2.15). We find that:  
· Patent applications are generally high in Analysis, Measuremen t, Control and grew 
substantially in  Medical Engineering. The share of opposed patents is highe r in the latter 
area. Tables 4.5.4 and 4.5.5 show that opposition in both areas is higher than in 
Electronics in general.  
· The overlap between the opposed and the opposing firms is moderate in both areas.  
· In Medical Engineering  there is both a high level o f opposition amongst the top ten 
opposed and opposing firms and a high level of opposition against the group of very 
infrequently opposed firms. The latter finding relates to the large number of small firms 
that operate in this industry as is shown in the first case study (5.1.1) below. 
· In Analysis, Measuremen t, Control opposition is heavily concentrated amongst the less 
frequently opposed firms. These are likely to be smaller firms. This finding is especially 
interesting because this industry is dominated by larger firms (viz. Table 5.1.1). 
Opposition against smaller firms is likely to be an interesting issue to study in greater 
detail in this technology area.  
 
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals  
 
Figure 4.2.16 shows that opposition activity in this main area is very high. Applications in this 
main area have also risen and claims per patent have increased dramatically. In this area we 
include an opposition table for Chemical - , Petrol - and Basic Materials Chemistry  as many 
patents by Cosmetics firms are included  in this technology area. Our analysis of Tables 4.5.6 – 
4.5.9 shows that: 
 
· The set of most important opposing firms is much less homogeneous across the 
technology areas Agriculture, Food ; Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics  and Biotechnology than 
is the case across the technology areas in Electronics.  
·  The set of the most opposed firms is also less homogeneous than in Electronics.  
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· The groups of most opposed and most opposing firms by technology area are far more 
homogeneous than in Electronics. This is particularly  true of Biotechnology  and 
Agriculture, Food .   
· Opposition is also dispersed here with even more opposition cases directed at firms not 
inside the top ten opposed than in Electronics.  
· In Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics  the pharmaceuticals firms oppose a more di verse set of 
firms than the cosmetics firms. The latter frequently oppose one another.  
 
 
Table 4.5.6                     Agriculture, Food 
 Opposing parties  









































































































UNILEVER 2 30 12 28 18 6 0 1 5 2 104 
NESTLE 17 5 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 9 35 
P & G 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 18 
CPCINT 2 0 0 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 8 
MILUPA 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
CAMPINA 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
DSMNV 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Rank 1-10  40 35 17 28 18 12 1 4 5 11 171 
Rank 11-40  33 6 4 3 4 5 1 3 2 0 61 
Rank >41  84 35 14 3 10 10 17 10 9 3 195 
Total 157 76 35 34 32 27 19 17 16 14 427 
 37% 18% 8% 8% 7% 6% 4% 4% 4% 3% 100% 
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Table 4.5.7                         Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics  
 Opposing parties  



















































































UNILEVER 39 0 0 11 2 0 9 0 4 0 65 
L'OREAL 36 0 3 0 0 1 6 5 9 0 60 
P & G 30 1 0 12 6 2 0 0 4 0 55 
KAO 23 0 1 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 29 
GLAXO SMITH KLINE  8 0 1 1 1 4 1 0 0 0 16 
HOFFMANN ROCHE  2 0 7 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 13 
J&J 0 11 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 
BAYER 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 1 0 0 9 
SUMITOMO 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 5 
3M 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Rank 1-10  142 13 13 30 10 14 18 9 17 0 266 
Rank 11-40  11 19 9 4 13 7 3 8 5 4 83 
Rank >41  84 54 51 27 37 24 23 25 11 27 363 
Total 237 86 73 61 60 45 44 42 33 31 712 
 33% 12% 10% 9% 8% 6% 6% 6% 5% 4% 100% 
 
Table 4.5.8  Chemical - , Petrol - and Basic Materials Chemistry  
 Opposing parties  
















































































UNILEVER 210 189 1 2 8 2 4 11 0 0 427 
P & G 109 0 119 1 2 0 0 2 0 2 235 
HENKEL 1 42 30 3 5 13 1 1 2 1 99 
NOVARTIS 4 1 0 14 0 12 15 0 0 1 47 
BASF 3 1 2 2 8 6 7 4 2 1 36 
HOECHST  7 0 3 9 5 2 3 2 2 3 36 
SHELL 2 0 0 3 16 1 1 0 5 0 28 
BAYER 4 0 1 9 2 8 2 0 0 0 26 
SUMITOMO 0 0 0 7 0 10 5 0 0 2 24 
THE LUBRIZOL  1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 13 2 17 
Rank 1-10  341 233 156 51 46 54 38 20 24 12 975 
Rank 11-40  77 41 36 39 23 15 10 17 6 10 274 
Rank >41  102 26 43 82 73 24 34 29 35 18 466 
Total 520 300 235 172 142 93 82 66 65 40 1715 
 30% 17% 14% 10% 8% 5% 5% 4% 4% 2% 100% 
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Table 4.5.9                       Biotechnology 
 Opposing parties  








































































































GENENTECH  7 0 1 2 2 2 1 0 4 0 19 
GENENCOR  1 6 0 2 0 0 5 1 0 0 15 
HOFFMANN ROCHE  2 0 0 1 3 0 1 0 3 0 10 
NOVOZYME  0 1 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 9 
GIST BROCADES  0 1 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 7 
DOWCHEMICAL  0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 6 
SYNGENTA 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 6 
MONSANTO  0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 
CALGENE  0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 
CHIRON CORP.  2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Rank 1-10  12 12 6 5 5 3 13 10 7 9 82 
Rank 11-40  28 15 13 10 5 10 2 9 7 4 103 
Rank >41  68 17 17 18 21 16 14 5 9 8 193 
Total 108 44 36 33 31 29 29 24 23 21 378 





Figure 4.2.17 shows the incidence of opposition is also high in several technology areas of 
Mechanical engineering. O pposition cases have increased in recent years in Agricultural- and 
Food machinery. In contrast the share of opposed patents in Transport is not very high but the 
absolute number of cases is high. We analyze these two technology areas in detail here. We fi nd 
that: 
· The sets of 10 most opposed and opposing firms are entirely disconnected across these 
two technology areas.  
· The sets of the top opposed and opposing are very homogeneous within the technology 
areas, this is especially true of Agricultural- and Food Machinery .  
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· In Agricultural- and Food Machinery opposition cases are highly concentrated amongst 
the top ten opposed and opposing firms. This suggests a healthy level of competition 
exists in this technology area.  
· In Transport opposition is weakly disp ersed here it is possible that smaller firms find that 
opposition affects their patenting efforts adversely.  
 
Table 4.5.10                        Transport 
 Opposing parties  

























































































BOSCH 0 8 2 3 3 4 1 0 14 35 
SIEMENS 16 0 2 3 0 3 0 1 0 25 
NISSAN MOTOR  8 3 7 3 2 1 0 0 0 24 
WABCO 13 2 3 0 1 0 4 0 0 23 
BMW 10 1 0 4 0 4 0 1 0 20 
PORSCHE 1 2 7 2 1 1 1 0 1 16 
AUDI 1 1 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 10 
LUCAS 3 1 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 10 
SUMITOMO 3 1 1 0 2 3 0 0 0 10 
BOEING 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Rank 1-10  55 19 29 17 14 16 7 2 15 174 
Rank 11-40  46 16 28 20 16 6 3 11 3 149 
Rank >41  82 79 54 32 16 24 25 19 11 342 
Total 183 114 111 69 46 46 35 32 29 665 




Table 4.5.11   Agricultural – and Food Machinery 
 Opposing parties  



























































































MAASLAND 9 0 44 0 0 29 21 0 1 104 
AMAZONEN WERKE  0 24 0 21 0 0 0 22 12 79 
KUHN 5 3 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 16 
DEERE 3 0 0 2 10 0 0 0 0 15 
C VAN DER LELY  8 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 3 14 
RABEWERK 8 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 11 
CNH GLOBAL  1 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 6 
Rank 1-10  34 29 46 28 16 29 21 22 20 245 
Rank 11-40  17 16 4 14 6 0 2 0 1 60 
Rank >41  25 9 3 9 13 1 2 1 1 64 
Total 76 54 53 51 35 30 25 23 22 369 






This section contains the results of regressions describing the probability of receiving opposition 
by technology area. The aim of these regressions is to establish whether the probability of a 
patent application being opposed at the EPO depends on the size of the applicant firm. As noted 
above the literature studying patenting and litigation in the United States indicates that smaller 
firms in certain technologies have encountered a higher probability of litigation against their 
patents. Lerner (1995) argues that this has affected firms’ decisions in which technologies to 
patent their inventions.  
 
We emphasize that our regressions are purely descriptive. This means that while the additional 
variables we include allow us to control for the effects of differences in the quality or value of 
patents, the regressions are not based on any theoretical models of oppositio n behaviour. While 
this reduces the strength of the results we present, the regressions do provide a fairly robust 
impression of the effects which patent portfolio size has on the probability that patents are 
opposed conditional on the size of the applican t firm. We have tried several different 
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specifications for these regressions and the effect of patent portfolio size has had the same sign 
and the same significance throughout.  The regressions show that:  
 
· Ceteris paribus, the probability of opposition ag ainst a patent is greater for applicants with 
smaller patent portfolios in all the included technology areas belonging to Electronics as 
well as in Engines, Pumps and Turbines .  
· Ceteris Paribus, the probability of opposition against a patent is smaller for  firms with 
smaller patent portfolios in Pharmaceuticals , Agriculture and Food  and Medical 
Engineering. The PatVal-EU case study will show that these are technology areas with a 
much higher share of smaller firms than the other technology areas.  
 
In Table 4.5.12 we report the effects for the logarithm of the size of firms’ patent portfolios and 
the significance of these effects. As this is a descriptive regression we focus on the signs of 
coefficients. These indicate that the probability of opposition again st a patent depends in part on 
how large the applicant firm is. A negative sign of the coefficient indicates that a marginal 
increase in the size of a firm’s patent portfolio reduces the probability of opposition against its 
patents and vice versa. These r esults indicate that small firms may find it harder to obtain patents 
in the technology areas in which the coefficients are significant and negative.   
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-0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.007 0.001 0.007 -0.002 -0.000 0.006 -0.001 
size    (0.000)** (0.000)
** 
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.001)** (0.001) (0.001)** (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Obser-
vations 
43295 25374 28296 52060 24491 14068 7781 22890 40826 34326 52557 
Opposition  
Probability  
0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.08 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 
            
 Standard errors in parentheses    




The last line of Table 4.5.12 presents the probability of being opposed. This line shows that the 
highest opposition rates arise in Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics , Biotechnology and Agriculture 
and Food. In these technology areas smaller firms are less likely to be opposed. Rather it is the 
large firms that oppose one anothers’ patent applications with high frequency.  
 
4.5.3 Firm characteristics in selected technology areas  
 
This section has two aims:  
· To establish whether the pat enting explosion at the EPO is due to the patenting activities 
of a specific group of firms.  
· To determine which firms are making use of strategic patenting and what effects this has.  
We investigate the patenting behaviour of selected firms. From the six ar eas selected in the last 
section we have extracted the 30 firms with the highest number of patent applications over the 
period 1999-2002. Of the potential 180 firms we were left with 90; this shows that all firms in 
this group are active in more than one t echnology area. In fact they are all active in at least three 
as we show below. The group of firms we have selected in this way accounts for 28,7 % of all 
patent applications made at the EPO over the period until the end of 2005.  
 
In Table 4.5.13 below we rank all of the selected firms by the growth of patent applications 
between 1989 and 2003.  This growth rate is calculated relative to the base period, i.e. 1989 -
1992. Table 4.5.13 also shows the three most important technology areas for each firm for the 
period 1999-2002. The results in table 4.5.13 are based on our consolidation of the firm names. 76 
 
                                                   
76    The consolidation of firm names into valid entities is complex. We have chosen to include all mergers until end 
of 2002 in our data. Split off firms suc h as Delphi, Infineon or NTT Docomo are treated as separate entities. All 
firm names in Table 4.5.13 were researched and we included as many large subsidiaries (>10 patents) as we 
found in the data.   
 201 
Table 4.5.13         Ranking of selected firms by average growth of patent applications  
Firm name Primary 
technology area  
Secondary 
technology area  
Tertiary 









HUMAN GENOME  Organic Ch.  Pharm., Cosm. Biotech. 586 0 306 305,8 
JTEKT Transportation  Mech. Elements Analysis 522 1 300 149,3 
INFINEON Semicond. IT Telecom 4039 16 2250 135,4 
BROADCOM Telecom IT Audiovisual  1116 6 759 107,5 
DELPHI  Transportation  Motors Energy 2595 31 1226 37,4 
INTEL IT Telecom Semicond. 1848 29 1037 33,1 
QUALCOMM Telecom IT Analysis 1911 34 1163 32,7 
BOSTON SCIENTIFIC  Medical Eng.  Pharm.,Cosm.   Mat proc. 1364 23 731 29,5 
WYETH Organic Ch.  Pharm., Cosm.  Biotech. 658 13 336 24 
RICOH Optical  Telecom Audiovisual  1706 39 885 21,2 
NTT DOCOMOINC  Telecom IT Analysis 1272 27 613 21,1 
SCA HYGIENE  Medical Eng.  Mat proc.  Printing 549 16 275 15,3 
LG GROUP Telecom Audiovisual  Energy 3192 99 1143 10,4 
SAMSUNG Telecom Audiovisual  IT 6662 242 2185 8 
ERICSSON Telecom IT Energy 6339 308 2582 7,3 
UNICHARM Medical Eng.  Mat proc. Cons. Goods 764 51 422 7,2 
NISSAN Transportation  Motors Mech. Elements  2829 128 968 6,5 
NOKIA Telecom IT Audiovisual  6448 474 3158 5,7 
VOLKSWAGEN  Transportation  Motors Mech. Elements  2525 179 1085 5 
BEIERSDORF  Pharm., Cosm. Medical Eng. Polymers 992 69 406 4,9 
DENSO Energy Motors Transportation  1363 83 490 4,9 
BMW Transportation  Motors Mech. Elements  2509 149 858 4,7 
HONDA Transportation  Motors Mech. Elements  3693 271 1458 4,4 
MEDTRONIC  Medical Eng.  Energy Analysis 1761 126 632 4 
SHIMANO Transportation  Agric. Mach. Mech. Elements  942 65 318 3,9 
MICHELIN Transportation  Mat proc. Polymers 930 81 397 3,8 
NORTEL NETWORKS  Telecom Optical IT 1938 146 697 3,7 
DAIMLER CHRYSLER  Transportation  Motors Mech. Elements  3315 252 1185 3,7 
TOYOTA Motors Transportation  Mech. Elements 4745 327 1475 3,5 
KIMBERLY CLARK  Medical Eng.  Mat proc. Cons. Goods  1960 199 773 2,9 
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Firm name Primary 
technology area  
Secondary 
technology area  
Tertiary 









L’OREAL Pharm., Cosm. Polymers Cons. Goods  4330 413 1503 2,6 
BOSCH Motors Transportation  Analysis 13509 1447 5162 2,6 
PHILIPS Telecom Audiovisual  Energy 21970 2547 8224 2,2 
RENAULT Transportation  Motors Mech. Elements  2137 203 649 2,2 
BOEHRINGER ING  Organic Ch.  Pharm., Cosm.  Biotech. 1295 181 538 2 
SEIKO EPSON  Printing Optical IT 4148 500 1445 1,9 
MATSUSHITA Telecom Audiovisual  Energy 15676 1968 5470 1,8 
OLYMPUS Medical Eng. Optical Audiovisual  974 93 255 1,7 
SANYO EL. Audiovisual Energy Telecom 2009 250 680 1,7 
J&J Medical Eng. Pharm., Cosm.  Organic Ch. 5697 691 1809 1,6 
DEGUSSA Organic Ch.  Polymers Materials  3674 429 1119 1,6 
YAMAHA Motors Cons. Goods  Transportation  1600 187 484 1,6 
P & G Petrol Ch.  Medical Eng.  Pharm., Cosm. 7824 795 2048 1,6 
PFIZER Organic Ch.  Pharm., Cosm.  Biotech. 2746 367 925 1,5 
UNIV. of CALIFORNIA  Pharm., Cosm. Organic Ch.  Biotech. 1562 193 465 1,4 
PIONEER Audiovisual  Telecom Analysis 2487 439 1042 1,4 
HP IT Printing Telecom 6947 1004 2300 1,3 
DEERE Agric. Mach.  Transportation  Mech. Elements  1996 240 543 1,3 
STI MICROEL.  IT Semicond.  Telecom 5369 737 1631 1,2 
BMS Organic Ch.  Pharm., Cosm.  Medical Eng.  1519 241 523 1,2 
THOMSON LICENSING  Audiovisual  Telecom Energy 5363 827 1744 1,1 
ALCATEL Telecom Energy Optical  7655 1094 2304 1,1 
SONY Audiovisual  Telecom IT 12662 2031 4260 1,1 
SIEMENS Telecom Energy Analysis 32558 4138 8476 1 
GOODYEAR  Transportation  Polymers Mat proc. 1757 199 407 1 
PHARMACIA Organic Ch.  Pharm., Cosm.  Biotech. 1862 306 621 1 
GLAXO SMITHKLINE  Organic Ch.  Pharm., Cosm.  Biotech. 5447 692 1374 1 
BECTON DICKINSON  Medical Eng. Biotech. Analysis 1514 213 402 0,9 
KAO Pharm., Cosm. Petrol Ch. Organic Ch. 1730 275 515 0,9 




Firm name Primary 
technology area  
Secondary 
technology area  
Tertiary 









WARNER LAMBERT  Organic Ch.  Pharm., Cosm.  Agric., Foods 1360 200 335 0,7 
PORSCHE Transportation  Motors Mech. Elements  1231 195 303 0,6 
HITACHI Energy IT Audiovisual  10885 1488 2213 0,5 
3M Polymers Optical  Medical Eng.  8188 1374 2009 0,5 
GE Polymers Energy Motors 10246 1877 2742 0,5 
PEUGEOT  Transportation  Mech. Elements  Motors 1956 291 423 0,5 
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS  IT Semicond. Telecom 3470 651 866 0,3 
HONEYWELL Analysis Energy Mech. Elements  4833 937 1231 0,3 
CONTINENTAL  Transportation  Mech. Elements  Analysis 2442 420 548 0,3 
MERCK Organic Ch.  Pharm., Cosm.  Petrol Ch. 5268 1016 1308 0,3 
ELI LILLY  Organic Ch.  Pharm., Cosm.  Biotech. 2369 299 383 0,3 
SUMITOMO Telecom Energy Organic Ch.  29598 5278 6737 0,3 
MITSUBISHI Telecom Energy Polymers 12797 2628 3306 0,3 
HOFFMANN ROCHE  Organic Ch.  Polymers Biotech. 7294 1201 1462 0,2 
SCHERING PLOUGH  Organic Ch.  Pharm., Cosm.  Biotech. 1033 189 229 0,2 
UNILEVER Petrol Ch. Agric., Foods  Pharm., Cosm.  4068 783 931 0,2 
EASTMAN KODAK  Optical Printing Polymers 10673 2423 2789 0,2 
BASF Polymers Organic Ch.  Petrol Ch. 14398 2307 2582 0,1 
TAKEDA Organic Ch.  Pharm., Cosm.  Biotech. 1717 316 353 0,1 
LUCENT  Telecom Optical  IT 8409 1582 1768 0,1 
MOTOROLA Telecom IT Semicond.  5042 979 1039 0,1 
BAYER Organic Ch.  Polymers Petrol Ch. 13845 2112 2110 0 
FUJITSU Telecom IT Semicond.  7718 1638 1601 0 
SCHERING Organic Ch.  Pharm., Cosm.  Petrol Ch. 1562 320 254 -0,2 
SHARP Audiovisual  Optical  Telecom 4670 1137 900 -0,2 
TOSHIBA IT Telecom Energy 9750 2049 1518 -0,3 
HENKEL Petrol Ch. Polymers Organic Ch.  4872 949 698 -0,3 
CANON Optical Printing Telecom 12694 3350 2448 -0,3 
NOVARTIS Organic Ch.  Petrol Ch. Pharm., Cosm.  6152 1143 674 -0,4 
IBM IT Telecom Semicond.  13863 3543 1059 -0,7 
Average       5303 775 1483 0,9 
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Table 4.5.13 is ranked by growth of applications. Unsurprisingly relatively new companies  
(Human Genome, Infineon, Broadcom, Delphi) are at the top of the list. An analysis of Table 
4.5.13 shows that: 
 
· Firms that are connected to the main area Electronics are the largest group within the 25 
applicants with the fastest growing patent portfolios  (Names in boldface). 77 Interestingly 
Medical Engineering  and Pharmaceuticals  firms are about as important as firms from 
Transport within this group.   
· To ensure that our interpretation of Table 4.5.13 is not driven by the sensitivity of the 
growth rate to the definition of the firm in the earlier period (which may be affected by 
our treatment of mergers and divestments) we add Table 4.5.14 which ranks firms from 
Table 4.5.13 by total number of patent applications in the period 1999 -2002. This 
representation also shows that the group of firms that are patenting most heavily recently 
at the EPO contains a large number of firms from Electronics. The second largest group 
of firms in this Table is connected both to Instruments and Chemicals and 
Pharmaceuticals.  
· Table 4.5.13 also shows that some firms which are generally cited as having been at the 
forefront of the shift towards strategic patenting or use of patent portfolios, such as Texas 
Instruments and IBM or firms which appear as frequent opponents such as Hen kel appear 
towards the bottom of this ranking. This suggests that these firms have built up patent 
portfolios of sufficient size and no longer need to patent as much as those ranked towards 
the top of Table 4.5.13 who may still be building up portfolios. A  recent interview 
conducted with Beiersdorf showed that in their view L’Oreal are pursuing a strategy of 
flooding certain patent classes with patent applications in order to build up a large patent 
stock. Our ranking shows that the patent stock of Beiersdo rf is growing faster than that of 
L’Oreal. However  L’Oreal have a patent stock which is 4 -5 times larger than Beiersdorf. 
They also made three times more applications over the period 1999 -2002 than Beiersdorf 
.  
                                                   




Table 4.5.14    Top 25 firms from the reference group ranked b y patent applications 1999 -2002 


















        
SIEMENS Telecom Energy Analysis 32558 4138 8476 1,0 
PHILIPS Telecom Audiovisual  Energy 21970 2547 8224 2,2 
SUMITOMO Telecom Energy Organic Ch. 29598 5278 6737 0,3 
MATSUSHITA  Telecom Audiovisual  Energy 15676 1968 5470 1,8 
BOSCH Motors Transportation  Analysis 13509 1447 5162 2,6 
SONY Audiovisual  Telecom IT 12662 2031 4260 1,1 
MITSUBISHI Telecom Energy Polymers 12797 2628 3306 0,3 
NOKIA Telecom IT Audiovisual  6448 474 3158 5,7 
EASTMAN KODAK  Optical Printing Polymers 10673 2423 2789 0,2 
GE Polymers Energy Motors 10246 1877 2742 0,5 
ERICSSON Telecom IT Energy 6339 308 2582 7,3 
BASF Polymers Organic Ch.  Petrol Ch. 14398 2307 2582 0,1 
CANON Optical Printing Telecom 12694 3350 2448 -0,3 
ALCATEL Telecom Energy Optical  7655 1094 2304 1,1 
HP IT Printing Telecom 6947 1004 2300 1,3 
INFINEON  Semicond. IT Telecom 4039 16 2250 135,4 
HITACHI Energy IT Audiovisual  10885 1488 2213 0,5 
SAMSUNG Telecom Audiovisual  IT 6662 242 2185 8,0 
BAYER Organic Ch.  Polymers Petrol Ch. 13845 2112 2110 0,0 
PROCTER & GAMBLE  Petrol Ch.  Medical Eng. Pharm., Cosm.  7824 795 2048 1,6 
3M Polymers Optical Medical Eng.  8188 1374 2009 0,5 
J&J Medical Eng. Pharm., Cosm. Organic Ch. 5697 691 1809 1,6 
LUCENT Telecom Optical IT 8409 1582 1768 0,1 
THOMSON LIC. Audiovisual  Telecom Energy 5363 827 1744 1,1 
STI MICRO.  IT Semicond. Telecom 5369 737 1631 1,2 
Average of all 90 firms     5303 775 1483 0,9 
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In order to further investigate the question whether the increase in patenting is mainly due to 
developments in a specific technology or group of firms we calculated an additional indicator 
which is presented in Table 4.5.15 below. We calculated how concentrated the patenting 
activities of each firm were across the 30 technology areas. We used the Herfinda hl index as a 
measure of concentration of patenting across technology areas. If this index is higher then the 
firm is concentrating most of its patenting activity in a few technology areas, if the index is 
lower, then the firm is spreading its patenting ac tivity very widely. It is interesting to note that in 
the set of firms presented in Table 4.5.2 above there are firms which have begun to patent in a 
wider set of technology areas (these are presented in Table 4..5.3 below), but there are also firms 
which have begun to patent in a narrower set of technology areas.  
 
Firms which patent with greater focus than in the past are:  
· Alcatel, Qualcomm, Nokia, Nortel Networks, Motorola, Lucent, Ericsson, HP, Texas 
Instruments  and IBM who are all connected to Telecommunications or Information 
technology. While this finding is not surprising in the cases of Qualcomm, Nokia and 
IBM it is unexpected for the remainder of the firms listed here, since they are in the group 
of firms that has chosen a wider focus for their pat enting activities in the United States, 
viz. Hall (2005). This finding presents an interesting puzzle which we have to resolve in 
the future.  
· Additionally, we find that several firms from Medical Engineering  have adopted a greater 
focus in their patenting activity: Boston Scientific, Medtronic, Becton Dickinson and 
Johnson & Johnson (J&J).  
· Finally Boehringer Ingelheim, Schering, Schering Plough, Nov artis and Pharmacia who 
are all pharmaceuticals firms have also adopted a greater focus of their patenting activity. 
L’Oreal also adopted this approach.  
 
We turn now to those firms that patent more widely. Table 4.18 ranks those firms with the 
highest increase in the dispersion of their patenting activities as measured by the difference in the 
measure of concentration. We measured an increase in dispersion as: HHI for 1989 -1992 – HHI 
for 1999-2002.   
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Table 4.5.15    Firms with highest increases in diversification of patenting activity in the reference set 



























         
INFINEON  Semicond.  IT Telecom 4039 0,22 0,54 0,22 0,32 
FUJIFILM Optical  Printing Audiovisual  5801 0,20 0,40 0,14 0,26 
SHIMANO Transportation  Agric. Mach.  Mech. El. 942 0,52 0,66 0,44 0,22 
SCA HYGIENE  Medical Eng.  Mat proc. Printing  549 0,43 0,56 0,36 0,20 
BROADCOM Telecom IT Audiovisual  1116 0,51 0,67 0,47 0,20 
PFIZER Organic Ch. Pharm., Cosm.  Biotech. 2746 0,39 0,56 0,37 0,19 
INTEL IT Telecom Semicond. 1848 0,27 0,42 0,26 0,17 
GLAXO SMITHKLINE  Organic Ch. Pharm., Cosm.  Biotech. 5447 0,36 0,45 0,30 0,16 
UNICHARM Medical Eng.  Mat proc. Cons. Goods  764 0,55 0,74 0,58 0,16 
NTT DOCOMOINC  Telecom IT Analysis 1272 0,74 0,87 0,72 0,15 
SONY Audiovisual  Telecom IT 12662 0,24 0,35 0,20 0,15 
YAMAHA Motors Cons. Goods  Transportation  1600 0,17 0,27 0,14 0,13 
VOLKSWAGEN  Transportation  Motors Mech. El. 2525 0,22 0,32 0,20 0,12 
MERCK Organic Ch. Pharm., Cosm.  Petrol Ch. 5268 0,27 0,31 0,21 0,10 
DELPHI  Transportation  Motors Energy 2595 0,14 0,24 0,15 0,09 
KIMBERLY CLARK  Medical Eng.  Mat proc. Cons. Goods  1960 0,25 0,31 0,24 0,07 
SANYO EL. Audiovisual  Energy Telecom 2009 0,14 0,18 0,13 0,05 
BAYER Organic Ch. Polymers Petrol Ch. 13845 0,19 0,21 0,16 0,05 
PIONEER Audiovisual  Telecom Analysis 2487 0,39 0,39 0,34 0,05 
HONDA Transportation  Motors Mech. El. 3693 0,16 0,19 0,14 0,05 
LG GROUP Telecom Audiovisual  Energy 3192 0,12 0,15 0,11 0,04 
NISSAN Transportation   Motors Mech. El. 2829 0,18 0,22 0,18 0,04 
PROCTER&GAMBLE  Petrol Ch. Medical Eng.  Pharm., Cosm.  7824 0,17 0,17 0,14 0,03 
SHARP Audiovisual  Optical  Telecom 4670 0,13 0,16 0,13 0,03 
MEDTRONIC  Medical Eng.  Energy Analysis 1761 0,77 0,78 0,76 0,03 
Average of all 90 firms     5303 0,27 0,28 0,28 0,00 
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This measure is greater if firms’ patenting activities were more concentrated in the earlier period.  
 
Table 4.5.15 shows that:  
· Electronics and Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals companies participated in the increased 
dispersion of patenting activities in equal measure.  
· Most of the firms that have diversified their patenting activities strongly are not amongst 
the firms that applied for most patents in the period 1999 -2002 as a comparison of Tables 
4.5.14 and 4.5.15 reveals.  
 
Summarising this analysis we find that firms pursue very dif ferent patenting strategies at the EPO 
in response to the explosion in patenting activity. Some have diversified their patenting into more 
technology areas whilst others have concentrated their patenting activity. Which strategy is 
chosen seems to have no bearing on the amount of patents applied for as a comparison of Tables 
4.5.14, 4.5.15 and our discussion of the firms that have concentrated their patenting activity 
reveals.  
 
Table 4.5.13 shows that firms whose patent stocks are growing very fast have lo wer than average 
size patent stocks at present , whilst those whose patent stocks are growing more slowly tend to 
have very large patent stocks. Many of those firms whose patent stocks are growing less quickly 
are also concentrating their patenting on fewe r patent classes than in the past. This pattern is 
common to firms from both Electronics and Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics.  
 
We turn now to an analysis of those indicators that may tell us something about strategic uses of 
the patent system by firms in the re ference group described by Table 4.5.13. To do this we 
present the 25 most active firms from this group by a series of indicators.  
 
Growth in patents with a high level of claims relative to the average  
In Table 4.5.16 we present firms who have the highest share of patents with a very large number 
of claims relative to the industry average. The indicator reported in the last column gives the 
share of patents in the overall stock of a firm’s patent applications over the period 1999 -2002 
which were above the 7 5th percentile of patent applications in a given technology area on the 
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basis of claims. This indicator controls for technology area specific differences in the number of 
claims. Table 4.5.16 shows those firms that consistently apply for more complex paten ts than 
their rivals. 
 
Firms that make such complex patent applications are highly likely to have strategic intentions 
when they make such applications. Table 4.5.16 shows that:  
 
· The group of firms selected by this indicator is spread widely across differe nt technology 
areas. The Table does not show that firms from any one technology area have a 
consistently higher share of patents with high claims. This indictor shows us that complex 
patent applications are used by a wide range of firms in a similar way.  
· The firms that pursue complex patenting techniques have patent portfolios that are mostly 
smaller than the average portfolio in the set of firms we have selected.  
· Table 4.5.16 reveals that most of the firms using unusually large numbers of claims on 
their patents are not European. In fact the majority are U.S. firms. As Archontopulos, et 
al. (2006) this may have something to do with different drafting styles. 
 
In section 4.3 we make use of divisional patent applications in order to trace strategic behaviour 
within the patent system. We have also calculated this indicator for the set of firms presented in 
Table 4.5.13. The indicator shows that Japanese f irms make particularly strong use of divisional 
patents. This may be a sign of strategic behaviour but it may also be a sign of an institutional 
specificity which we do not yet understand. Therefore we do not report this indicator at the firm 
level at present. We are still confident that the indicator is useful at an aggregate level as here the 
influence of a set of firms from a specific country is less likely to distort the overall results than 
in a selected sample such as the one presented here.  
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Table 4.5.16    Firms with the highest share of patents with high claims in the reference group over the sample period  
Firm name Primary 
technology area  
Secondary 







Applications    
1999-2002 
Applications 








        
KIMBERLY CLARK  Medical Eng.  Mat proc. Cons. Goods  1960 773 605 78% 
UNIV. of CALIFORNIA  Pharm., Cosm.  Organic Ch . Biotech. 1562 465 339 73% 
SHIMANO Transportation  Agric. Mach.  Mech.  El. 942 318 209 66% 
QUALCOMM Telecom IT Analysis 1911 1163 644 55% 
MICHELIN  Transportation  Mat proc. Polymers 930 397 203 51% 
CANON Optical  Printing  Telecom 12694 2448 1251 51% 
SCHERING PLOUGH  Organic Ch. Pharm., Cosm.  Biotech. 1033 229 112 49% 
LG GROUP Telecom Audiovisual  Energy 3192 1143 549 48% 
NOVARTIS Organic Ch. Petrol Ch. Pharm., Cosm.  6152 674 323 48% 
SHARP Audiovisual  Optical  Telecom 4670 900 425 47% 
DELPHI  Transportat ion Motors Energy 2595 1226 578 47% 
WYETH Organic Ch. Pharm., Cosm.  Biotech. 658 336 142 42% 
BOSTON SCIENTIFIC  Medical Eng.  Pharm., Cosm.  Mat proc. 1364 731 309 42% 
NORTEL NETWORKS  Telecom Optical  IT 1938 697 279 40% 
TAKEDA Organic Ch. Pharm., Cosm.  Biotech. 1717 353 140 40% 
RICOH Optical  Telecom Audiovisual  1706 885 348 39% 
TOYOTA Motors Transportation  Mech. El. 4745 1475 576 39% 
PHARMACIA Organic Ch. Pharm., Cosm.  Biotech. 1862 621 242 39% 
SONY Audiovisual  Telecom IT 12662 4260 1585 37% 
3M Polymers Optical  Medical Eng.  8188 2009 744 37% 
BROADCOM Telecom IT Audiovisual  1116 759 272 36% 
ERICSSON Telecom IT Energy 6339 2582 919 36% 
BEIERSDORF  Pharm., Cosm.  Medical Eng.  Polymers 992 406 142 35% 
UNILEVER Petrol Ch. Agric., Foods  Pharm., Cosm.  4068 931 323 35% 
MEDTRONIC  Medical Eng.  Energy Analysis 1761 632 214 34% 
Average of all 90 firms     5303 1482 325 22% 
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Having established that a strategy of using complex patents arises across different technology 
areas we now turn to indicators that provide  information about blocking patents and about the 
novelty embodied in patent applications.  
 
Table 4.5.17 below ranks firms by the share of patents which are cited by other patents as critical 
of the inventive step embodied in those other patents. This mea ns that the measure captures how 
often these patents block others’ patents. We have calculated the share of critical references to 
each patent in order to control for technology area specific differences in the propensity to cite 
patents.  
 
Table 4.5.17 shows very clearly that: 
 
· Blocking patents in the sense just described are most important in the Pharmaceuticals, 
Organic chemistry, and Medical engineering. Table 4.5.17 lists only two firms connected 
to Electronics – LG Group and Sharp. This finding unders cores the results which we 
report in the PatVal -EU case study in section 5.3.1 below. This case study shows that 
patents are used as blocking patents most frequently in the sectors noted here. Patents 
have a much higher importance as bargaining chips in El ectronics. This shows that in 
Electronics the complementarity of patents may be more strongly founded on the joint use 
of patents in a specific product whereas in Pharmaceuticals and Chemistry the patents will 
often share a direct technological link.  
· The share of blocking patents in the sense described above has increased for all firms that 
were active in both the base period (1989 -1992) and the reference period (1999 -2002). 
This may indicate that firms are placing a greater emphasis on obtaining such paten ts – a 
strategic interpretation – or that technology has developed in such a way that patent more 
frequently relate to one another – a technological interpretation. The PatVal -EU case 
study will provide additional information regarding these two alternativ es.  
 
 212 
Table 4.5.17    Firms with the highest average share of patents that are cited as critical towards others’ patents  



























        
TAKEDA  Organic Ch.  Pharm., Cosm.   Biotech. 1717 0,43 0,41 0,65 
HUMAN GENOME   Organic Ch. Pharm., Cosm.   Biotech. 586 0,64 . 0,64 
BMS  Organic Ch.  Pharm., Cosm.   Medical Eng. 1519 0,53 0,40 0,59 
PROCTER & GAMBLE   Petrol Ch. Medical Eng.   Pharm., Cosm.  7824 0,44 0,37 0,58 
BOSTON SCIENTIFIC   Medical Eng. Pharm., Cosm.   Mat proc. 1364 0,52 0,31 0,57 
SCHERING PLOUGH   Organic Ch.  Pharm., Cosm.   Biotech. 1033 0,47 0,55 0,56 
BOEHRINGER ING   Organic Ch.  Pharm., Cosm.   Biotech. 1295 0,43 0,36 0,56 
NOVARTIS  Organic Ch.  Petrol Ch.  Pharm., Cosm.  6152 0,37 0,40 0,56 
PFIZER  Organic Ch.  Pharm., Cosm.  Biotech. 2746 0,44 0,41 0,55 
LG GROUP  Telecom Audiovisual   Energy 3192 0,45 0,36 0,55 
UNILEVER  Petrol Ch. Agric., Foods   Pharm., Cosm.  4068 0,42 0,37 0,55 
WARNER LAMBERT   Organic Ch.  Pharm., Cosm.   Agric., Foods 1360 0,39 0,38 0,55 
SCHERING  Organic Ch.  Pharm., Cosm.   Petrol Ch.  1562 0,40 0,42 0,54 
J&J  Medical Eng. Pharm., Cosm.   Organic Ch.  5697 0,42 0,35 0,54 
HENKEL  Petrol Ch. Polymers  Organic Ch.  4872 0,35 0,30 0,54 
BAYER  Organic Ch.  Polymers  Petrol Ch.  13845 0,34 0,36 0,53 
BEIERSDORF  Pharm., Cosm. Medical Eng.   Polymers 992 0,39 0,36 0,53 
HONDA  Transportation  Motors  Mech. Elements  3693 0,39 0,38 0,53 
PHARMACIA  Organic Ch.  Pharm., Cosm.   Biotech. 1862 0,42 0,42 0,52 
FUJIFILM  Optical Printing  Audiovisual  5801 0,43 0,41 0,52 
MERCK  Organic Ch.  Pharm., Cosm.   Petrol Ch.  5268 0,39 0,42 0,52 
RICOH  Optical Telecom  Audiovisual  1706 0,44 0,28 0,52 
SHARP  Audiovisual  Optical   Telecom 4670 0,35 0,31 0,52 
BMW  Transportation  Motors  Mech. Elements  2509 0,44 0,39 0,51 
BASF  Polymers Organic Ch.   Petrol Ch.  14398 0,35 0,35 0,51 
Average of all 90 firms     5303 0,37 0,31 0,47 
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Finally we provide evidence about the degree of novelty which is embodied in firms’ patents.  
Table 4.5.18 ranks the top 25 firms out of the reference set pre sented in Table 4.5.13 which 
receive the highest share of critical references on their patents. Table 4.5.18 shows us which 
firms have a high number of patents that do not embody a very significant technological advance.  
Table 4.5.18 shows that:  
 
· Firms with a high share of patents that do not embody large technological advances 
come form a fairly heterogeneous set of technology areas. The results reported in 
Table 4.5.17 indicate that we might observe a large number of firms from the same 
industries that featured there, i.e. Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals. However, we find 
that Information Technology and Telecommunications  firms also play an important 
role.  
· A third of the firms that receive high shares of critical references to their patents also 
belong in the group of firms that have a high share of claims on their patents (viz. 
Table 4.5.16). This is perhaps not surprising, as these patents are likely to represent 
attempts to get very extensive protection for a given technology.  
· A third of the firms that r eceive high shares of critical references to their patents also 
belong to the top 25 firms in Table 4.5.13, i.e. those whose patent stocks grew fastest. 
This may be an indication that the dash for patents is leading to patenting of more 
marginal patents. I f so, then this is entirely consistent with the theory that patent 
portfolios are more important than individual patents in some technology areas. A 
comparison of Tables 4.5.13 and 4.5.18 shows that the firms represented in both 
Tables are not all Electron ics firms.  
· It is interesting that only two of the firms with the highest number of patent 
applications between 1999 -2002 are also amongst the firms with high shares of 
critical references. It seems that the larger patent applicants whose patent stocks are  
growing at a slightly lower rate are able to produce better patents.  
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Table 4.5.18    Firms out of our reference set with patents bearing highest share of critical references in 1999-2003  




























        
HUMAN GENOME  Organic Ch.   Pharm., Cosm.  Biotech. 586 0,52 . 0,67 
BMS  Organic Ch.   Pharm., Cosm.  Medical Eng. 1519 0,48 0,40 0,56 
TAKEDA  Organic Ch.   Pharm., Cosm.  Biotech. 1717 0,37 0,34 0,56 
SCHERING  Organic Ch.   Pharm., Cosm.  Petrol Ch.  1562 0,34 0,30 0,53 
SCHERING PLOUGH   Organic Ch.   Pharm., Cosm.  Biotech. 1033 0,37 0,36 0,53 
UNIV. of CALIFORNIA   Pharm., Cosm.  Organic Ch.   Biotech. 1562 0,45 0,40 0,51 
INTEL  IT  Telecom  Semicond. 1848 0,49 0,30 0,51 
PFIZER  Organic Ch.   Pharm., Cosm.  Biotech. 2746 0,36 0,27 0,51 
BOSTON SCIENTIFIC   Medical Eng.  Pharm., Cosm.  Mat proc. 1364 0,48 0,28 0,50 
NOVARTIS  Organic Ch.   Petrol Ch.  Pharm., Cosm.  6152 0,28 0,26 0,50 
PROCTER & GAMBLE   Petrol Ch.  Medical Eng.  Pharm., Cosm.  7824 0,37 0,30 0,50 
PHARMACIA  Organic Ch.   Pharm., Cosm.  Biotech. 1862 0,35 0,31 0,49 
BROADCOM  Telecom  IT  Audiovisual  1116 0,50 0,09 0,49 
HENKEL  Petrol Ch.  Polymers  Organic Ch.  4872 0,28 0,22 0,48 
J&J  Medical Eng.  Pharm., Cosm.  Organic Ch.  5697 0,37 0,26 0,47 
HITACHI  Energy  IT  Audiovisual  10885 0,36 0,25 0,47 
FUJIFILM  Optical  Printing  Audiovisual  5801 0,37 0,33 0,47 
NORTEL NETWORKS   Telecom  Optical  IT 1938 0,36 0,23 0,47 
QUALCOMM  Telecom  IT  Analysis 1911 0,42 0,28 0,47 
MEDTRONIC   Medical Eng.  Energy  Analysis 1761 0,35 0,27 0,46 
BOEHRINGER ING.   Organic Ch.   Pharm., Cosm.  Biotech. 1295 0,39 0,34 0,46 
NTT DOCOMO   Telecom  IT  Analysis 1272 0,44 0,63 0,46 
KIMBERLY CLARK   Medical Eng.  Mat proc.  Cons. Goods  1960 0,36 0,30 0,46 
GE  Polymers  Energy  Motors 10246 0,32 0,23 0,45 
BMW  Transportation   Motors  Mech. El. 2509 0,37 0,27 0,45 
Average of all 90 firms     5303 0,33 0,25 0,42 
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This section has shown that there is evid ence for strategic patenting at the firm level. We have 
found that there is a lso evidence that firms are pursuing quite different types of strategies These 
are discussed in grater detail below.  
4.5.4 Conclusions from the firm level analysis  
 
Here we survey the evidence from the firm level analysis (4.5.1 - 4.5.3) of patenting behaviour a t 
the EPO. To begin with we restricted our analysis to nine technology areas chosen on the basis of 
indicators at the level of the technology area. These are: Telecommunications ; Information 
Technology; Audiovisual Technology ; Medical Engineering ; Biotechnology; Pharmaceuticals, 
Cosmetics ; Agriculture, Food ; Transport; Agriculture, Food Machinery .  
 
For these nine technology areas we undertake an analysis of the concentration of citations 
(section 4.5.1) in order to establish how likely we are to find paten t thickets in these technology 
areas. Our definition of strategic use of patents, introduced in section 3.2, is based on 
complementarities between patents. This definition implies that complementarities between 
patents are a precondition for the strategic use of patents. Therefore the identification of 
technology areas in which we are likely to observe such complementarities is an important step in 
our analysis.  
 
In section 4.5.1 we show that:  
  
· Of the nine areas we have noted above as being most likely to  harbour strategic patenting 
behaviour three are shown to be very likely to contain patent thickets on the basis of our 
indicator based on the concentration of references. These are: Telecommunications ; 
Medical Engineering ; Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics .  Additionally the data show fairly high 
levels of concentration in Information Technology  and in Transport. 
· The data also suggest that the concentration of references and X -References is not very high 
in Biotechnology ; Agriculture, Food ; Agriculture, Food Machinery.  
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· The data show high levels of concentration for references in Analysis, Measurement and 
Control a technology area which we did not include in our selection of the nine technology 
areas most likely to harbour strategic patenting behaviour. On the b asis of the concentration 
of references indicator we also inspected this technology area in the following section.  
 
After this analysis we turned to a firm level analysis of oppositions in section 4.5.2. This analysis 
complements the preceding analysis in two ways: it shows us in which areas firms are availing 
themselves of opposition in order to try and stem the increase in new patents and it shows us 
whether there are areas in which larger firms are more likely to oppose smaller firms.  
 
In section 4.5.2 we provide opposition tables for a large set of technology areas (11) in order to 
ensure that we are focusing on the most interesting ones. This allows us to double check the 
results we have obtained from the preceding analysis. The analysis of firm level o pposition data 
shows that: 
 
· In Electronics opposition is very weak and dispersed in Information Technology while 
it is moderate in Telecommunications  and slightly stronger in Audiovisual Technology . 
In these technology areas opposition is also more concent rated amongst the most 
opposed and opposing firms. In our firm level analysis we have therefore concentrated 
on these last two technology areas. As the opposition data show and as the firm level 
tables show many of the firms which are investigated in Secti on 4.5.3 are also active in 
Information Technology .  
· In Instruments opposition activity in Medical Engineering  is very different from 
opposition activity in Analysis, Measurement, Control . This is confirmed by ou r 
regression in Section 4.5.2.2 . We find that opposition activity in the latter area should 
be studied in greater detail as it is very highly concentrated on a diverse and probably 
small set of firms. The main opposing firms here are Siemens and Bosch. We analyze 
the behaviour of firms form both are as in Section 4.5.3.  
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· In Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals we find the opposition activity is very strongly 
associated with large cosmetics firms who oppose one another. This indicates a very 
healthy level of competition. We focus mainly on firms from this techno logy area in 
Section 4.5.3 due to the concentration of references which indicate that there may be a 
patent thicket in this technology area.  
· In Mechanical Engineering we find that opposition is dispersed in Transport whereas it 
is highly concentrated amon gst the top ten opponents and opposed in Agricultural- and 
Food Machinery . Therefore we include Transport in the set of technology areas for 
which we analyze firms’ behaviour more closely.  
 
As a result we focus on the following six technology areas in our  analysis of the patenting 
behaviour of large firms in Section 4.5.3: Telecommunications ; Audiovisual Technology ; Medical 
Engineering; Analysis, Measurement, Control ; Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics  and Transport. 
 
We proceed by selecting the 30 top applicants at the EPO in the period 1999 -2002 from these 
technology areas. Their patenting behaviour is then analyzed in greater detail on the basis of a 
number of firm level indicators. The firm level analysis shows that:  
 
· A prominent group of firms is seeking to b uild patent portfolios and is patenting more 
marginal patents in the process. This strategy is not restricted only to firms from 
Electronics as one might have expected based on the existing literature surveyed in 
section 3. 
· Some of the firms building paten t portfolios are also patenting more complex patents.  
· While one set of firms is seeking to patent in more technology areas another set of firms 
is specializing in fewer.  
· Blocking patents are used most extensively in the Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals 
industries. 
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· Firms with large patent portfolios that also feature frequently in opposition cases, such as 
Siemens or Philips, do not feature strongly in any of the tables set out above. The same is 
true of firms that led the patenting explosion in the United Sta tes such as IBM or Texas 
Instruments. This suggests that they are part of a group of firms that have already 
established sufficiently large patent portfolios to exist comfortably in an environment in 
which patent portfolios are an important strategic asset . The firms we have found to be 
building patent portfolios actively are still building this asset.  
 
In sum we have found evidence for strategic patenting behavior using indicators at the level of 
the technology area and the firm level. In Section 5 below w e introduce additional analysis to 
establish whether the indicators we have developed provide a reliable picture of strategic 





5. Assessment of Empirical Results: Identification of Criteria 
 
In this section of the report we provide an assessment of our results from S ection 4.  The main 
element of this section consists of two case studies which seek to validate and evaluate the results 
we have derived there . The first case study presents an analysis of data generated in the PatVal -
EU survey. In this survey firms were surveyed about specific patents and their uses. We employ 
the results to validate our findings about firms’ patenting behavior which are based on patent 
data. This validation provides a unique opportunity to match the results of our patent data 
analysis with survey data. The second is a comparison of the paten ting behavior of 
Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics firms based on the work of Harhoff and Hall (2003)  on the 
Cosmetics industry and  our analysis of firms’ behavio r in sections 4.5.2 and 4 .5.3 of this report. 
Finally in section 5.2 we provide an assessment of firms’ behavior and discuss whether or not 
there are competition policy implications of this behavior.   
 
5.1 Case studies  
5.1.1 Case study: evidence on strategic patenting by using the PatVal -EU survey   
 
 
Section 4 of the report  identified a set of technology areas characterized by changes in patenting 
activities, particularly with respect to the changing behavior of patentees and their attitude 
towards strategic patenting. This section furthe r explores these issues. It focuses on strategic 
behavior in patenting and the strategic use of patents by using information drawn from the 
PatVal-EU survey of inventors in EPO patents. PatVal -EU interviewed the inventors of 9,550 
patents with priority yea rs between 1993 and 1998 and granted by the European Patent Office 
(EPO)78. The inventors of these patents are located in Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Details of the survey are reported in 
                                                   
78  The questionnaire was submitted to the inventors of about 28,000 patents granted by the EPO with inventors 
located in the eight countries listed above. This sample was drawn from a population of about 50,0 00 patents. 
Since the survey over -sampled “important” patents, we corrected for the stratification by computed sampling 
weights for the hypothetical unbiased sample. Sampling weights also control for the representativeness of the 
sample of patents for whic h we received a response with respect to the selected sample of patents/questionnaires 
that have been sent to inventors. All descriptive statistics reported in this section have been computed by using 
these sampling weights.  
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Giuri, et al. (2005)79. A unique feature of the PatVal -EU survey is that it provides information on 
the patentees, the characteristics of the invention, the invention process, the motivations for 
patenting and the actual use of patents.  
 
In order to study strategic behavior in patenting we build a series of indicators based on the 
following characteristics of patents and patentees by technology area:  
 
1. the complementarity of patented inventions with other rel ated inventions produced by the 
patentee or by other external actors;  
2. the size of the patent applicant;  
3. the proportion of X -References in the patent;  
4. the economic/strategic value of patents;  
5. the strategic motivations for patenting (i.e. blocking competitor s, cross-licensing) and the 
use or non-use of patents.  
 
We focus on three main technology areas, which in turn comprise the following technology areas 
identified earlier in this report as most likely to be affected by strategic use of patents :  
 
· Electronics: Electrical Devices; Audiovisual Technology; Telecommunication ; Information 
Technology and Semiconductors . 
· Instruments: Optics; Analysis-Measurement-Control, and Medical Engineering  
· Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals: Organic Fine Chemistry; Macromolecular Chemistry; 
Polymers; Pharmaceuticals; C osmetics; Biotechnology; Materials, Metallurgy and 
Agriculture, Food. 
 
We compute all indicators for each technology area and, as a reference point, for the total sample 
of patents in all 30 technology areas .  
 
                                                   
79   Details on the methodology and results of the survey are also reported in (European Commission 2005a, 2005b, 
2006). 
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We proceed as follows:  
· First, we identify a set of preconditions  that suggest strategic patenting  behavior. These 
are the patenting of interrelated inventions, the large size of the patent applicant, the 
production of patents requiring low man months in the resear ch process, and the sha re of 
X-References.  
· Second, we identify a patent that a s having strategic uses  if it is not used by its applicant 
and the invention is patented for blocking competitors or for use in cross -licensing 
negotiations.  
· Third, we check th e preconditions suggesting strategic patenting with our indicators of the 
actual strategic use of the patents. This allows us to as sess for each technology area 
whether patents have strategic uses and to figure out which  preconditions are associated 
with the strategic use of patents. 
 
For example we will look at the share of X -References for the sub -groups of used and unused 
patents and for the sub -groups of unused patents for blocking rivals in order to show differences 
in the strategic use of less origina l patents across technical classes.  
 
We use indicators on patents with priority dates between 1993 -1998, which means that on 
average these patents were granted by the EPO between 1997 and 2001. 80 Given the short time-
period, we build indicators and descrip tive statistics for the pooled years.  
 
Patents and related inventions  
 
A first precondition of strategic patenting is based on the extent to which patents are related to 
other inventions developed or in progress within the applicant organization or by ext ernal actors. 
By using this information we can identify areas in which complexity in patent activities is more 
frequent, and thus cross -validate the results obtained earlier in this report.  
 
                                                   
80   As noted earlier, the time lag between priority data and granting date is on average more than 4 years (Harhoff 
and Wagner (2005) ). 
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We show descriptive statistics by technology areas based on the following indicators: 
 
· Family of patents and number of patents in the family;  
· Related inventions: separate internal inventions and inventions by competitors in the specific 
field; 
· Cumulative inventions.  
 
Family of patents 
The first set of indicators that w e use is the share of patents that are part of a broader “family of 
patents” and the size of the patent families by technological classes. The indicators are built from 
the answers to the following PatVal -EU question:  
 
“We define a “family of patents” as a group of patents which crucially depend on each other in 
terms of their value, or in a technical way. Was the patent in question part of a family of patents? 
(Y/N). If yes, please indicate how many patents were part of the patent family.”  
 
This information may reveal strategic behavior of patent applicants that build patent thickets to 
strongly protect their inventions. Moreover, a patent belonging to a family of intertwined patents 
is likely to be a complement of the other patents.  
 
Figure 5.1.1 reports for each technology area  and for the total sample of patents in the 30 
technology areas the percentage of patents belonging to a family. For the patents belonging to a 
family, Figure 5.1 .1 shows in parenthesis the average number of patents of the family.  
 
 
We show that: 
 
· On average 43.8% of patents belong to a family and the average size of families is 6.7 
patents.  
· With the exception of Agriculture, Food Chemistry  in all the technology areas of Chemicals/ 
Pharmaceuticals the proportion of patents that are  part of a family are high (between 52 and 
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65%) in Organic Fine Chemistry, Macromolecular C hemistry and Pharmaceuticals, 
Cosmetics . 
· In the other main technology areas  only in Audiovisual Technology, Information Technology  
and Optics the shares of patents in families are also quite high. Moreover, the size of the 
patent families is also large compared to the other classes. While in Organic Fine Chemistry, 
Macromolecular C hemistry and Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics each family is composed of 
about 7-8 patents, in Audiovisual Technology the average family comprises 9 patents and in 
Optics 8.5 patents.  
· In Telecommunications  and Semiconductors the percentage of patents belonging to a family is 
not large if compared with the total average (about 39%), but when patent s are part of 
families, these families are broad, as they comprise on average more than 8 patents. This 
mirrors heterogeneous inventions and patenting behavior, comprising both the production of 
many autonomous inventions and large families of interrelated  patents.  
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Note: Total is computed over  all patents in the 30 technological classes.  
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Related inventions  
A second set of indicato rs stems from the following question of the PatVal -EU survey:  
 
“Why was it decided to patent the invention as it was, as opposed to developing it further by devoting 
additional resources?  
1. Further improvements (could have) resulted in another invention  that could be patented separately . 
2. The invention had to be patented quickly, because your organization was aware of other inventors, 
research groups or firms that were working on inventions in the same field” 81. 
 
The first answer suggests that there can  be strategic considerations in patenting behavior when 
the research leading to the patent produces several related outcomes. Improvements of the 
patented invention are not included in the patent if it is possible to separate the related inventions 
into different patents. However, the novelty of the additional separate patents may be narrow and 
therefore the resulting overall increase in patent applications might be associated to a decreasing 
average quality of the patents.  
 
According to the second answer, applicants may patent quickly if they are aware of the presence 
of competitors in the same technical field. This does not necessarily indicate strategic patenting 
behavior but healthy technological competition that may accelerate the production of inventio ns. 
 
Figure 5.1.2 shows for each technology  area the proportion of inventions patented without 
devoting additional resources (i) because the applicant could patent a separate invention, or (ii) 
because of the presence of competitors in the field.  
 
On average 9.5% of the inventions are patented incrementally because improvements could be 
included in separate inventions. This suggests that this potentially strategic behavior of patentees 
is not diffused. However in many technology areas the share of potential  separate inventions is 
                                                   
81   The PatVal-EU questionnaire incl uded other possible answers that were related to the achievement of research 
goals or the scarcity of resources for continuing the research activities. We do not show the results here as they 
are less relevant for the purposes of this analysis.  
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larger than the average and reaches 16 -17% of the total inventions. Specifically, the share of 
patented inventions is high in Electronics (with the exception of Electrical devices), in 
Chemicals/ Pharmaceuticals (with the exception of Biotechnology  and Agriculture, Food ) and in 
Optics. 
 
Figure 5.1.2 shows that more than one third of the inventions (about 37%) are patented quickly 
because of competitors in the field. Again, the share of these patents is larger in our three main 
technology areas, viz. Electronics, Instruments and Chemicals/Pharmaceuticals.  
 
Figure 5.1.2  Share of inventions patented without additional resources because of: 
1) potential patenting of a separate invention, 2) presence of 
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Note: Total is computed for all patents in the 30 technological classes.  
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Cumulative inventions  
The final set of indicators in this section examines whether the patented invention is 
“cumulative”, in the sense that it builds on previous inventi ons developed within the applicant 
organization or by other external actors.  
 
The PatVal-EU questionnaire asked the inventors whether the patented invention was built in a 
substantial way on other inventions that they knew, and, if yes, it also asked if t his previous 
invention had been made in the same organization or not.  
 
Figure 5.1.3 shows that almost half of the patented inventions are “cumulative” in nature. About 
26% of patents build on previous inventions of the same organization (“Cumulative - Internal”) 
while about 21% build on external inventions. It also confirms the presence of interrelated 
inventions, mainly internal, in Chemicals/Pharmaceuticals, as we observed in the case of patent 
families and separate inventions. Between 55 and 61 % of pate nts are cumulative in 
Chemicals/Pharmaceuticals, with the exception of Biotechnology and Agriculture, Food. In all 
these areas patents build on internal inventions, but the linkages with external inventions are 
frequent in Materials, Metallurgy and in Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics. 
 
In Electronics the largest percentages of cumulative inventions are in Information Technology 
and Semiconductors . In Audiovisual Technologies the share of patents that build on internal 
inventions is also high.  In Instruments, Optics shows large shares of cumulative inventions, both 
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Note: Total is computed for all patents in the 30 technological classes.  
 
 
Size of patent applicants  
 
The information on the size of companies identifies technical fields dominated by large firms and 
where anti-competitive or collusive behaviors is more likely to take place, as well as fields 
populated by small firms. This data complements the analysis developed in Section 4.3.1.1 on the 
concentration of technology areas.  
 
We report the average size of firm patentees by technology area in terms of their number of 
employees, and the share of large, medium and small firms. We obtained data on the number of 
employees by matching the name of the firm applicants in the PatVal -EU survey with the 
Amadeus and Compustat databases (years 1993 -1998). Applicant firms were f irst consolidated at 
















Electronics     
Electrical Devices  140342 86.4% 5.2% 8.4% 
Audiovisual Technology  146770 88.3% 3.6% 8.1% 
Telecommunications 147506 96.7% 1.3% 2.0% 
Information Technology 115051 87.6% 3.1% 9.2% 
Semiconductors 178187 95.1% 0.0% 4.9% 
Instruments     
Optics 113732 89.2% 4.7% 6.2% 
Analysis, Measurement, Control 102950 81.1% 7.2% 11.6% 
Medical Engineering 25316 62.7% 3.8% 33.5% 
Chemicals / Pharmaceuticals     
Organic Fine Chemistry 66003 93.7% 1.7% 4.6% 
Macromolecular Chemistry, Polymers  74192 92.6% 3.4% 4.0% 
Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics 36272 78.9% 6.0% 15.2% 
Biotechnology 49777 79.2% 2.1% 18.7% 
Materials, Metallurgy 56858 92.2% 2.9% 4.9% 
Agriculture, Food Chemistry  97230 73.6% 13.3% 13.1% 
Total average (30 tech classes) 75774 81.8% 7.0% 11.3% 
Note: Values above the total average are reported in bold. Total average is computed for all patents in the 
30 technological classes.  
 
Table 5.1.1 shows that the average number of employees in th e total sample is about 75,000. the 
large firms cover 81.8% of our patentees, while 7% are medium firms and 11.3 % are small 
firms. Differences by technical classes are sizable:  
 
· In all technical areas within Electronics the average number of employees is very large and 
consistently the share of large firms is high. It is the largest in Telecommunications  and 
Semiconductors  in which the percentages of large firms are respectively 96.7 % and 95.1%.  
· In Instruments the average number of employees is high in Optics and Analysis, 
measurement, control . By contrast, it is low in Medical Engineering , where it is the smallest 
across all 30 technological classes. Consistently, the share of small firms is largest  (33.5 %). 
· In Chemical / Pharmaceuticals the average size  of employees is smaller than the average in all 
technical fields with the exception of Agriculture, Food. The percentages of small and 
medium firms are high in Pharmaceutical, cosmetics , Biotechnology, Agriculture and Food. 
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Table 5.1.2 summarizes our fin dings on patents and related inventions and on the size of patent 
applicants by technical areas.  
 
Table 5.1.2   Summary of results regarding patents and related inventions   
and the size of patentees  













Electronics        
Electrical Devices - - - - - - +++ 
Audiovisual Technology  + ++ ++ + + - +++ 
Telecommunications - + + o - - +++ 
Information Technology + - +++ + - + ++ 
Semiconductors - + ++ - + - +++ 
Instruments        
Optics + + +++ + ++ - ++ 
Analysis, Measurement, Control - - - - - + ++ 
Medical Engineering - - - o - ++ --- 
Chemicals / Pharmaceuticals        
Organic Fine Chemistry ++ + +++ o ++ - - 
Macromolecular Chem., 
Polymers  ++ + +++ - ++ - o 
Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics + + + + + + -- 
Biotechnology + - - + - + -- 
Materials, Metallurgy + - + + + ++ - 
Agriculture, Food Chemistry  - - - + - - +/-- 
 
Table 5.1.2 shows that there are important differences in firm size between Electronics and 
Instruments, Chemicals/Pharmaceuticals. Furthermore, we have found that patent families and 
cumulative inventions are most important in Chemicals /Pharmaceuticals. Nonetheless t he 
incentive to generate additional separate inventions is strong across all three main areas. 
However, this incentive is restricted to specific technology areas such as Information Technology 
or Organic Fine Chemistry.     
 
X-References and economic/strategic value of patents  
 
Another precondition suggesting strategic patent ing behavior is the share of X -References per 
patent. In section 4.3.2 we s howed that the share of X-References, which suggests that patents 
may not be that novel, is increasing per pat ent and more importantly per claim.  A higher 
proportion of X-References may then reflect strategic behavior because it indicates that firms are 
pursuing a strategy of building portfolios made up of more marginal patents.  
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Table 5.1.3   X-References in Top 25% and Bottom 75% patents for economic and 
strategic value 
 
























Electronics       
Electrical devices  0.151 0.137 0.014 0.078 0.078 0.001 
Audio-visual technology  0.216 0.197 0.018 0.099 0.084 0.015 
Telecommunications 0.187 0.137 0.050 0.059 0.053 0.006 
Information technology 0.194 0.173 0.022 0.069 0.057 0.012 
Semiconductors 0.400 0.127 0.273 0.217 0.093 0.124 
Instruments       
Optics 0.229 0.201 0.027 0.097 0.076 0.021 
Analysis, measurement, control 0.139 0.127 0.013 0.062 0.069 -0.007 
Medical engineering 0.127 0.201 -0.074 0.166 0.097 0.068 
Chemicals / Pharmaceuticals       
Organic fine chemistry 0.166 0.206 -0.040 0.076 0.079 -0.003 
Macromolecular chemistry, polymers  0.269 0.237 0.031 0.110 0.114 -0.004 
Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics 0.299 0.283 0.016 0.292 0.107 0.185 
Biotechnology 0.442 0.218 0.224 0.046 0.066 -0.020 
Materials, metallurgy 0.151 0.166 -0.015 0.112 0.099 0.012 
Agriculture, food chemistry  0.347 0.256 0.091 0.173 0.215 -0.042 
Total average (30 tech classes) 0.180 0.174 0.006 0.109 0.100 0.009 
Note: Values above the total average are reported in bold. Total average is computed for all patents in the 
30 technological classes.  
 
As a first check of the association between share of X -References and strategic uses of patents we 
investigate if  the share of X-References and the number of X -References per claim are greater 
for patents with high or low economic and strategic value 82. 
 
To compare the sha re of X-References in patents with high and low strategic value we use the 
PatVal-EU questions asking th e inventors to rate, in comparison with other patents in their 
industry or technological field, the economic and strategic value of their patent as Top 10%, Top 
25%, Top 50%, Bottom 50%.  
                                                   
82  In order to verify if there is a relation between X -references and the “effort” put in the research proces s we 
checked if the share of X -References and the number of X -References per claim are greater for patents whose 
research process requires less man -months with respect to patents requiring higher man -months. We denoted as 
“low-effort” patents that required up to 6 months. We did not find a clear association across technical fields 
between a large share of low -effort patents and a large share of X -References or of X-References per claim. 
Only in some tech nological areas the share of X -References in low-effort patents is larger that in high -effort 
patents and this is more evident when w e compare the number of X -References per claim in low - and high-effort 
patents. This pattern is observable in Audiovisual Technology; Telecommunications ; Information Technology ; 
Optics; and in most Pharmaceutical, Cosmetics ; Biotechnology  and Agriculture, Food  suggesting that in these 
areas low effort patents are more likely to draw on less novel or original patents.  
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Table 5.1.3 compares the share of X -references and the number of  X-references per claim in the 
top 25% and bottom 75% patents. In almost all the technology areas the share of X -References is 
larger in the top 25% than in the bottom 75% patents. The pattern is similar for the number of X -
References per claim. Moreover, the differences are more marked in Semiconductors and 
Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics 83. 
 
Unfortunately we cannot distinguish between the economic and strategic value of the patents. 
Therefore, these indicators may only suggest that patents citing poor patents are l ikely to be more 
valuable in a broad economic or strategic sense. A better explora tion of the relation between X -
References is developed in the next section.  
 
 
Motivations for patenting and use of patents  
 
The PatVal-EU survey offers the unique opportunity  to identify inventions that have been 
patented mainly for strategic reasons like blocking competitors. We can also check whether these 
inventions have been used for industrial or commercial purposes by the applicants.  
 
By using this information we identi fy patents having strategic uses  as the patents that have been 
patented for blocking competitors or for cross -licensing and that have not been used by their 
applicants.  
 
We can then identify technology areas  in which strategic reasons for patenting are im portant, and 
in which patents are used less intensively than in other classes. A major concern from a policy 
perspective is to understand whether strategic patents are used or not. In fact, strategic patents are 
not always harmful. If the owners are willin g to use them in cross licensing agreements, patent 
pools or patent thickets, they may reduce fragmentation of patent ownership and thus reduce 
transaction costs in technology mark ets ( Shapiro (2001)). However, firms still behave 
strategically by patenting as much as possible to acquire bargaining power against their partners 
in these agreements. If these  patents are eventually used or exchanged, from a social welfare 
                                                   
83     These patterns are confirmed if we compare Top10% and Bottom 90% patents.  
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perspective anti-competitive collusive behavior can be mitigated or compensated by the 
increasing diffusion and use of technologies, and by more rapid technological progress stemming 
from innovation races among rivals ( Shapiro (2001); ).  
 
Yet, patents for substitute products can be harmful for society not only because they are not used 
by firms, but also because they may not be used in agreements that facilitate the u se and diffusion 
of knowledge ( Shapiro (2001)). This is often the case in discrete industries, in which patents 
protect substitute inventions, and firms aggressively patent around their invention to prevent that 
they are fenced  in by competitors in their market. Firms therefore patent technologies that can be 
integrated in substitutes of their core products even if they do not ultimately use them (  Cohen, 
Nelson and Walsh (2000); Reitzig (2004)). 
 
In this section we first assess the strategic uses of p atents for different technological areas by 
showing the following indicators:  
 
· the importance of strategic and other motivations for patenting;  
· the proportion of unused patents, and the proportion of unused patents in which blocking 
competitors (that we define “Unused-Blocking”) and cross-licensing are important reasons 
for patenting  (“Unused Cross Licensing”).  
 
Second, we cross tabulate the indicators of the preconditions suggesting strategic patenting with 
our indicators of the strategic uses  of patents. We carried out all combinations of our measures of 
relatedness across patents with the strategic uses of the patents. However in some cases, 
particularly for patents belonging to families and for cumulative inventions, we did not find 
interesting or clear-cut results and do not show them here.  
 
With respect to the relation between size of the patent applicants and strategic uses of patents, 
previous work ( Giuri, et al. (2005)) has found that large firms are less likely to use their patents, 
and are more likely to patent to block competitors. We do not expect that these patterns change 
significantly across technology  areas. These results are not reproduced here.  
In this section we illustrate:  
 233 
 
· the share of used and unused patents that have or do not have related inventions that can be 
patented separately; 
· the share of used and unused patents where competitors are active in the specific 
technological field of the patented invention;  
· the share of X-References and the number of X -References per claim in used and unused 




Motivations for patenting  
 
To assess the relevance of strategic motivations for patenting we first use the PatVal -EU question 
that asked the inventors to rate from 0 to 5 the importance of the following motivations for 
patenting: commercial exploitation of the innovation, licensing, cross -licensing, prevention from 
imitation, and blocking competitors.  
 
Table 5.1.4 illustrates the average importance of the motivations for patenting by technical areas. 
On average, commercial exploitation and prevention from imitation are the most important 
reasons for patenting, followed by blocking competitors (the average level of importance ranges 
between 3 and 3.8). Licensing and cross -licensing are on average less important reasons for 
patenting.  
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Table 5.1.4      Motivations for patenting  








Electronics      
Electrical devices  3.107 2.163 2.057 3.787 3.982 
Audiovisual technology  3.223 2.808 2.458 3.596 3.478 
Telecommunications 3.047 2.936 2.319 3.327 3.339 
Information technology 2.997 2.990 2.510 3.531 3.520 
Semiconductors 2.800 2.963 2.249 3.344 3.578 
Instruments      
Optics 3.049 2.561 2.395 3.650 3.794 
Analysis, measurement, control tech. 2.790 1.911 2.140 3.665 3.652 
Medical engineering 2.805 1.725 2.170 3.905 3.633 
Chemicals / Pharmaceuticals      
Organic fine chemistry 3.069 1.729 2.199 3.959 3.541 
Macromolecular chemistry, polymers  3.056 1.634 2.015 3.833 3.894 
Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics 3.137 2.000 2.560 3.844 3.616 
Biotechnology 2.090 1.602 2.588 3.786 2.723 
Materials, metallurgy 2.819 1.694 2.166 3.771 3.531 
Agriculture, food chemistry  3.376 1.150 1.856 3.786 3.689 
Total average (30 tech classes) 3.016 1.792 2.044 3.795 3.752 
Note: Values above the total average are reported in bold. Total average is computed for all patents in the 
30 technological classes.  
 
However, there are differences across technology areas:  
 
· Blocking competitors is a particularly important reason for patenting in Electrical Devices, 
Audiovisual Technology, Telecommunications , Optics and in most areas of 
Chemicals/Pharmaceuticals (the only exceptions are Biotechnology  and Materials, 
Metallurgy). 
· The importance of licensing is higher than average in almost all technical classes while 
patenting for cross licensing is particularly relevant in all Elec tronics areas, in Optics, 
Analysis, Measurement, C ontrol and Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics. 
· Commercial exploitation and prevention from imitation are not particularly relevant in most 
technical areas. Above average values are mainly observable in the other ar eas not shown in 




Strategic use of patents 
 
Table 5.1.5      Used and unused patents by technical area  












Electronics       
Electrical devices  33.0% 17.9% 10.5% 11.8% 33.6% 14.4% 
Audio-visual technology  30.5% 13.8% 15.2% 9.7% 38.2% 26.6% 
Telecommunications 47.1% 22.7% 24.1% 12.3% 25.7% 24.8% 
Information technology 41.4% 18.2% 18.1% 16.6% 26.0% 23.7% 
Semiconductors 51.3% 17.6% 30.1% 17.5% 17.5% 16.9% 
Instruments       
Optics 44.5% 18.0% 16.1% 16.2% 28.7% 18.2% 
Analysis, measurement, control tech. 34.3% 12.8% 7.2% 17.0% 28.2% 12.4% 
Medical engineering 25.8% 12.8% 3.1% 12.5% 31.2% 12.1% 
Chemicals / Pharmaceuticals       
Organic fine chemistry 69.4% 36.2% 9.0% 30.6% 13.7% 4.5% 
Macromolecular chemistry, polymers  46.6% 23.7% 5.3% 20.3% 23.9% 4.7% 
Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics 45.4% 24.2% 8.2% 18.2% 23.4% 15.8% 
Biotechnology 39.9% 9.3% 3.1% 30.6% 22.3% 15.2% 
Materials, metallurgy 42.1% 16.8% 8.0% 19.8% 25.8% 6.4% 
Agriculture, food chemistry  31.6% 16.9% 3.4% 12.9% 40.4% 6.9% 
Total average (30 tech classes) 36.9% 18.4% 7.2% 15.6% 29.3% 9.6% 
Note: Values above the total average are reported in bold. Total average is computed for all patents in the 
30 technological classes.  
 
The previous results pointed out that strategic motivations for patenting like blocking rivals a re 
particularly significant in several technical areas, but did not tell us anything about the actual use 
of these patents. The PatVal -EU questionnaire also asked the inventors if the patent applicant 
used or not their patents in commercial or industrial a pplications or for licensing.  
 
This information is used in Table 5.1.5 , which shows the proportion of unused patents, and the 
shares of used and unused patents  when blocking competitors and c ross licensing are “important” 
reasons for patenting, where “important” means that inventors reported a score 4 or 5 to these 
reasons. We show the results on the use of patents only for blocking and c ross licensing, because 
in these cases strategic behavior is more likely. These are the patents that we identify as havi ng 
strategic uses . For example companies may not only hoard patents in their portfolio to block 
competitors, but also to increase their bargaining power for cross -licensing agreements. We 
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finally grouped in “Unused Others” all the patents that are not used  and such that the score of 
blocking and cross licensing is smaller than 4.  
 
Table 5.1.5 shows different patterns across technical areas. The main findings are: 
 
· About 37% of patents are not used on average. However, the share of unused patents is higher 
in Telecommunications; Information Technology ; Semiconductors ; Optics; Organic Fine 
Chemistry; Macromolecular Chemistry; P olymers; Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics; 
Biotechnology and Materials, Metallurgy. Among these classes the share of unused patents 
reaches almost 70% in Organic Fine Chemistry. By contrast, it is the lowest in Medical 
engineering (25.8%), where there is a large presence of small firms who tend to use and 
license more their patents with respect to large firms (  Gambardella, Giuri and Luzzi (2007) , 
Giuri, et al. (2005)). 
· Unused Blocking patents  are frequent in Organic Fine Chemistry; Macromolecular 
Chemistry; Polymers, Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics; and Telecommunications . Values close to 
the total average are observed in Information Technology; Semiconductors  and Optics. 
· We find many areas in whic h the share of unused patents is higher than the average when 
cross licensing is an important motivation for patenting. The largest share (30%) is in 
Semiconductors . This finding is in line with Hall and Ziedonis (2001)  who point out that 
“manufacturers appeared to be ‘harvesting’ more of their latent inventions and explicitly 
‘ramping up’ their patent filings in order to amass more sizeable patent portfolios”. The 
percentages are also very high in Telecommunications ; Information Technology; Audiovisual 
Technology and Optics. 
· The share of unused patents for other reasons (which may be considered as being “sleeping” 
patents) is also high in many technology areas. These patents may be worthless, or may be 
sleeping in patent portfolios of companies that do not have th e assets for investing in 
production activities or that are unable to license their patents even if they are willing to do it 
( Gambardella, Giuri and Luzzi (2007) ). 
 
Finally, we checked whether patents used for commercial exploitation or licensing score high for 
blocking competitors or for cross -licensing. On average the share for blocking competitors is 
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high (29.3%), but only in Electrical Devices; Audiovisual Technology; Medical Engineering  and 
Agriculture, Food  this share is higher than the overall average. In these areas the share of unused 
patents and the importance of cross -licensing are also lower. 
 
The share of patents used for commercial exploitation and in which cross licensing was an 
important motivation for patenting is higher than average in all the subfields in Electronics and 
Instruments and in Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics  and Biotechnology. 
 
Unused patents and related inventions  
 
An informative exercise is to compare the share of unused patents in the case of patents having 
related inventions that could be patented separately and of inventions patented quickly for the 
active presence of competitors in the specific technical field. This allows to check if this 
precondition for strategic patenting results in a less intensive use of patents.  
 
The results in Table 5. 1.6 show that apart from a few areas, the share of unused patents that could 
have separate inventions is higher than the share of patents without separate invention. This 
suggests that strategic behavior in patenting activities leading to separation of inventions in 
different patents can produce a negative impact on the actual use of the paten ts.  
 
In unreported tables we also compare the shares of “Unused blocking” and “Unused Cross 
Licensing” patents that could have separate inventions respectively with the shares of “Unused 
blocking” and “Unused Cross Licensing” patents without a separate in ventions and these patterns 
are confirmed. These results also point out that this precondition for strategic patenting is in 
several technology areas associated to strategic uses of patents.  
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Electronics       
Electrical devices  32.1% 44.0% 11.8% 33.3% 32.1% -1.2% 
Audio-visual technology  28.7% 38.8% 10.1% 31.9% 27.6% -4.3% 
Telecommunications 46.3% 57.1% 10.8% 50.9% 37.7% -13.2% 
Information technology 40.3% 47.1% 6.8% 43.8% 35.9% -7.9% 
Semiconductors 51.1% 52.3% 1.1% 48.3% 60.7% 12.4% 
Instruments       
Optics 49.4% 24.7% -24.7% 50.4% 33.2% -17.3% 
Analysis, measurement, control 32.6% 52.0% 19.4% 35.1% 32.5% -2.7% 
Medical engineering 25.5% 30.3% 4.8% 29.3% 19.0% -10.2% 
Chemicals / Pharmaceuticals       
Organic fine chemistry 67.8% 77.2% 9.4% 71.1% 66.4% -4.7% 
Macromolecular chemistry, polymers  44.6% 55.4% 10.8% 47.0% 44.8% -2.2% 
Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics 45.7% 44.1% -1.6% 47.7% 41.7% -6.0% 
Biotechnology 42.0% 29.1% -12.8% 40.0% 41.4% 1.3% 
Materials, metallurgy 43.2% 33.7% -9.4% 42.5% 41.3% -1.2% 
Agriculture, food chemistry  29.6% 48.8% 19.2% 36.5% 23.7% -12.9% 
Total average (30 tech classes) 35.9% 44.5% 8.6% 37.2% 35.7% -1.5% 
Note: Values above the total average are reported in bold. Total average is computed for all patents in the 
30 technological classes.  
 
By contrast the share of unused patents that are quickly patented because of the presence of 
competitors in the field is almost always lower than in the case in which there are less 
competitive pressures. This suggests that the actual use  of patents may benefit from competition. 
The main exception here is in Semiconductors , where when competitors are active, firms try to 
obtain many patents but most often do not use them. As noted previously, it is more likely that 
they keep patents in the ir portfolio for maintaining the possibility of using them in cross -licensing 
agreements. 
 
In unreported tables we compare  shares of “Unused blocking” and “Unused Cross Licensing” 
patents in the presence of absence of competitive pressures. Results are qui te interesting as they 
show that the share of unused patents for blocking rivals is larger when competitors are active in 
the technological field. The same is observable for unused patents for cross licensing. This shows 
that competition may produce benefi cial effects on the use of patents, but when there are 
competitive purposes it is more likely that unused patents have strategic uses.  
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Table 5.1.7    Unused patents and share of X -references  




























Electronics        
Electrical devices 0.133 0.139 0.006 0.125 -0.013 0.120 -0.018 
Audio-visual technology  0.207 0.177 -0.030 0.101 -0.076 0.152 -0.025 
Telecommunications 0.157 0.122 -0.036 0.140 0.018 0.153 0.032 
Information technology 0.185 0.148 -0.037 0.227 0.079 0.167 0.019 
Semiconductors 0.169 0.131 -0.037 0.088 -0.043 0.194 0.063 
Instruments        
Optics 0.213 0.182 -0.031 0.163 -0.018 0.173 -0.008 
Analysis, measurement, 
control 0.113 0.156 0.043 0.158 0.002 0.213 0.057 
Medical engineering 0.174 0.195 0.021 0.186 -0.009 0.342 0.147 
Chemicals / 
Pharmaceuticals        
Organic fine chemistry 0.197 0.197 0.000 0.178 -0.019 0.176 -0.021 
Macromolecular chemistry, 
polymers  0.260 0.215 -0.045 0.216 0.001 0.351 0.137 
Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics 0.290 0.319 0.029 0.251 -0.068 0.460 0.141 
Biotechnology 0.295 0.156 -0.140 0.229 0.073 0.290 0.135 
Materials, metallurgy 0.183 0.121 -0.063 0.129 0.009 0.144 0.024 
Agriculture, food chemistry  0.263 0.292 0.029 0.298 0.006 0.441 0.149 
Total average (30 tech 
areas) 0.171 0.179 0.009 0.185 0.006 0.193 0.013 
Note: Total average is computed for all patents in the 30 technological classes.  
 
 
Unused patents and X -References 
 
We observe the difference in the share of  X-References and the number of X -References per 
claim between used and unused patents, and between  unused Blocking or Cross Licensing patents 
and all unused patents. The aim is to explore differences in quality of patents in unused patents.   
The main findings are the following:  
 
· Only in a few classes the share of X -References in unused patents is large r than in used 
patents, suggesting that unused patents have lower quality (Table 5. 1.7). This is observable in 
Electrical Devices; Analysis, Measurement, Control; Medical Engineerin; , Pharmaceuticals,  
Cosmetics  and Agriculture, Food. 
· Interestingly, the share of X-References in unused patents for cross -licensing is almost 
always larger than in all unused patents.  
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· The share of X-References in unused patents for blocking competitors is larger than in all 
unused patents in Information Technology ; Semiconductors  and Biotechnology .  
 
Similar results are observable in Table 5. 1.8 where we compare the number of X -References per 
claim in the same categories of used and unused patents.  
 





























Electronics        
Electrical devices 0.072 0.081 0.009 0.058 -0.022 0.052 -0.029 
Audio-visual technology  0.084 0.089 0.004 0.072 -0.016 0.100 0.011 
Telecommunications 0.053 0.061 0.008 0.059 -0.002 0.077 0.015 
Information technology 0.073 0.038 -0.034 0.057 0.019 0.045 0.006 
Semiconductors 0.147 0.096 -0.050 0.108 0.012 0.143 0.047 
Instruments        
Optics 0.078 0.080 0.001 0.085 0.005 0.096 0.016 
Analysis, measurement, 
control 0.061 0.070 0.008 0.067 -0.003 0.101 0.031 
Medical engineering 0.089 0.214 0.126 0.067 -0.148 0.075 -0.139 
Chemicals / 
Pharmaceuticals        
Organic fine chemistry 0.069 0.082 0.012 0.064 -0.018 0.040 -0.042 
Macromolecular 
chemistry, polymers  0.111 0.116 0.005 0.138 0.022 0.142 0.026 
Pharmaceuticals, 
cosmetics 0.174 0.151 -0.024 0.070 -0.081 0.186 0.035 
Biotechnology 0.057 0.050 -0.007 0.082 0.032 0.124 0.074 
Materials, metallurgy 0.110 0.095 -0.015 0.152 0.057 0.060 -0.035 
Agriculture, food 
chemistry  0.224 0.187 -0.037 0.181 -0.006 0.291 0.104 
Total average (30 tech 
classes) 0.099 0.106 0.007 0.112 0.006 0.115 0.008 
Note: Values above the total average are reported in bold. Total average is computed for all patents in the 







Summary of findings  
 
 
Table 5.1.9 reports the summary of findings on unused patents. Together  with Table 5.1.2, these 
findings highlight, through the use of different indicators, evidence of strategic patenting in 
several technology areas that we investigated.  
 
The main results are the foll owing: 
 
· A large share of patents protect inventions that are closely related to other inventions of the 
patent applicant. This may not only depend on natural technical or economic 
complementarities among inventions, but also on strategic separations of min or inventions 
into different patents.  
· Low quality of patents (as measured by the share of X -References) is associated with patents 
that have high strategic and economic value  for their owners . 
· A large share of patents is not strategically used by applicants for reasons that are different in 
different areas: blocking competitors is main motive in Chemicals/Pharmaceuticals, 
increasing bargaining power against competitors is a motive for cross -licensing negotiations 
mainly in Electronics.  
· In several technology areas inventions are less likely to be used when they are the results of 
strategic separations in to different related patents.  
· The presence of competitors in the specific field of the invention positively affect s the use of 
patents. 
· The quality of unused patented inventions that are used in cross -licensing negotiations is 
lower than the quality of all unused patents. This is also apparent for unused blocking patents 
only in a few areas.  
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Electronics              
Electrical devices + + - - ++ - + + - - - + o 
Audio-visual technology  + ++ - - +++ -- + - - - - + + 
Telecommunications  + ++ + + +++ - + - - + + ++ + 
Information technology  o +++ + - +++ + - - - + + + + 
Semiconductors  - ++ ++ - +++ + - + - - + ++ ++ 
Instruments               
Optics + ++ + - +++ + - - - - - + + 
Analysis, measurement, control  - + - - o + + - + - + + o 
Medical engineering  - - - - -- - - - + - + - ++ 
Chemicals / Pharmaceuticals               
Organic fine chemistry + - +++ +++ + +++ + - - - - - o 
Macromolecular chem., polymers  + - + + - + + - - - + ++ o 
Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics  + + + + + + - - + - + + ++ 
Biotechnology - - + -- -- +++ - + - + + ++ - 
Materials, metallurgy  - - + - + + - + - + + - + 
Agriculture, food chemistry  + -- - - -- - + - + + + ++ - 
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We also find that the combination of these patterns varies by technology areas as summarized 
below: 
 
· In Chemicals/Pharmaceuticals  there is evidence of complementarity in patenting activities 
and cumulative processes of inventions that result in patents. This occurs in Organic Fine 
Chemistry, Macromolecular Chemistry, P olymers, and Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics . All these 
technology areas are characterized by higher -than-average shares of small firms, suggesting 
that complementarity is less likely to induce anti -competitive or collusive behaviors among 
large firms. However, if interrelated patents are substitutes and not complements, they may 
represent patent thickets that may block others to enter the technical field. This is confirmed 
by the large share of unused patents, especially for blocking competitors. Moreover, the 
presence of competitors in the field seems to affect positively the speed of the patenting 
process and the use of the patents. In Biotechnology  and Agriculture, Food there is scarce 
evidence of strategic separation of inventions in different patents and of blocking patents, but 
for blocking patents, the patent quality is lower than for less strategic patents.  
 
· In Electronics  patents are more frequently interrelated with other inventions of the same 
applicant mainly in Audiovisual Technology and Information Technology . There is also 
evidence of separation of inventions in different patents in Telecommunications  and 
Semiconductors  in which the size of pat ent families is also above average and there are many 
unused patents. However, in all these areas patents are mainly held unused not to block rivals, 
but to have the possibility to exchange them in cross -licensing agreements by very large 
firms. Although cross-licensing might in principle facilitate the use of patented inventions by 
rivals, we find that very frequently patents aimed at this purpose are often not used and they 
have lower quality than other unused patents.  
 
· In Instruments we find two very di fferent patterns: in Optics the pattern is very similar to 
the Electronics areas, with many interrelated patents especially within the applicant 
organization, a marked presence of very large firms and large percentages of unused patents 
for cross licensing . In Medical engineering  we do not find evidence of strategic patenting. 
When patents are related to other inventions, they mainly build on inventions produced by 
 244 
external actors. The presence of small firms is comparatively very strong and they tend to us e 
patents more than in other sectors mainly for commercial exploitation and for licensing.  
 
 
5.1.2 A closer look at the patenting behavior of the Pharmaceutical and Cosmetics Industry  
 
Based on the results of previous sections , the patenting behavio r of the Pharmaceutical and the 
Cosmetics industries will be analyzed more closely. The main aim of this section is to establish 
whether there are differences between the patenting activities of Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics 
firms. Since both types of firms are analyz ed jointly in the rest of this report we attempt to 
separate them out here. Additionally, we discuss whether patenting activities in both industries 
reveal anticompetitive behavior. The Pharmaceutical and the Cosmetics industries in particular 
are characterized by (1) strong increases in application figures over time, (2) increasing 
complexity of patent applications, (3) slightly decreasing opposition activity and (4) overall 
decreasing patent quality. These aspects do not automatically imply increasing str ategic patenting 
behavior. Therefore, in the following, the patenting activity and, foremost, the opposition 
behavior of these two industries is analyzed more closely.  
 
Figure 4.2.3 above shows that the patent applications in Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics grew 
substantially after 1985 and remained relatively stable afterwards. Nevertheless, Pharmaceuticals 
and Cosmetics are among the top 3 technology areas in Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals over the 
whole period under consideration.  
 
Table 4.5.1 ranks firms by the average growth rate of patent applications between 1989 and 2002.  
As already pointed out earlier, the growth rate was calculated as the difference between 
application counts between 1989 -1992 and 1999-2002 divided by the average number of patent 
applications in three years for the sample period. Results reveal that pharmaceutical and 
cosmetics firms are among the firms showing high growth rates.  
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Table 5.B.10        Ranking of selected firms by average growth of patent a pplications 



















Human Genome Organic Ch. Pharm., Cosm. Biotech. 586,0 0,0 305,8 305,8 
Infineon Semicond. IT Telecom 4039,2 15,5 2249,9 135,4 
Intel IT Telecom Semicond. 1848,4 29,5 1037,2 33,1 
Qualcomm Telecom IT Analysis 1910,5 33,5 1162,5 32,7 
Boston Scientific Medical Eng. Pharm., Cosm. Mat. proc. 1364,3 23,0 731,3 29,5 
Wyeth Organic Ch. Pharm., Cosm. Biotech. 658,5 12,5 335,9 24,0 
Ricoh Optical Telecom Audiovisual 1706,2 39,0 885,2 21,2 
Nokia Telecom IT Audiovisual 6448,2 474,0 3157,7 5,7 
Volkswagen Transportation Motors Mech. Elements 2524,6 178,8 1084,6 5,0 
Beiersdorf Pharm., Cosm. Medical Eng. Polymers 992,0 68,5 406,0 4,9 
BMW Transportation Motors Mech. Elements 2508,7 149,2 857,9 4,7 
Honda Transportation Motors Mech. Elements 3693,3 271,4 1457,8 4,4 
Toyota Motors Transportation Mech. Elements 4744,8 326,9 1475,5 3,5 
Bosch Motors Transportation Analysis 13509,3 1446,5 5162,1 2,6 
Philips Telecom Audiovisual Energy 21970,2 2546,7 8223,8 2,2 
Renault Transportation Motors Mech. Elements 2137,2 202,6 649,1 2,2 
Boehringer Ing. Organic Ch. Pharm., Cosm. Biotech. 1295,2 180,6 537,5 2,0 
Seiko Epson Printing Optical IT 4148,1 500,0 1445,4 1,9 
Degussa Organic Ch. Polymers Materials 3674,3 428,9 1119,0 1,6 
Yamaha Motors Cons. Goods Transportation 1599,5 186,8 484,0 1,6 
Procter & Gamble Petrol Ch. Medical Eng. Pharm., Cosm. 7823,9 794,9 2047,8 1,6 
Pfizer Organic Ch. Pharm., Cosm. Biotech. 2745,7 367,0 924,5 1,5 
Univ. of California Pharm., Cosm. Organic Ch. Biotech. 1561,8 193,4 465,5 1,4 
 
 
It is well known that patents play a major role in the Pharmaceutical industry. In particular, 
patents provide incentives to invest in R&D, which is of particular interest due to (1) high R&D 
expenses and costs for clinical studies and (2) since pharmaceutical products can be imitated 
rather easily. However, it is surprising that in t he Cosmetics industry patents  also play such an 
important role. Table 5.1.10, for instance, shows that Beiersdorf exhibits a growth of applications  
comparable to BMW or Volkswagen. Procter & Gamble shows a growth rate of applications that 
is only slightly lower than that of Degussa and Yamaha.  
 
Especially, since the R&D intensity in the Cosmetics industry is much lower than in the 
Pharmaceutical or the Automobile industries, one could assume that patents are used differently 
by firms active in the Cosmetic s industry compared pharmaceuticals companies. This assumption 
proves true when comparing the opposition behaviour of firms active in these industries.  
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As discussed earlier, o pposition activity has been above average in almost all areas within 
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals (Figure 5.1.4). During the 1980s the Pharmaceutical and  
Cosmetics industries are characterized by the largest share of opposed patents (between 20% and 















Organic Fine Chemistry Macromolecular Chemistry, Polymers
Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics Biotechnology




A more differentiated picture is provided by Table 5.1.11. The table contains  the top 10 
opponents in Pharma and Cosmetics. The opposed firms were ranked by the number of 
oppositions they received in total. The table shows that  opposition activity is strongly  
concentrated among a small number of firms, both with respect to the opponents and opposed 
parties. 
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Table 5.1.101  Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics   
        Opposing parties            





















































































UNILEVER 39 0 0 11 2 0 9 0 4 0 65 
L'OREAL 36 0 3 0 0 1 6 5 9 0 60 
PROCTER & GAMBLE  30 1 0 12 6 2 0 0 4 0 55 
KAOCORPORATION  23 0 1 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 29 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE  8 0 1 1 1 4 1 0 0 0 16 
HOFFMANNROCHE  2 0 7 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 13 
J&J 0 11 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 
BAYER 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 1 0 0 9 
SUMITOMO 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 5 
3M 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 142 13 13 30 10 14 18 9 17 0 266 
Share 53.38 4.89 4.89 11.28 3.76 5.26 6.77 3.38 6.39 0 100 
 
 
Table 5.1.11 further shows that pharmaceutical firms oppose a more diverse set of firms than the  
cosmetics firms (highlighted in the table) . The latter frequently oppose one another.  Overall, 
Henkel filed the largest number of oppositions. In particular, Henkel is responsible for 50% of all 
oppositions filed by the top 10 opposing firms. Taking all firms into account, Henkel is still 
responsible for more than 30% of all oppositions. The patents of Unilev er, L’Oreal and Procter 
and Gamble received most of the oppositions, more than twice as much as the opposed party 
ranked fourth, which is KAO Corp.  
 
These results confirm the findings of Harhoff and Hall (2003) . Analyzing the opposition behavior 
in the Cosmetics industry, the authors find that Henkel, Goldwell and Wella account for the 
major part of the oppositions filed and that oppositions are mostly directed to patents of Procter 
& Gamble, Unilever and L’Oreal. Although, oppositions occur also between pharmaceutical 
companies, both, the frequency of opposition and the concentration ar e much lower.  
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Table 5.1.12 displays a cross -tabulation of opposed and opposing firms containing the top 14  
patent holders in the cosmetics industry. The figure stems from  Harhoff and Hall (2003) and 
comprises oppositions filed against granted patents that were filed before December 31, 1995. 
Oppositions are mostly directed to L’Oreal ( 120 oppositions received). One third of these 
oppositions were filed by Henkel. L’Oreal itself files 35 oppositions, interestingly, not directed to 
Henkel but mainly to the patents of Procter & Gamble and Unilever. The second largest opponent 
is Goldwell (74 oppositions filed). Again, L’Oreal, Procter & Gamble and Unilever receive most 
of the oppositions, i.e. 75%.  
 
Table 5.1.12 Cross-tabulation of Opposed and Opposing Firms  
Opponent 
Patent holder  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Total 
1    L’Oreal 0 6 1 39 0 25 4 3 0 0 4 0 27 11 120 
2    Procter & Gamble  12 0 8 28 0 2 0 0 6 0 0 0 11 0 67 
3    Unilever 10 7 0 29 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 18 0 72 
4    Henkel 1 0 3 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 13 
5    KAO 4 1 2 22 0 5 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 37 
6    Wella 4 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 13 
7    Beiersdorf 1 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 7 
8    BASF 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
9    Colgate-Palmol 0 5 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 10 
10  Shiseido 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 
11  Cognis 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
12  Dow Corning  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13  Goldwell 2 0 0 7 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 
14  Bristol-Myres 1 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 7 
Total 35 21 16 139 0 47 5 5 11 0 6 0 74 11 370 
 
Harhoff and Hall (2003)  argue that more valuable patents are more likely to be attacked and that 
oppositions can also be a means to increase uncertainty and strategic d elay in order to weaken the 
position of competitors in the market. However, as Harhoff (2005) finds in an extended analysis, 
the most frequent opponents also have an above -average success rate in getting opposed patents 
invalidated. This particular finding suggests that there are distinct differences in opposition  
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capabilities, and that the above -average frequency of attacks is caused by earlier investements in 
such capabilities. 
 
These results suggest that while oppositions in the cosmetics industry may indeed be used for 
strategic reasons, for instance, to build a reputation of being tough on imitators or potential 
competitors entering the market, the success patterns suggest a different explanation. Similarly, 
pharmaceutical firms act rather inconspicuously in terms of anticompetitive behavior. These 
firms rather seem to use patents to protect their investment in R&D and act accordingly.  
 
5.2 Assessment of firms’ behaviour from a competition policy aspect  
5.2.1 Comparison of the patent data analysis and survey results regarding strategic use of 
patents.  
 
Here we review the results of the indicators analyzed in Section 4 of the report in light of the 
findings from the PatVal -EU study set out in Section 5.1.1 above.  
 
We can separate the indicators investigated in Section 4 as follows:  
· Indicators that capture overall patenting  activity: counts of patent applications, information 
of patent grant rates, on the number of claims on each patent, on entry and exit into 
technology areas and on concentration of applicants;  
· Indicators for the development of  patent quality: information on the number of critical 
citations per patent and per claim;  
· Indicators for strategic behaviour: information on the number of divisionals and on the 
number of shared priorities;  
· Indicators of  patent thickets: measures of the concentration of patent citat ions by cohort; 
· Indicators for opposition activity: measures of the share of opposed patents and information 
on which type of firms are opposed.  
 
The PatVal-EU study is particularly helpful in providing firm level information about the 
importance of complementarities between patents, which we emphasized in our definition of 
strategic patenting (Section 3.2).  Additionally it is useful in providing supporting evidence 
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about the difference in the way in which Electronics and Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals firm s 
make use of patents.  
 
In providing evidence about complementarities between patents the survey helps us to validate 
the indicators in Section 4.5.1 regarding concentration of references. We used these to try to 
identify technology areas in which patent t hickets are likely to have arisen. We identified the 
following technology areas:   Telecommunications ; Information Technology ; Medical 
Engineering; Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics ; and Transport.  
 
In the PatVal-EU study there are several indicators which can b e used to try and assess whether 
patent thickets are likely in a given technology area. These are the questions relating to whether 
firms patented in order to generate a separate invention, the share of patents which are 
cumulative and based on external in ventions, the degree to which firms develop patents for 
blocking purposes and the extent to which firms have high shares of unused patents. All of these 
indicators jointly point to a slightly larger and more diffuse set of technology areas than our 
measures. All of the technology areas we have identified above are included in this set. The 
likelihood of a patent thicket is not so strongly supported in Medical Engineering  by the PatVal-
EU survey. In general the PatVal -EU survey provides much evidence for the  fact that 
complementarities between patents are an important reason for the patenting activities we 
observe.  
 
The survey also shows very clearly that there are important differences between firms in the 
Electronics main area and firms that patent in the technology areas connected to medical, 
pharmaceutical and chemicals research.  This is very clear if we look at the questions regarding 
the motivation for patenting and also if we look at which types of patents go unused. The 
conclusion of that study draws  out the most important differences between the patenting 
strategies pursued by firms in Electronics and in the Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals. We have also 
found that these areas differ, particularly when we look at the likelihood of opposition against 
patent applications but also when we look at the quality indicators we have constructed (X -
References per claim). The quality indicator suggests that the share of claims that do not 
represent an inventive step is higher in Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals than in Elec tronics. Also the 
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likelihood of opposition is higher. We have yet to understand how the causality between these 
different patterns runs. This will be a topic of future research.  
 
5.2.2 Competition policy implications of our findings  
 
Table 3.2 sets out the stag es of the patent application process and notes which competition policy 
issues may be associated with each stage. Our analysis in this report represents the attempt to 
develop a set of indicators which will show whether patents are being used strategically  and if so 
whether competition policy has a role to play in rectifying potential anticompetitive effects.  
 
In general we reach the following broad conclusions:  
 
1. There is clear evidence that firms are patenting at an increasing rate at the EPO and that this  
coincides in many cases with patent applications that are more complex (involve more 
claims) and are more questionable (have a higher number of X -References).  
2. Furthermore we find clear evidence that some firms make greater use of the opportunities 
afforded them by the patent system to create uncertainty about their patents by making 
patents complex, by introducing divisional patents and by rearranging the content of patents 
between the stage at which patents are applied for at national patent offices and the 
application at the EPO (measurable via shared priorities). We interpret this as strategic 
behaviour where firms engage in such activities in a regular fashion (e.g. Table 4.5.17 ) .  
3. Our firm level analysis also suggests that there are important differe nces between firms, 
depending on the technology which is being patented. Our evidence is consistent with the 
existence of patent portfolio races in Electronics (Hall and Ziedonis (2001) ) . In the 
technology areas that belong to this main area firms are building u p large patent portfolios 
and often these patents represent only minor technological innovations (viz. Table 4.5.18). 
However, there are also differences amongst the firms in these technology areas. We find 
that those which already possess large patent por tfolios are less likely to patent low quality 
patents and that some of these firms are pursuing a strategy of greater focus of their patenting 
activities. The results of the PatVal -EU survey indicate that firms in these technology areas 
are likely to cross -license patents in order to avoid conflicts over intellectual property. This 
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might also explain the rather low incidence of patent opposition in these technology areas; 
there is less reason to oppose patents if cross -licensing reduces the likelihood that they will 
ever be used to exclude rivals from certain technologies.  
4. In the field of Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals and in parts of Instruments we find that firms are 
also behaving strategically. Here the growth in patents is also noticeable. However firms in 
these technology areas seem to focus more on the use of patents as stumbling blocks for one 
another, i.e. to block. As a result opposition activity is much greater in these areas and firms 
are far more likely to own patents that reduce the validity of riva ls’ patents (viz. Table 
4.5.17). 
5. Smaller applicants are likely to face more opposition from rivals in the technology areas that 
are more concentrated and in which patent portfolio races are taking place it seems. Our 
analysis of opposition suggests that op position in the following technology areas should be 
studied in greater detail in order to establish whether small firms are systematically 
disadvantaged:  Information Technology  and Analysis, Measurement, Control . 
 
Are there implications for competition p olicy? 
The extensive analysis of indicators based on patent data shows that there are no indicators which 
would show exactly where to look for anticompetitive behaviour by individual firms. We have 
built up a large number of indicators and sought to analyz e in detail how each indicator has 
developed. By themselves the indicators are all amenable to alternative interpretations. In sum 
they are more reliable and provide a consistent impression of firms' patenting activities.  
 
In our view the results point to three different kinds of implication for competition policy in 
Europe: 
 
1. The number of patent applications is strongly increasing, patents are often more complex 
and more of them are questionable. Additionally, patents are increasingly part of a set of 
complementary patents that jointly cover a technology. This indicates that uncertainty 
about the scope and validity of patents has increased. As Tom and Gilman (2003) argue 
uncertainty about the validity and the scope of patents affects competition policy 
whenever firms license patents. The rules regarding what is permissible in patent 
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licensing are based on a distinction between horizontal and vertical relationships between 
firms. In the case of a horizontal relationship the rules are more restrictive. The question 
whether a particular patent is valid or how far its scope extends often det ermines whether 
the firms in question are regarded to be competitors or not. Here increases in uncertainty 
regarding the scope of patents have direct implications for competition policy because 
they create more uncertainty about the application of competit ion policy rules.  
 
2. The opposition mechanism at the EPO has been shown to be less effective than it was in 
the past. Two issues arise:  
a.  Too few patents are opposed;  
b.  Smaller firms seem to be opposed too often in certain technology areas.  
The first issue relates directly to our conclusion above that the quality of patents has 
decreased. The fact that patents are not opposed frequently is adding to this problem. The 
analysis we have undertaken does not suggest that large firms have agreed explicitly not 
to oppose each other’s patents. However there seems to be a tacit understanding which 
leads to lower opposition rates in some concentrated technology areas. It is not clear that 
competition policy is the right policy instrument with which to alter this state of affairs. 
However it is clear that competition policy makers should have a strong interest that it is 
changed.  
We also find that opposition seems to be directed to a more dispersed and most likely 
smaller set of firms in a few technology areas than is t rue on average. Here it should be 
investigated whether small firms are facing barriers to entry into the patent system that are 
higher than in other technology areas. This is an area in which competition policy might 
be developed into a more forceful instr ument. However, much stronger evidence than that 
which we have found is needed to make a case for such intervention.  
 
3. We find that many firms patent strategically to build up patent portfolios which are 
used to block rivals or to negotiate with them. In  our view this is a highly inefficient 
development which should be reined in as far as is possible. We find some evidence that 
firms which have built up large patent portfolios reduce the growth rate of these 
portfolios. Even if this were a general pattern  it implies that the number of patents within 
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the patent system will continue to grow for quite some time and that the average quality 
of these patents will continue to diminish. Our literature review in Section 3 of this report 
has shown that large patent  portfolios may be used to achieve anticompetitive aims ( viz. 
Rubinfeld and Maness (2005) ). Where this is the case competition policy should 
intervene. The strategic use of patent portfolios s hould be taken into account if it can be 
proven. In such cases the view that individual patents are important innovation incentives 
should not be given undue weight.  
 
Overall it would be desirable if the patent system could be rebalanced in such a way as to 























6. Key Findings and Policy Conclusions 
 
The European Patent Office was established in 1973 by the Convention on the Grant of European 
Patents (EPC). The EPO describes itself as follows. “ The mission of the European Patent Office 
(EPO) – the patent granting authority for Europe – is to support innovation, competitiveness and 
economic growth for the benefit of the citizens of Europe. ”84 
 
This study has documented that the service provided by this patent office has undergone 
important changes in the past decade. These changes result in part from the way the European 
Patent Office operates and in part from the way in which applicants’ behaviour has chang ed and 
is changing. As a consequence of these changes it is highly likely that the European Patent Office 
is not in a position to fulfil its mission as fully as it might in the absence of these developments.  
 
In this chapter we reflect on the most importa nt challenges facing the European Patent Office and 
the patents it administers.85 The empirical analysis documented in Chapter 4 of this study 
indicates that current trends in firms’ patenting behaviour are changing the uses and the value of 
patents for firms and for society. We summarize these developments in Section 6.1. Next we 
discuss the implications of these developments from a public policy perspective (Section 6.2). 
We draw out challenges which developments in patenting have for enterprise policies, for 
competition policy and for the institutions that constitute the patent system. In Section 6.3 we 
discuss policy measures which might be adopted in each of these areas in order to improve the 
effects of granting patents for society. Section 6.4 conclude s. 
 
The analysis of policy implications in this chapter is based on two general principles of 
economics that should guide public policy intervention in general: First, we seek to identify the 
source of the changes we identify within the patent system and p ropose policy measures that are 
                                                   
84 See http://www.epo.org/about -us/office/annual-reports/2005/mission -statement.html (last visit July 9, 2007).  
85 Our policy conclusions focus on the EPO as our data analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 is based on data describing 
patenting at the EPO. We expect that other national patent offices in Europe are  broadly affected by the same trends 
we observe here. Interviews with practitioners suggest that there are also differences between the national offices and 
the EPO.  
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as closely targeted to these sources as possible. 86 Second, we follow the guideline that complexity 
of economic incentive systems should be reduced to the minimum necessary in order to avoid 
unwanted side effects that arise w hen different parts of the incentive system interact in 
unforeseen ways. 
 
In the context of this study the first principle implies that patenting behaviour which is found to 
be detrimental to social welfare should be addressed within the patent system if a t all possible. 
Attempts to remedy patenting behaviour which reduces social welfare more indirectly through 
competition policy or enterprise policy will introduce additional complexity into the incentive 
structure provided by the patent system in Europe. I t is highly likely that such complexity would 
have unforeseen and unwanted consequences. Therefore, we will focus some of our attention on 
policy measures which would improve the value of patents administered by the European Patent 
Office. Our discussion will clarify that the patent office can introduce measures which will 
eliminate most of the changes in firms’ patenting behaviour. However such changes may not be 
implemented due to present governance structures at the EPO. Therefore, we also address 
enterprise and competition policies that can mitigate effects of strategic patenting.  
 
6.1 Main findings  
 
In this study we have undertaken a thorough empirical analysis of developments in the patent 
system administered by the European Patent Office. Our findings in dicate that the patenting 
behaviour of firms whose production is based on specific technologies (outlined below) is being 
affected by an escalation mechanism . This means that firms are increasingly forced to increase 
expenditure on constructing patent port folios which leads to higher costs of entry into 
technologies affected by high rates of patenting. This mechanism is discussed in greater detail in 
Section 3.1 . 
 
Escalation mechanisms become effective if the returns to fixed outlays on a specific strategi c 
variable are high. The theoretical (Chapter 3) and empirical (Chapter 4) evidence that we collect 
                                                   
86 This may be taken to correspond to the  Intervention Principle  as described by Grinols (2006) : “ .. the most 
efficient way to accomplish a desired objective is to identify the margin to be inf luenced and impose a tax or subsidy 
narrowly at that margin at the minimal level needed to accomplish the objective. ” 
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in this report indicates that expenditure on the management of intellectual property has become 
such a strategic variable. The race to build up patent portf olios documented by  Hall and Ziedonis 
(2001) is one element of the process of escalation of spending on patents. So is the increase in 
patent litigation that we observe in the United States. This is illustrated in the report on patent 
system reform by the National Academy of Sciences (2004) . In this report the number of patent 
law suits (Figure 2 -3) and patent attorneys in the United States (Figure 2 -4) are plotted. Both 
series show strong increases, indicating that the legal prof ession has benefited strongly from the 
increases in patent applications.   
 
There is copious anecdotal evidence that large high technology firms are focusing their efforts on 
building stronger management capabilities for intellectual property rights. For i nstance, Grindley 
and Teece (1997) report that Texas Instruments turned to licensing revenues to make up for 
shortfalls in other fields. Rubinfeld and Maness (2005)  report on how Yamaha concentrated on 
the exploitation of their patent portfolio and Parchomovsky and Wagner (2004)  provide several 
case studies of firms constructing patent portfolios.  
 
Where these efforts are leading to better utilization of underutilized patents, this will be a 
productive activity. However, the investigation by the Federal Trade Commission Federal Trade 
Commission (2003) into the patent syste m in the United States showed that many practitioners 
believe these efforts to be excessive. The following quote from the hearings illustrates this view:  
 
“My observation is that patents have not been a positive force in stimulating innovation at Cisco. 
Competition has been the motivator; bringing new products to market in a timely manner is 
critical. Everything we have done to create new products would have been done even if we could 
not obtain patents on the innovations and inventions contained in these p roducts. ….. The only 
practical response to this problem of unintentional and sometimes unavoidable patent 
infringement is to file hundreds of patents each year ourselves, so that we can have something to 
bring to the table in cross -licensing negotiations. …..The time and money we spend on patent 
filings, prosecution, and maintenance, litigation and licensing could be better spent on product 
development and research leading to more innovation. ” 
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Quotation from statement by Robert Barr, formerly Cisco Patent Counsel at the FTC hearings in 
2002. 
 
In the context of the patent system in Europe we identify factors which suggest that many firms 
are over-investing in patent management in response to inefficiencies inherent in the patent 
system itself. 
 
As we show in  Chapter 4, the European Patent Office is currently affected by an explosion of 
patenting activity as well as increases in strategic patenting behaviour. These developments are 
concentrated on a few technologies, specifically: Telecommunications , Information Technology, 
Audiovisual Technology, Medical Engineering, Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics, Biotechnology 
and Transport. Empirical analysis of this phenomenon reveals that firms in affected industries 
recognize the need to grow their patent portfolios in or der to compete with their rivals. For the 
United States, this mechanism is identified by Hall and Ziedonis (2001)  and Ziedonis (2004b). It 
is further confirmed by Schankerman and Noel (2006)  and Hall and Macgarvie (2006). The 
evidence presented in Chapter 4 (e.g. Table 4.5.13) is consistent with the operation of such a 
mechanism within the patent system administered by the European Patent Office. The table 
shows that many of the more important patent applicants i n the technology areas cited above have 
grown their patent portfolios significantly between 1989 -1992 and 1999-2002. Additionally, our 
interviews with several important patent applicants from Germany support this view.  
 
Chapter 4 also shows that specific strategic behaviour in the application process is increasing. 
Not only do firms make patent s more comprehensive, longer and more complicated by adding 
claims (4.2.3). They also increase the number of divisional patents (4.3.3.2) and the number of 
patents that share the same priority (4.3.3.3). Both of these measures provide an indication that 
patent applicants are making it more difficult for rivals to determine the precise content of their 
patents and thereby the degree of protection which firms will enjoy . Box 1 below provides two 
specific examples of patent filings that exemplify this development.  
 
Patent portfolio races which lead to competition by many firms for larger patent portfolios 
resemble an arms race. The management of patent portfolios for stra tegic purposes requires 
important fixed outlays in legal expertise. In industries where patent portfolios have become 
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important, these outlays, respectively the resulting patent portfolios, provide strategic advantage 
over time as they will constitute a ba rrier to participation for competitors.  
 
Box 1 – Extreme applications  
 
Case1 – WO2005/051444 A2    
This application is belongs to a group of 7 PCT -applications which are all characterized by a 
particularly large number of claims. The PCT -application WO2005/051444 A2 contains a total of 
19,368 claims, WO2005/046746 A2 a total of 10,247 claims and WO 2005/046747 contains 
1,738 claims. The remaining four applications also contain more than 1,000 claims each.  
The applicant filed more than 50 USPTO patent applic ations based on these 7 WO/ PCT 
applications and reduced the number of claims per USPTO application significantly (about 100 
claims per USPTO application). For example, in the case of the USPTO application 
US2005/0182468 which originally contained 13,305 c laims, the USPTO fee for additional claims 
totaled to 1,3 billion USD. As consequence the applicant reduced the number of claims to less 
than 70. 
The EPO declined to examine the application WO2005/051444 (“no search decision”). However, 
a “no search decision” enables the applicant to derive priority rights from their filing until a 
reduction of the number of claims takes place and an examination by the EPO is finally initiated. 
This situation is advantageous to the applicant as it enables them to defer sear ch and examination 
processes as well as opening the possibility for a division of the application in a number of 
separate applications. Moreover, this application might become a viable starting point in suing 
other applicants infringing a critical claim (h idden in 19,368 claims).  
 
Case 2 – US19920991074 
Based on the USPTO priority filing US19920991074 (Set Top Terminal for Cable Television 
Delivery Systems, 91 claims, 183 pages) a total of 7 separate applications had been filed at the 
EPO. All 7 applications were granted by the EPO. More over, the applicant divided these  
applications leading to an additional 16 divisional patent applications. Three of these divisional 
filings were again divided. Hence, one priority filing led to 26 EPO patent applications (18  




There is some evidence in the literature Lerner (1995), Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) , 
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004)  that such barriers to participation have particularly strong 
impacts on SMEs. Patent portfolio races advantage firms which have the organizational 
capability to obtain large numbers of patents and to ensure that these patents are enforced through 
the courts or opposition proceedings.  
 
Previous research on patenting activity in th e United States and in Europe ( Hall and Ziedonis 
(2001)) does not suggest that the competition to increase patent portfolios is leading firms to 
increase spending on research and or development. Rather, this process is operating mainly 
through spending on legal and administrative capabilities. As we set out in more detail below 
(Section 6.2) the escalation mechanism operating within the patent system administered by the 
EPO is unlikely to be welfare enhancing.  We conclude that policy intervention to curb this 
development is highly desirable.  
 
Our analysis of the patent system in Chapter 4 demonstrates that firms’ patenting behaviour in 
many technology areas remains unaffected by the logic of patent portfolio races. However, in 
those technology areas which are affected by this logic, the problem is serious. This finding, 
points to an important conclusion: any policies that are adopted in response to the patenting 
explosion should be targeted at specific sectors or technical fields if they cannot be targeted 
directly at the underlying causes of specific problems within the patent system itself.  
 
In this section we review the evidence we provide in Chapters 3 and 4 which supports our 
conclusion that an escalation mechanism is operating within the European patent syste m. 
  
 
Evidence of strategic patenting  
 
Our empirical analysis contained in Chapters 4 and 5 of this study gives rise to the following 
observations: 
 
1. There has been a very large increase in the volume  of patent applications. This increase 
in volume has the direct effect of greatly increasing the workload for the European Patent 
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Office. The increase in volumes that we observe is a confirmation of research by 
Archontopoulos , et al. (2007) and Zeebroek, Guellec and Pottelsberghe (2006) . In 
particular we find that:  
i. Patent applications have increases strongly in the following technology 
areas: Telecommunications; Electrical devices; Information technology; 
Analysis, Measurement and Control; Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics; 
Organic fine chemistry; Biotechnology; Agricultural and Food Machinery; 
Transport. 
ii. The number of claims per patent has increased strongly in the following 
technology areas: Information technology; Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics; 
Organic fine chemistry; Biotechnology . These technology areas are a 
proper subset of those in which patent applications rose strongly.  
iii. The number of divisional applications has increased very strongly in the 
following technology areas:  Telecommunications; Information 
technology; Audiovisual technology; Medical engineering; 
Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics ; Biotechnology; Agricultural and Food 
Machinery; Handling and printing . This set of technology areas overlaps 
partly with those characterized b y strong growth of patent applications.  
 
2. There is an increase in the use of patenting strategies  which make patent applications 
more complex and decrease the transparency of firms’ patenting strategies:  
i.  Increased complexity derives partly from the length of a patent and from 
the number of claims made on a patent. We list the technology areas 
affected by increased complexity in this sense under 1.ii above.  
ii. Rival firms will find it harder to determine the extent of protection enjoyed 
by a patent applicant if  the applicant makes frequent use of divisional 
applications. The technology areas affected by complexity in this sense are 
listed at 1.iii above.  
iii. Finally complexity also increases if the applicant applies for very similar 
patents at the EPO. We measure th is using the share of patents with shared 
priorities. Our results show that this practice is frequently used in the 
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following technology areas: Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics; Organic fine 
chemistry. 
 
3. The quality of patent applications  in certain technology areas and by specific firms has 
decreased noticeably . We attach the interpretation that quality decreased to measures of 
novelty or inventive step incorporated in patent application documents. This interpretation 
is supported by independent evidence from ins ide the European Patent Office – compare 
footnote 1. We also interpret the decrease of the rate of oppositions to granted patents in 
several technology areas as troubling. In view of the general upward trend of the share of 
critical references to patents p er claim (4.3.2) it is highly likely that the decline of 
opposition is contributing further to a reduction in the quality of patents granted by the 
EPO. In summary we find that:  
i. Our measures of quality of patent applications (share of critical references 
per claim) in technology areas show that quality thus measured declined 
significantly, relative to a declining overall trend, in the following 
technology areas: Semiconductors; Medical engineering ; Pharmaceuticals, 
Cosmetics; Organic fine chemistry . 
ii. Our measures of opposition activity in the technology areas show that 
opposition declined significantly in the following technology areas:  
Telecommunications; Information technology;  Semiconductors; 
Audiovisual technology; Optics; Organic fine chemistry; Space 
Technology, weapons.  
iii. It is important to note that opposition activity did not decrease (in contrast 
to the general trend) in the following technology areas noted at 3.1 above: 
Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics.  This indicates that here opposition 
activity may be helping to undo the problem of a decrease in the strictness 
of patent examination at the EPO.  
 
4. Firms that are patenting more heavily adopt one of two distinct patenting strategies : the 
first focuses on the use of patents as bargaining chips, the second focuses on the use of 
patents as blocking devices. Firms adopt these strategies depending on which type of 
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technology area they patent in. This provides confirmation that the strength of 
complementarities between patents determines firms’ patenting behavio ur. 
i. Our firm level analysis in Chapter 4 shows clearly that blocking patents are 
most important for firms in the following technology areas: 
Pharmaceuticals , Cosmetics; Organic chemistry  and Medical engineering. 
We discuss this finding in Section 4.5.3, co mpare also Table 4.5.17. This 
finding is supported by the results of our analysis of the PATVAL data in 
Chapter 5. In particular, Table 5.1.4 shows that cross -licensing does not 
matter for firms in these technology areas very much (in comparison to 
firms from the main area Electronics), whereas licensing and commercial 
exploitation do. The high level of opposition activity in these technology 
areas (noted above in 3.iii, not the case for Organic chemistry) also fits in 
with this patenting strategy. If firms  do not cross-license very much it 
matters more to prevent rivals’ blocking patents from remaining on the 
patent register.  
ii. Our case study analysis in Chapter 5 shows that the use of patents as 
bargaining chips matters most for firms in the main area Electr onics. This 
can be most clearly demonstrated in Table 5.1.4. Additionally, we find that 
firms from this group dominate the group of firms that patented most 
heavily in the period 1999 -2002 and whose patent portfolios grew fastest 
over the period 1990-2000. This is documented in Tables 4.5.13 and 4.5.14 
in the firm level analysis in Section 4.5.3 of Chapter 4.   
 
From these observations we conclude that in many technical areas, firms are increasing the 
degree to which they patent for strategic reasons. Indep endently of the particular patenting 
strategy adopted, firms are under pressure to build up larger patent portfolios in order to by able 
to keep up with their direct competitors in technology markets. This type of behaviour is 
consistent with an escalation  of spending on patents. It does not imply a higher rate of innovation, 
nor does it indicate that innovation efforts have increased.  
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6.2 Implications of findings  
 
Our investigation of patenting behaviour in Europe demonstrates that firms dependent on specifi c 
technologies are building large patent portfolios in a process of patent portfolio racing. We 
argued above that this development is an instance of an escalation mechanism. Such mechanisms 
have been previously identified to affect the increase in R&D outl ays or advertising spending in 
specific industries. 87 Escalation of spending on fixed outlays has the implication that industries 
become more concentrated as barriers to entry increase.  
 
In the context of spending on patenting portfolios the welfare effect s of the escalation mechanism 
are quite clear. Costs of competition to build large patent portfolios derive from increased 
transactions costs affecting all firms that patent in a technology area affected by such 
competition. Additionally, the substantial i ncrease in patent applications that is associated with 
the escalation of spending on patenting leads to increased backlogs at patent offices – this is 
certainly true of the EPO as Archontopoulos, et al. (2007)  show in Figure 2 of their paper. 
Uncertainty about the extent of patent protection enjoyed by firms increases as the speed 
decreases with which a patent office processes patent applications. Thi s in turn affects firms’ 
incentives to innovate, to the extent that these incentives depend on obtaining patent protection. It 
may also reduce the effort which patent offices put into the scrutiny of each patent application 
and thereby contribute to a decr ease in the quality of the average granted patent. Such decreases 
in patent quality, which signal a lower patentability threshold, may increase the level of patent 
applications as more marginal inventions are put forward by applicants. Thus the inelastic s upply 
of examination capacity and of legal expertise together with increased demand for examinations 
caused by the escalation mechanism may lead to a feedback loop which leads to steadily 
decreasing quality of granted patents. 88  
 
                                                   
87 The pioneering work undertaken on such mechanisms by John Sutton (1991, (1998, (2002)  has recently found 
additional support in the work of  Siotis and Marin (2004) . 
88  The problem of decreasing quality of patents granted by the EPO is highlighted by comments from a recent 
internal report at the EPO ( Epo (2007)). The report states: “There is a strong belief amongst staff that the 
financial benefits to the Member States arising from the renewal fees motivat e the Administrative Council, and 
consequently the EPO administration, to focus on the quantity rather than the quality of the granted patents.”  
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Which benefits does increased expenditure on the management of patents provide in the context 
of the patenting explosion? There is no evidence that an escalation of expenditure on building 
patent portfolios is leading to more spending on innovation in Europe. The growth of patent 
applications and –grants at the EPO has outstripped the growth of R&D spending in OECD 




Source:  EPO Annual reports (various years)  as well as own calculations bas ed on the EPOLINE -Data provided 
by the European Patent Office . 
 
Figure 6.1 shows that patent applications at the EPO grew from 70.955 to 145.241 
(Corresponding to  an annual growth rate of 7,4%), whilst real expenditure on R&D (relative to 
1995) grew from $398 to $555 billion (corresponding to an annual growth rate of   3,4%). This 
implies that the number of applications is growing twice as fast as aggregate R&D investments. 
Studies of comparable trends in the United States ( Hall and Ziedonis (2001)  and Ziedonis and 
Hall (2001)) have shown that this developmen t is not the result of greater R&D productivity but 
reflects changes in firms’ patenting activities.  
 
 R&D in OECD countries and Patent applications at the EPO  
 (1985=100)
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Preliminary evidence from ongoing research by Hall, Thoma and Torrisi (2006)  suggests that the 
average ratio of patent applications at EPO to R&D expenditure per firm in different industries 
has increased between 1991 and 2000. This is further evidence that the aggregate trend illustrated 
in Figure 6.1. reflects developments at the firm level.  
 
Escalation mechanisms increase the costs of participating in a market. In the context of patenting 
the increase in patent portfolios is leading to higher costs of competing against rivals in those 
technology areas in which patent portfolios are being ramped up. Our analysis of entry and exit 
rates as well as of C4 concentration rates for those technology  areas in which patent applications 
grew very strongly  shows little evidence that the patent portfolio races we uncover are affecting 
concentration or entry and exit into technology areas at present (4.3.1.1 and 4.3.1.2 ). Whether 
there is an effect in th e product markets is impossible for us to determine using our data sources. 
This finding can be explained if the patentability threshold at the EPO is decreasing. Such lower 
thresholds will induce increases in patent applications, counteracting the effects  of patent 
portfolio races that would lead to concentration of patenting amongst fewer firms.  
 
Therefore, the main social cost of the escalation mechanism leading to firms ramping up their 
patent portfolios is to overload the patent office with applicatio ns, to increase the duration of 
examination and lower the novelty embodied in granted patents. These developments cannot  
be in the interest of society as they increase the likelihood that markets are monopolized even 
though firms have not provided society with innovations. 
 
If aggregate R&D investments have not increased and the productivity of patenting is also not 
improving it must be the case that the escalation of expenditure on patenting has led to increases 
in efficiency and effectiveness of firms’ in tellectual property departments. Investments in these 
departments may well deliver benefits where they lead to better exploitation of patent rights 
owned by firms. Presently, there is no evidence that the benefits that are available from such 
efficiency gains are large enough to outweigh the tangible costs of inefficiencies in patenting 
which are discussed above. 
 
Therefore, we conclude that there is ample evidence that strategic patenting behaviour, such as 
we have documented it in this study, is having ef fects on firms’ behaviour that are highly likely 
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welfare decreasing. Most importantly we can see that these developments are affecting the ability 
of the European Patent Office to fulfil its mission. We now turn to a review of policy responses 
that are available to weaken the incentive mechanisms leading to the observed escalation in 
spending on patenting.   
 
6.3 Policy responses  
 
The growing importance of patent portfolios for firms in specific technology areas has bee clearly 
documented in Chapter 4. In this section we focus on policy measures that could be adopted to 
reduce socially costly impacts of these developments that we anticipate (Section 6.2). In keeping 
with the Intervention Principle these policy measures are always focused on specific goals which 
we outline below. In this way we seek to identify precisely how the different policy measures we 
outline will contribute to an improvement of the challenge posed by increased strategic patenting 
in Europe.  
 
The tender document requested that we focus spec ifically on enterprise and competition policy 
measures. Therefore we begin by discussing policy measures outside of the patent system that 
can complement attempts from within the patent system to weaken the escalation mechanism we 
identify. However, we not e that the latter policy measures are likely to be far more effective and 
efficient in weakening the escalation mechanism.  
  
6.3.1 Enterprise Policies  
 
Strategic use of patents challenges smaller firms if the escalation mechanism is in effect. These 
firms will find it difficult to match the legal and administrative clout of firms owning large patent 
portfolios. Where firms owning large patent portfolios derive advantages mainly from patent 
portfolios that consist of patents with low or questionable novelty, supp ort for smaller firms 
seems warranted. The problem that enterprise policies directed at smaller firms will seek to 
rectify is the possible reduction in innovative effort by smaller firms in specific technology areas. 
To do this the enterprise policy must b e targeted at the root of the problem. Thus enterprise 
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policy should be targeted at the profitability of using large patent portfolios consisting of patents 
with questionable novelty to exclude smaller firms from certain markets.  
 
We have found some evide nce that is consistent with a negative effect of the escalation in 
spending on patenting overall on small firms’ patenting activities (Chapter 4.5.2). Additional 
evidence on the effects of the patenting explosion on small firms’ access to and use of patent  
protection should be sought. If such evidence confirms our findings, small firms will require 
support in making use of patent protection in those technology areas we identify as being affected 
by the escalation mechanism in patenting (Section 6.1.1). The need for such support derives from 
small firms’ inability to finance patent protection to the same extent that larger firms are able to 
do this. Here the constraint on small firms arises if these firms are capital constrained. Any 
support directed to small  firms on this basis should therefore be part of a larger set of policies that 
seek to overcome this disadvantage.  
 
Enterprise policies directed towards the patenting explosion broadly fall into two separate groups:  
 
1) Policies which strengthen the hand of SMEs in building up their own patent portfolios.  
2) Policies which seek to support SMEs faced with patent litigation threats or concerted 
efforts by rivals to raise their costs of patenting and their use of patents.  
 
Policies of the first type  respond to the build-up of patent portfolios by larger firms by providing 
smaller firms with support for similar activities.  
 
Examples would be any policy which provides extra incentives for small firms to patent, such as 
reductions in the costs of patent examination o r in the fees charged for patent renewal. Clearly 
such policies fall into the remit of the patent office and we comment further on them in Section 
6.3.3 below. However, equivalent policies implemented by institutions outside of the patent 
system such as national governments or the European Commission can be envisaged. The 
simplest schemes would consist of subsidies for patent applications filed by smaller firms or for 
the costs of preparing patent applications.  
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Policies of the second type  respond to the build up of large patent portfolios by providing 
additional protection to smaller firms against patent litigation threats. Furthermore, they support 
small firms seeking to challenge low quality patents that hamper their business. Such policies are 
more likely to reduce the value of large patent portfolios where these are created with the 
intention to exclude smaller rivals. These policies may contribute to a softening of the escalation 
mechanism outlined above. They would do this by reducing the benefit to a ccrual of large 
numbers of patents with low novelty value.  
 
Examples for this type of policy include:  
 
1) A centralised register of intellectual property disputes . The European Commission is 
uniquely placed to collect information regarding intellectual prope rty disputes and to 
provide information to small businesses on how they might protect themselves against 
misuse of intellectual property rights. Such a register would provide the Commission 
with the best possible information about the incidence of problems  with intellectual 
property rights, about their causes and about the importance of such problems for 
small businesses. In order for such an institution to work the Commission would need 
to collect information that is distributed in national courts througho ut the European 
Union at present. Additionally, the office housing the register might provide expert 
advice to small businesses on how to deal with a specific problem. A register of 
intellectual property disputes would provide a unique database on which to  build such 
a service. The main benefit of this policy is to increase transparency of problems 
arising within the realm of intellectual property. Additionally, it might strengthen the 
hand of small businesses in opposing specific abuses of intellectual pro perty rights 
and might provide them with the ability to seek out others affected by the same 
problem. This would eliminate a public goods problem that arises when many parties 
are affected by a similar issue, each waiting for another to tackle the problem.  The 
register could also capture excessive settlement, i.e. in cases where parties seek to 
keep patents in force although one of the parties has sufficient information to have the 
patent revoked or annulled.  
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2) Patent litigation insurance . This policy is promoted by Lanjouw and Schankerman 
(2004) who argue that smaller firms face systematically higher risks of being involved 
in patent litigation and therefore also significantly higher costs of enforcing their 
intellectual property. They show this using data on patent litigation from the United 
States. In their view r isk sharing mechanisms such as patent litigation insurance might 
provide a mechanism that reduces the expected costs for such smaller firms of 
enforcing their own patents. This in turn could reduce the pressure on such smaller 
firms to build up patent port folios, while simultaneously reducing the benefit of such 
portfolios for individual firms . The Commission has investigated the idea of patent 
litigation insurance before ( C.J.A. Consultants (2006)  ). The results of the 
investigation and the responses from stake -holders are mixed at best.  From a 
theoretical perspective, it is not clear to what extent patent litigation insurance could 
lead to adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Moreover, industry experts have 
voiced concerns that due informational problems, insurance rates may be too high, in 
particular for SMEs.  
 
3) Incentives for opposition . We have documented in Chapter 4 that the rate of 
opposition against patents has decreased substantially over time at the European 
Patent Office (4.2.4). The effectiveness of the opposition procedure in correcting 
errors made by the examiners at the European Patent Office has been demonstrated in 
several studies ( Hall, et al. (2003) and Hall and Harhoff (2004) ). Therefore, the 
decrease in the rate of patent opposition must have the effect of leaving more 
questionable patents in the pool of patents granted by the European Patent Office if 
the intensity of examination of patents by this office has not  increased. 
Archontopoulos, et al. (2007)  confirm that patent examination intensity has not 
increased at the EPO. One possible explanation for the d ecrease in patent oppositions 
is a reduction in incentives for individual firms to oppose poor patents. A subsidy to 
firms that provide evidence showing that patents were granted erroneously and that is 
related to the value of the market protected by such patents could have important 
effects. Such a policy can be implemented by institutions outside of the patent system. 
In fact, for the policy to work it is important that the provision of this incentive is not 
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financed out of the budget of the patent office  affected. Better review of low quality 
patents will already have negative effects on the earnings of the European Patent 
Office as it reduces the pool of patents from which the office derives renewal fees. If 
the patent office is financing an institution that decreases its revenue it may not 
support the effectiveness of the institution as much as it should.  
   
4) Peer to patent review : The USPTO has recently opened up its patent review process to 
outside reviewers who can provide information on prior art affe cting patents that are 
being examined by the USPTO ( Noveck (2006)). The model of allowing third parties 
to provide evidence about the validity of patent applications early on is extremely 
attractive as it has the potential to reduce errors in the examination process. Clearly 
there are strategic considerations to be taken into ac count. It is not clear that all 
applicants will open their applications for peer review if they fear imitation of their 
patents by rivals. Nonetheless this model of collecting information from third parties 
for patent review is important and its applicatio n in Europe should be considered. 
Such a policy cannot be implemented without the support of the European Patent 
Office however. Therefore it can only be partly considered to be an enterprise policy. 
Nonetheless, the policy is also related to the suggestio n we make at 1) above and is 
likely to benefit smaller firms in particular as it offers a lower cost mechanism to 
prevent poor patents from being issued.  
 
In sum we find a role for enterprise policies that are directed at strengthening the ability of SMEs 
to participate in the scrutiny of intellectual property rights that are granted erroneously. If such 
scrutiny can be strengthened this creates incentives for patent applicants to focus their efforts on 
patents embodying higher novelty. This in turn can onl y be beneficial to society as it 
simultaneously reduces administrative burden created by marginal patent rights, reduces 
complexity of patent rights covering any given technology and promotes a greater focus on 





6.3.2 Competition Policy  
 
Competition policy authorities have traditionally attempted to avoid actions that reduce the 
protection enjoyed by holders of intellectual property and most notably patent owners ( Encaoua 
and Hollander (2001)). The main rationale underlying this behaviour has been the danger that 
incentives to undertake R&D provided by intellectual property rights should not be undermined 
by competition policy acting on a case by case basis.  
 
In Chapter 3 of this report we made a distinction between the traditional view of patents and an 
analysis of patenting in complex technologies which recognizes the very different role that a 
patent right has there (Section 3.1.1 ). We argued there that in the context of complex 
technologies innovation incentives are not derived from individual patents. The reason being that 
appropriation of rents from a new complex technology cannot be achieved on the basis of 
individual patents. Rather firms need to secure whole patent portfolios in order to secure rents 
from a complex technology. This point is best illustrated by  the example of Qualcomm Inc. who 
have derived considerable rents from their patent portfolio covering CDMA technology.   
 
Empirical evidence suggests that firms in complex technologies view patent rights as largely 
irrelevant in the process of securing co mpetitive advantage ( Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000)  
and Arundel (2001)). Rather firms using complex technologies prefer to rely on lead time and 
secrecy to secure such advantages. The importance of patent portfolios in such industries is 
derived mainly from their role as bargaining chips in negotiations for access to technology held 
by rival firms and as a defence against hold-up by such rivals or by patent trolls (Grindley and 
Teece (1997), Hall and Ziedonis (2001)  and Shapiro (2001)). 
 
Two implications for competition polic y follow directly from these observations:  
 
1. Patents do not have the same role in all technology areas or for all firms. Therefore, the 
regulation of firms’ competitive behaviour must take note of the specific role of patents in 
each case, if patenting beha viour forms part of an inquiry. In particular the distinction 
between complex and discrete technologies should be borne in mind. This finding 
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supports the importance of a sectoral approach to the regulation of competition as such 
approaches are better able  to take account of the specific context of technology 
competition which a group of firms is engaged in.  
 
2. In the context of a complex technology, patent rights determine which firms are able to 
negotiate access to or use of which technologies. This affects  firms’ overall profits. In this 
setting competition policy measures that weaken a firm’s ability to exclude others from a 
technology on the basis of its patents may affect the overall division of rents amongst 
firms. However, this does not imply that the incentives to innovate, which derive from the 
marginal benefits a firm receives from more R&D investment are also undermined. More 
specifically, in those complex technologies in which firms derive rents from lead time 
advantages, the marginal benefit to ex tra R&D spending will derive from the additional 
lead time which a firm obtains by spending more. In this context patent rights may simply 
determine whether another firm is able to threaten hold -up of production on the basis of 
its own patents. Such threat s of hold-up can lead to licensing contracts being signed 
between firms. Whether changes to such contracts, which result from interventions of a 
competition authority regarding the validity of patent rights or access to specific patent 
rights affect innovation incentives depends on the detail of the licensing contracts. If such 
contracts involve the exchange of access to patent portfolios and the payments of a fixed 
fee, then competition policy intervention into the validity of specific patents is unlikely to 
affect R&D incentives. This is in contrast to industries where individual patents have 
direct effects on firms’ marginal costs of production or on the quality of service that firms 
may offer. In such “traditional” settings challenges to the validity of patents will affect 
R&D incentives directly.  
 
From these observations follow two additional implications: 
 
3. Our empirical analysis has shown that there are clear differences between the escalation 
of patent applications in the main area Electronics and in o ther technology areas (Section 
6.1). We have found that patent thickets resulting from complementarities between 
patents are most likely in the main are Electronics, whereas strategic patenting to build 
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fences around own technologies and to block rivals’ t echnologies is more concentrated in 
the main areas Instruments and Chemistry. These findings imply that the regulation of 
licensing will have particularly strong effects in particular sectors. This should be taken 
into account in sectoral reviews of indust ries whose patenting activity is connected to the 
main area Electronics. In such reviews the role of licensing contracts should be very 
carefully studied. Licensing practices are not well understood as it is difficult to obtain 
reliable data on licensing c ontracts. Licensing contracts are necessary to disentangle 
patent thickets and therefore have an increasingly important role to play as these thickets 
become larger. This role also needs to be acknowledged and taken into account when 
considering future mod ifications and reforms of the EU’s Technology Transfer Block 
Exemption (TTBE) regulation . 
4. Additional importance is added by the observation that uncertainty about the validity of 
patents is increasing at the EPO, due to decreasing patent quality. As Tom and Gilman 
(2003) note, increased uncertainty about patent validity will affect fir ms’ ability to 
implement competition regulations on licensing correctly.  Greater scrutiny of such 
practices is therefore warranted. Leaving aside the need for a careful inspection of 
licensing practices in various industries, increased uncertainty about t he legal status of 
patents should also be taken into account when considering future modifications and 
reforms of the EU’s Technology Transfer Block Exemption (TTBE) regulation. The 
strong distinction made in the TTBE regulation between horizontal and vert ical 
relationships between licensor and licensee become blurred whenever the validity of a 
patent is uncertain. If the patent is valid, then technology transfers would fall under the 
provisions of the less critical vertical cases. But the loss of validity (e.g., through 
revocation in opposition or courts) would immediately make the transfer a horizontal one 
in which case the more restrictive TTBE provisions apply. A firm relying on the 
assumption that a valid patent exists could find itself ex post in viola tion of the TTBE 
regulation. The apparent simplicity of the distinction between vertical and horizontal 
transfers is no longer existent. There are apparently no simple solutions to this problem   
(cf. Tom and Gilman (2003)  ), but the increasing uncertainty regarding the validity of 
patents would make this topic a particularly important one for further study, both in legal 
and economic terms.  
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Finally we note that sectoral reviews which focus on the way that problematic developments 
we have identified in specific technology areas affect product markets would be very useful. 
Such studies would provide us with important insights into the concrete effects of the patent 
system on product market competition. In particular it would be very important to uncover 
whether the decreases in opposition activity together with the large increases in firm s’ patent 
portfolios in the main are Electronics and particularly in the technology area 
Telecommunications  are having detrimental effects on product market competition.   
6.3.3 Patent System reform  
 
As noted in the introduction the Intervention Principle implie s that many of the problems 
identified in Section 6.2 are best dealt with through policy measures within the patent system 
administered by the European Patent Office.  Proposals as to how the European patent system 
ought to be reformed have been presented b y a number of policy advisory bodies, for example:  
· the Advisory Council at the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology 
(Bowie) has issue a report title “Patentschutz und Innovation.” 89 
· the European Parliament’s Scientific Technology Options  Assessment90 group issued the 
draft version of a report titled “ Policy options for the improvement  of the European patent 
system”. 
 
Both reports assess potential problems in the European patent system and come to conclusions 
that are similar to those described in this report. However, the current report presents 
considerably more detailed data and empirical evidence. Both reports propose a number of 
reform steps that would help to alleviate the current problems at the EPO. We summarize some of 
these proposals briefly in order to reflect correctly and completely the current discussion.  
Patent examination is cross -subsidized by fees from later stages, in particular renewal fees.  This 
creates an immediate incentive in favour of granting patents, since the EPO and th e EPC 
countries profit from patent grants. Renewal fees also have very productive effects (such as 
                                                   
89 The report is available at http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Navigation/Ministerium/beiraete,did=161984.html . 
90 See the report at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/stoa/events/workshop/20070614/background_doc_en.pdf  
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creating incentives to let a patent lapse). But the allocation of the fees to the patent office also 
creates dysfunctional incentives that need to be taken i nto account. 
While it is true that a reduction of fees would help SMEs in getting access to the patent system, 
such fee reductions are also likely to increase the demand for strategic patenting. Therefore, a 
general reduction of patenting costs should not be attempted. Rather, the problem of SME access 
should be solved more directly, either by subsidizing patenting by SMEs or by introducing 
spezial fees for SME applicants.  These exist in the US and apparently, there is little abuse of that 
system. 
The governance structure of the EPO supports the negativ e incentive effect. The highest decision -
making body, the Administrative Council, makes decisions regarding the examination practices 
of the office.  Votes in the Council are cast by representatives of the EPC countries and national 
offices which directly profit from renewal fess which are split equally between the EPO and the 
respective national offices. The delegates have little incentive to vote for more stringent patent 
examination practices.  
 Criteria for granting patents should be enforced strictly and if need be, should become more 
demanding. It is the EPO’s obligation to influence examination practice in such a way that higher 
hurdles w.r.t. inventive step and novelty are enforced.  Intervention by the leg islative is not 
necessary here. 
The incentives of examiners at the EPO need to be realigned. Currently, the refusal of an 
application causes considerably more effort, but does not get the examiner in charge the same 
recognition as a patent grant. As long a s such biases exist, the EP O implicitly supports a quantity-
oriented patent policy.  
The fee structure at the EPO should be modified such as to discour age strategic and wilfully 
deficient patent filings. An excessively high number of claims or of mul tiple, very similar filings 
should be subjected to substantial increases in fees.  
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Patent offices should have some leeway to correct obvious errors. Current ly, the EPO cannot on 
its own motion correct mistakes, but has to rely  on third parties to step forward and file an 
opposition. The President of the EPO should have the power to initiate an opposition. 91  
Control mechanisms such as opposition should be strengthened, e.g. by streamlining the process 
and allowing for less strategic manoeuvring and filing of extensions. We recommend that patents 
with high similarity should be subject to opposition under one proceeding, thus lowering the cost 
of attack for the opponents.  
When rival patent owners are assoc iated in a patent pool or in reciprocal licensing agreements, 
the incentives to oppose patent grants will be reduced.  In such cases, there may be no third party 
whose incentives are well-aligned with those of the public at large. The report recommends 
introducing the position of an Ombudsman at the EPO with the right to initiate opposition 




This final chapter of the study provides a discussion of policy conclusions derived from a 
thorough empirical assessment of strategic paten ting activity within the patent system 
administered by the EPO.  
 
These policy conclusions affect three main areas of policy making: Enterprise - and Competition 
Policy as well as Patent Policy. We seek to derive policy implications that respect the 
Intervention Principle, i.e. that are targeted as closely as possible at the source of inefficiency 
within the patent system.  
 
We summarize the main findings of our empirical analysis in Chapters 4 and 5. Drawing on this 
summary we conclude that specific technolog y areas within the patent system are affected by 
competition between large patenting firms to build large patent portfolios. In our view the 
resulting patent portfolio races lead to increases in transactions costs and socially wasteful 
                                                   
91  That occurred in the case of the so -called Edinburgh patent EP 0695351. Vgl. http://www.european -patent-
office.org/news/pressrel/pdf/backgr_3_d.pdf  (last visit on 12.1.2007).  
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investments in the management of patent portfolios. We briefly discuss additional evidence in 
support of this view. We also discuss evidence which shows that these activities do not lead to 
socially desirable increases in R&D investments. Consequently we come to the conclusio n that 
public policy should seek to reduce the incentives of large patent applicants to patent innovations 
of questionable novelty value.  
 
It is our view that incentives within the patent system are currently such that firms will continue 
to patent heavily. Therefore, we discuss a number of changes that would improve the functioning 
of the patent system administered by the European Patent Office. In recognition of the fact that 
the European Commission is not in a position to implement such policy interventi ons directly we 
also discuss a number of independent policy measures which would complement necessary 
changes within the patent system administered by the European Patent Office. These policy 
measures include support for small and medium sized enterprises in their efforts to patent and to 
counteract bad patenting and patent litigation by rival firms. We also discuss changes in the 
practice of Competition Policy towards patents that are warranted in the context of patenting of 
complex technologies. It is in these technologies that we see firms patenting heavily and therefore 
it is here that competition policy must adapt its treatment of patent rights.  
 
Perhaps the most salient conclusion from our work is the heterogeneity of firms patenting 
behavior within. We find evidence of an escalation of firms patenting activities only in a subset 
of the technologies covered by patent protection by the EPO. Within these technology areas we 
find evidence of two distinct patenting behaviors. The first being directed toward s cross-licensing 
of patent portfolios and the second focusing more on protection of own technologies and 
blocking of rivals. In consequence reviews of competition and enterprise policy need to recognize 
the difference between technology sectors. This is b est achieved in sectoral reviews that take into 
account the competitive interaction of firms both in technology - and product markets.  
 
This study has provided important evidence on firms’ patenting behavior based on patent data. 
We have made no attempt to connect patenting and product market competition. However our 
study provides a good indication which technology areas are important candidates for integrated 
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studies of this kind. These will be necessary to establish whether patent portfolio races also hav e 
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8.1 Data sources and routines used  
 
The PATSTAT and EPASYS databases  
 
Our analysis of about the 1,76  Mio. patent applications filed at the EPO between 1978 and 2005 
combines two different data bases: (i) P ATSTAT and (ii) EPASYS. While PATSTAT is a 
publicly available database (for non -commercial use) EPASY S, is an administrative database of 
the EPO and not available to the public . This database is used by patent examiners and contains 
much confidential, proc edural information. It also forms the basis of the publicly available 
EPOLINE and ESPACENET databases . We are grateful that the EPO provided some of the 
information contained in the EPASYS database like the number of claims contained  in a patent 
application and procedural data on the patent application . 
 
PATSTAT was developed by patent information experts at the EPO's Vienna sub -office, and 
includes patent data from 73 patent offices world -wide as well as post-grant data from about 40 
offices. Before the ex istence of PATSTAT different data sets from various and disparate sources 
had to be matched which required extensive "cleaning" of the data at considerable cost and time. 
The PATSTAT dataset addresses these issues, efficiently harmonising data, resolving i ssues over 
patent family members and addressing such problems as applications from one applicant 
appearing under several different names. The database also contains related information on 
citations, procedural information and legal status, which are all of  interest to statisticians. In 
particular, the structure of PATSTAT makes citation analyses more reliable since it allows for the 
identification of the original priority application of any cited patent.  
 
Updates to the PATSTAT database are released twice a  year (in March and September). For the 
following analyses we used the PATSTAT release of September 2006.  This contained a patch in 
which a problem relating to applicant names was resolved.  
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8.2 Additional graphs and tables  
  
8.2.1  Applications 
Figure 8.2.1.1 










Chemical - , Petrol - and Basic Materials Chemistry Surfaces, Coating
General technological Engneering Material Processing
Environment, Pollution Thermal Processes and Apparatus
Average  
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Figure 8.2.2.2 
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8.2.3 Claims per patent 
Figure 8.2.3.1 
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8.2.4 Share of opposed patents by main area  
Figure 8.2.4.1 
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8.2.5 Concentration of applications  
Figure 8.2.5.1 
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Figure 8.2.6.3 
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Figure 8.2.6.4 
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8.2.7 Share of X-References per Patent  
Figure 8.2.7.1 
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8.2.8 Share of X-References per Claim  
Figure 8.2.8.1 
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8.2.9 Divisionals  
 
Figure 8.2.9.1 
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8.2.10  Shared priorities 
 
Figure 8.2.10.1 
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